



THE SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE 













A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS AND NEW MEDIA  









I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me in 
its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information which have been 
used in the thesis. 









I had never thought that writing thesis would be such a tough battle. You always had 
to fight against your own procrastination caused by perfectionism, indolence, and 
uncertainty. It was really a matter of gritting your teeth and bashing through it. 
Although my battle lasted for a long time, finally, I survived.  
  First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude and immeasurable 
appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Zhang Weiyu for her help and support. In the past 
three years, she has led me into the academic world. Frankly speaking, my academic 
ability was not very strong three years ago. Without Dr. Zhang Weiyu’s guidance, 
knowledge, patience and strong sense of responsibility, I will not be able to complete 
my thesis and stand where I am here today. More importantly, Dr. Zhang Weiyu has 
taught me why and how to do research, how to think critically and rigorously, with 
both language and action. I believe these precious gains will be helpful for me 
regardless of my future career path.  
  I would then like to express my gratitude to all the staff of CNM. I am grateful for 
Ms. Retna Muthuveloo who was always ready to provide her assistance, time and 
words of encouragement during last years, especially when I needed to extend my 
candidature half a year ago. I would also like to thank Dr. Iccha Basnyat and Dr. 
Ganga Sasidharan Dhanesh, for their valuable advices and suggestions that benefited 
me much during my fieldwork.   
  My sincere gratitude is also extended to all my fellow friends at CNM and NUS, 
for all the fun we had in the last three years. Master student life, sometimes, was dull 
ii	  
and boring. It was often the encouragements and inspirations from them that helped 
me pass these difficult times. 
  Besides, I devote my special thanks to my husband and my parents. They have 
always been there for me, making me know I always have my family to count on 
when times are tough.   
  Thanks for all the persons mentioned above. You all let me know that I am not 















Summary	  ...............................................................................................................................	  v	  
Chapter 1 Introduction	  .......................................................................................................	  1	  
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework	  ..................................................................................	  6	  
2.1 The Political Economy of Communication	  .......................................................................	  6	  
2.2 Media Marketization in China	  ............................................................................................	  9	  
2.3 Commercial Media and Market	  .......................................................................................	  13	  
2.3.1 The influence of advertisers	  .....................................................................................................	  13	  
2.3.2 The impact of media market competition	  ............................................................................	  16	  
2.3.3 The interaction between domestic and transnational investment	  .................................	  18	  
2.3.4 Summary of market-media relationship	  ...............................................................................	  21	  
2.4 Commercial Media and State	  ...........................................................................................	  23	  
2.4.1 State control on media	  ................................................................................................................	  24	  
2.4.2 The interdependency of state and media	  ..............................................................................	  28	  
2.4.3 Competition between official media and commercial media	  ........................................	  30	  
2.4.4 Summary of state-media relationship	  ....................................................................................	  33	  
2.5 Summary	  ...............................................................................................................................	  34	  
2.5.1 An integrated model: the hybrid of authoritarianism and capitalism	  .........................	  34	  
2.5.2 New possibilities brought by new media	  .............................................................................	  36	  
Chapter 3 Background Review and Research Questions	  ........................................	  39	  
3.1 Historical Review of China’s New Media Industry	  .....................................................	  39	  
3.1.1 State promotion and competition	  ............................................................................................	  39	  
3.1.2 The power of capital in new media market	  .........................................................................	  50	  
3.1.3 Trajectory of explorations of business model	  .....................................................................	  54	  
3.1.4 State regulation and control	  ......................................................................................................	  60	  
3.2 Sina Weibo	  ............................................................................................................................	  69	  
3.3 Research Problems and Questions	  ..................................................................................	  76	  
Chapter 4 Research Methods	  .........................................................................................	  81	  
4.1 Why Ethnography?	  .............................................................................................................	  81	  
4.2 In-depth interviews	  .............................................................................................................	  82	  
4.3 Participant observations	  ....................................................................................................	  85	  
4.4 Archival Documents	  ...........................................................................................................	  88	  
4.5 Ethical Procedures	  ..............................................................................................................	  91	  
4.6 Reflexivity vis a vis this study	  ...........................................................................................	  92	  
Chapter 5 Balancing State and Public	  .........................................................................	  94	  
5.1 Why Weibo Becomes the Most Popular Public Sphere in China	  .............................	  94	  
5.1.1 Weibo’s news media gene and public sphere function	  ....................................................	  94	  
5.1.2 Challenges to state’s information order and authoritarian rule	  .....................................	  97	  
5.2 Weibo Censorship and Conflict of Interest	  ...................................................................	  99	  
5.2.1 State delegating the censorship power to social media companies	  ..........................	  100	  
iv	  
5.2.2 Exercising self-censorship: survival strategy but burdens	  ..........................................	  103	  
5.2.3 State or public: the paradoxical role of Sina Weibo in 2013 Southern Weekly 
incident	  ....................................................................................................................................................	  109	  
5.3 Government Weibo: A Real Cooperation between State and Social Media 
Companies	  .................................................................................................................................	  120	  
5.3.1 Sina’s promotion in the development of government Weibo	  .....................................	  121	  
5.3.2 “Occupy Weibo”	  .......................................................................................................................	  123	  
5.3.3 Benefits for social media companies	  ..................................................................................	  126	  
5.4 Summary	  .............................................................................................................................	  131	  
Chapter 6 Increasing Profits or Preserving User Experience？ 	  ..........................	  134	  
6.1 Motivations for Weibo’s Monetization	  .........................................................................	  134	  
6.2 All-rounded Monetization of Weibo	  .............................................................................	  136	  
6.3 Profit-making or Public Interests: Sina Weibo in Strategic Alliance with Alibaba
	  ......................................................................................................................................................	  139	  
6.3.1 Why Alibaba?	  .............................................................................................................................	  140	  
6.3.2 Integration of the two platforms	  ...........................................................................................	  142	  
6.3.3 Interests brought by the alliance	  ..........................................................................................	  143	  
6.3.4 A chess piece of Alibaba?	  ......................................................................................................	  144	  
6.4 Conflicts and Problems in Weibo’s Monetization	  ......................................................	  148	  
6.4.1 Excessive advertising and conflicts with users	  ...............................................................	  148	  
6.4.2 Chaotic product development and internal power strife	  ..............................................	  151	  
6.4.3 The challenge for Weibo’s independence as a public media platform	  ....................	  156	  
6.5 Summary	  .............................................................................................................................	  159	  
Chapter 7 Discussions and Conclusions	  .....................................................................	  161	  
7.1 Revisiting the State-media-public Dilemma	  ................................................................	  162	  
7.2 Revisiting the Market-media-public Dilemma	  ...........................................................	  165	  
7.3 A More Complicated and Dynamic Media System	  ....................................................	  168	  
7.4 Avenues for Future Research	  .........................................................................................	  170	  
7.5 Limitations of the Study	  ..................................................................................................	  173	  










With the development of Internet technology and new media sector’s growing 
contribution to national economy, China’s new media sector plays an increasingly 
significant role in China’s media system. Being caught in the middle of state, market 
and public, Chinese new media business always needs to handle and balance the 
conflicting demands from its three “masters” – state, market and public. Thus, 
dilemmas arise. This thesis attempts to gain insights into the dynamics and 
mechanisms of China’s new media businesses, examine how they deal with the 
dilemmas and problems in interaction with state, market and public, and figure out 
how the new media business shifts the power game of China’s media system. This 
study employs a political economy approach to communication to particularly focus 
on the production side of new media and its links to the wider political economy. 
Ethnographic fieldwork, which combines in-depth interviews, participant 
observations and analysis of textual materials, is conducted in this study. This study 
has found that Chinese new media business has to invent new forms of operation as 
part of a self-preservation strategy in order to maintain its complicated relationship 
with state, market and public. This study argues that a more complicated and dynamic 
media system is forming with the growth of new media business, the multiple roles of 
the state, and the expansion of capital market.  
 
1	  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
On September 22, 2015, a group of executives from some of the most visible global 
names in new media industry gathered at the 2015 US-China Tech Summit in Seattle 
to meet with government officials from the US and China to discuss common issues 
for the future of the two countries’ new media industry (Ibtimes.com, 2015). 
Particularly, the presence of China’s president Xi Jinping in this summit, who was 
just on his first state visit to the US, made this summit quickly become the headline 
news around the world. After this summit, a group picture of President Xi with these 
attending CEOs, including Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, Apple’s Tim Cook, 
Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, Alibaba’s Jack Ma, Baidu’s Li Yanhong, Tencent’s Pony Ma, 
Sina’s Charles Chao, and other eighteen business leaders from the new media industry, 
had been quickly spread on social networking sites. People jokingly call it “the 
world’s most expensive group picture”, because the business leaders in this picture 
represent about USD3 trillion in market value. This picture and the future cooperation 
between China and the US in new media business implied by the picture let 
increasing people begin to notice that China’s new media business is rapidly rising 
and exerts growing influence on the structure of global Internet market.   
  Like other industries, new media industry is a non-ignorable element to China’s 
economic progress. In fact, the proportion of new media industry in the national 
economy is quickly increasing in recent years. According to the latest report of China 
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) released in October 29, 2015, Internet 
economy contributed to China’s nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) with 7% in 
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2014, a percentage point even higher than that of the US. The total market value of 
the entire listed Internet companies reached USD1.24 trillion, accounting for 25.6% 
of the total value of China’s stock market (CNNIC, 2015). 
  Unlike other industries, new media industry deals in information, ideas, and culture. 
Therefore, it shoulders some of the social and political responsibilities as traditional 
mass media, which can lead the trends, set public agenda, influence how people 
understand the world, and affect the democratization of the society. Today, Chinese 
people like to talk about current affairs and political events in online world. Political 
scandals, anti-party speech, democratic free speech, social protests, and other 
contested and critical opinions travel ever faster in the world of bits and bytes. 
Researchers of new media in China cheered new media as a public sphere for Chinese 
netizens to engaged in public debates (see Canaves, 2011; Lardinois, 2010; Sullivan, 
2012), a hotbed of collective action for Chinese civil society in both online and offline 
world (see Zheng, 2007; Zhu, 2014), and a growing democratic force which poses 
great challenges to the party-state’s information order and the authoritarian rules (see 
Yang, 2011; Tong, 2015). 
  Being as both commercial company and public media platform in China’s current 
political, economic and social environment means that new media business needs to 
develop itself and respond to the voices from its three “masters” at the same time, 
including the demands of the state in information control, the expectations of the 
capital market in profit making, and the concerns of the public in free speech (see 
Zhao, Y., 2008; Sullivan, 2014; Lagerkvist, 2011; Su, 2015). Most of the time, the 
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interests of these three “masters” are divergent, which means that the new media 
business always needs to handle and balance the conflicting demands from different 
forces. The complicated political and economic situation poses great dilemmas for the 
survival and development of Chinese new media business, and also makes the new 
media business certainly worthy of examination. 
  This paper attempts to gain insights into Sina Weibo, one of Chinese leading social 
networking businesses. The values, strategies, and perspectives that Sina Weibo 
company adopts to construct its own business practices to handle and balance the 
dilemmas, conflicts and problems in its relations with state, capital market and public 
will be examined. Although Sina Weibo obviously cannot represent all the new media 
businesses in China, some generalizable insights may nevertheless be drawn to help 
understand the dynamics and mechanisms of China’s new media business. Besides, 
this paper also attempts to draw a new picture of China’s current media system with 
taking the role of new media business and its political and economic implications into 
account.  
  A political economy approach to communication is employed in this research. This 
approach first focuses on the production side of media system - how media system 
and media content are shaped by professional practices, organization culture, 
ownership, market structures, commercial support, etc. Then, the political economy of 
communication links the media to wider political economy - how both economic and 
political systems work, and how social power is exercised in shaping media 
(McChesney, 2008). Specifically, in China, what role do media play in the 
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functioning of “socialist economy with Chinese characteristics”, and how do media, 
economic power and political power mutually influence the practices of each other? 
  Following the work of Vincent Mosco (2009) in the field of political economy of 
communication and based on the analytic model of authoritarianism-capitalism 
generally used in many political economy studies of contemporary China (e.g., 
Winfield & Peng, 2005; Zhao, Y., 1998, 2008), an analysis of China’s traditional 
mass media sector and its relationships with the state and market is presented to serve 
as the theoretical framework to help understand why the research problems regarding 
Chinese new media business are worth being studied. Besides, a historical review of 
China’s Internet industry is conducted to provide necessary background information 
and also to indicate some of the major changes that have occurred in the new media 
era. 
  Drawing evidence from my ethnographic fieldwork, which combines in-depth 
interviews, participant observations and analysis of textual materials, the attitudes, 
strategies and practices of new media companies in interaction with the state and the 
public are first described in details to make clear how China’s new media business 
exercises self-censorship and the duty of control of media content delegated from 
state whereas not offend the public interests. Then, an exploration of the interests and 
problems occurring in new media business’ pursuit of monetization is presented to 
make clear how the conflicts between capital market and public affect the 
development of new media business. Finally, I conclude with a discussion on how 
Chinese new media business forms a complicated relationship with state, market and 
5	  
public, how capital influences the structure of Chinese new media market, and how 



















Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework  
2.1 The Political Economy of Communication 
“Communication is a social process of exchange,” as Vincent Mosco (2009, p. 67) 
said, “whose product is the mark or embodiment of a social relationship.” This 
definition of communication, emphasizing social construction of meaning, is a further 
effort following the “decentering the media” among political economists. Decentering 
the media means viewing communication system as integral to the constituents of 
political, economic, social and cultural dimensions (Mosco, 2009). The tendency of 
decentering the media has made its way into communication research by 
concentrating on how government, business, and other structural forces have 
influenced communication practices. Moreover, this tendency also has helped place 
these abovementioned structures and practices within a wider political economy 
background.  
  Rather than studying the Chinese Internet industry in isolation, this work follows 
the approach of political economy of communication, also known as the political 
economy of media, which is “concentrating primarily on the production side of the 
communication process by examining the growth of the communication industry and 
its links to the wider political economy” (Mosco, 2009, p. 70). Different from other 
media scholars, the political economists of communication look at the media and 
communication in an approach that mainly entails three key focuses.  
  First, the political economy approach to communication focuses on the production 
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side of communication process. This focus is paramount because it is aware of issues 
of where and how media messages originated. Theories and many empirical studies 
about mass communication always begin with the message itself, and the originating 
media organization has been taken for granted. The media production research has 
moved beyond descriptions of media occupations (Rosten, 1937, 1941) to study how 
individual practices and media professional cultures could affect what is produced 
(e.g., Hodges, 1986; Ettema et al., 1997; Hollifield el at., 2001). But as McQuail 
(2010) noted, attention should also be paid to how relations and strategies internal to 
the media organization exert influence upon media-making. This point is particularly 
relevant to contemporary Chinese media industry. As mass media, including new 
media, have transformed into multidivisional organizations, conflicts, tensions and 
problems across departments and administrative ranks are increasingly notable.  
  Second, such an approach addresses external relationships at the societal levels, 
which helps understand the role of mass communicators. As Gerbner (1969, p. 205) 
stated, “power roles” or “types of leverage” often combine and overlap, which 
accumulate to “give certain institutions dominant positions in the mass 
communication of their societies”. He identified various external “power roles”, 
including advertisers, competitors, authorities, experts, other institutions and 
audiences, all of which could affect mass communicators. The relationships among 
them are sometimes active negotiations and exchanges, and sometimes tensions and 
conflicts (McQuail, 2010). Again, this focus is significant to study contemporary 
China, where accelerating market reforms have profoundly changed various social 
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relations, as well as the role of media industry. Research of scholars in Chinese media 
showed that China’s media industry is always operates with uncertainty and 
ambiguity in allying itself with government officials or ordinary publics, and making 
a choice between profit-making and preserving public interests (see Zhao, 1998). 
These conflicts and tensions are appeared after China’s social transformation since 
post-Mao era, and became more evident in the digital age (see Sullivan, 2014; 
Lagerkvist, 2011).  
  Third, this approach examines how communication industry connects with the 
broader political economy (e.g., capitalism, globalization and international trade) and 
ongoing currents of global cultural flows. In the case of China, the interactions 
between Chinese and global forces is worth thinking. How does transnational capital 
get access to Chinese media market? How does domestic media industry respond to 
the international media competition? How do transnational capital and domestic 
social forces intersect to reshape Chinese media? The answers to these questions are 
critical to understand the role of media industry in contemporary China.   
  As Mosco (2009) documented, political economist of communication focuses on 
how media, information and even audiences as resources are packaged into 
marketable commodities under the influence of market and state forces. Scholars of 
media in China have taken a great many of efforts on understanding China’s media 
system from the perspective of political economy (e.g., Stockmann, 2012; Zhao, 1998; 
Zhao, Y., 2008; Li, 2000; Winfield & Peng, 2005; Shirk, 2011). Although most of 
their existing works focus on the traditional mass media, the research findings they 
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provide serve as important contribution to study China’s new media system. After the 
review of existing literature, an integrative framework is expected to be established to 
study China’s media system situated within the field of Chinese structural forces, 
particularly forces from state and market, all related to each other. This framework 
will be used as fundamental theoretical framework in this paper, which remains to be 
updated and revised when study new media in China.  
 
2.2 Media Marketization in China 
China’s media reform started from the expansion and adjustment of the role of the 
state in media system since the late 1970s. Moving from the complete state regulation, 
China’s government decided to (partially) deregulate the media outlets. In China, the 
deregulation of media is accomplished through four developments of 
commercialization, privatization, liberalization, and internationalization. These four 
actions are often called by political economists the most significant examples of “the 
state’s constitutive role” (Mosco, 2009) in liberal democracies. They are together 
understood as media marketization in this thesis.  
  Commercialization takes place when the state replaces state regulation with market 
standards, and emphasizes market ability and profitability (Mosco, 2009). In most 
capitalist countries, free-market media often seek to maximize the needs of 
advertisers by matching the media content patterns to the consumption patterns of 
targeted audiences of the advertisers (McQuail, 2010). The media in China, before the 
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economic reform, were completely subsidized by state. However, as the economic 
reforms were implemented, the state could no longer bear the entire financial burden. 
At the same time, the clamor for enlarging the autonomy of the media grew aloud. 
Therefore, central government adopted a policy towards both newspapers and 
television stations to gradually cut subsidies and encourage commercialized financing 
(Zhao, 1998). This tough policy had the inadvertent effect of sending media into the 
marketplace, in search of their own commercial niches. As a result, advertising has 
become the most important source of media revenue in China, even for those central 
official media outlets. For example, in 2001, the government subsidies CCTV 
received were USD 1 million, and its advertising revenue was USD 626 million (The 
Year book of CCTV, 2002). Commercialization has made media become more 
dependent on and responsive to audience demands because advertisers care most 
about the audience’s size and characteristics.  
  Liberalization is a process of increasing the number of participants in the media 
market. Unlike commercialization, which makes media practice market standards 
with or without competition, liberalization aims specifically at increasing the number 
of competitors in the media market (Mosco, 2009). In most western countries, 
governments have introduced private competitors as providers of broadcasting. In 
China, the media market hasn’t achieved complete liberalization because the private 
forces are still restricted from entering the print and broadcasting media markets. 
However, compared to 1978, the number of both official and commercial media had 
dramatically increased due to liberalization. At the end of 2010, there were 1,939 
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newspapers published (Sina.com, 2011a) and 247 television stations in China 
(China.com, 2011), amounting to over nine-times increase from 1978 (Miao, 2011; 
Paper.com, 2014). Liberalization, as argued by its supporters, has led to a more 
competitive media market which contributes to the more diverse media content, lower 
prices and more expanded service (International Chamber of Commerce, 2007).  
  Privatization is a process of transferring property from state or public ownership to 
private ownership. It takes many forms, partial or complete, as Mosco (2009, p. 177) 
noted, “depending on the percentage of shares to be sold off, the extent to which any 
foreign ownership is permitted, the length of a phase-in period, and the specific form 
of continuing state involvement”. Private enterprise sector is the dominant sector in 
current Western media systems, which is often regarded as the guarantors of free 
speech and political independence from the state. In China, however, the issue of 
private-owned media is still being suppressed. The current licensing system explicitly 
forbids individual citizens or corporations as fully independent businesses to set up 
print and broadcasting media outlets. Domestic private capital is allowed for up to 49 
percent of the ownership and China’s media organizations are often regarded as 
partially privatized (Stockmann, 2012). In contrast, the ICT industry enjoys the state’s 
friendly policies toward private capital. Domestic major portals, such as Sina.com and 
163.com, are publicly traded with private shareholders (Sina.com, 2009). Additionally, 
compared with strict limitation on the investment of foreign capital in print and 
broadcasting media, China’s policies are relatively loose toward new media outlets. 
Many Chinese websites are funded by foreign venture capital. Even People.com.cn, 
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the official website of the CCP’s core mouthpiece People’s Daily, was established 
with the financial help of international media mogul, Rupert Murdoch (Nybooks.com, 
2011).  
  Internationalization refers to the process “by which the ownership, structure, 
production, distribution, or content of a country’s media is influenced by foreign 
media interests” (Chan, 1994, p. 71). It includes both the imports of foreign media 
cultural products and the exports of domestic media cultural products. In the West, 
most large media enterprises have established their media empire, and always been 
eager to access China’s media market. China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001 has been generally regarded as a landmark for “China’s 
global reintegration within and around the media system” (Zhao, Y., 2008, p. 138). As 
a response to the competition from international media conglomerates, China 
accelerated the speed of establishing province-based media groups in both print and 
broadcasting media, such as Hubei Daily Media Group, Shanghai Media Group 
(SMG), Golden Eagle Broadcasting System (GBS). This development of media 
restructuration has been seen as an important step to strengthen China’s media, which 
has greatly facilitated the changes in modes of operation and the creation of engaging 
media products (Qian & Bandurski, 2011). Besides, in recent years, Chinese 
government has largely increased their investment to enhance the global presence of 
core party media. For example, Xinhua, China’s official news agency, rented a giant 
LCD screen at the Time Square to flash its advertisement (Xinhuanet.com, 2011).  
  China’s media marketization is an integrative process of media commercialization, 
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liberalization, privatization and internationalization. Among these four developments, 
commercialization is often regarded as the driving force behind media marketization, 
which makes media responsive to advertisers and hence, audiences. Commercial 
media become the fourth largest revenue generator to the national economy 
(ChuanmeiNet.com, 2003), and their impacts on the readjustment of media-market 
and media-state have been enormous. Scholars both from China and abroad have been 
attracted to the study of these relations. In the following sections, I try to provide a 
comprehensive picture of existing scholarly debates on each pair of the relations.  
 
2.3 Commercial Media and Market  
In most western countries, media-market relation often refers to media’s relationship 
with owners and clients, advertisers, consumers, investors and competitors, both 
domestic and transnational (McQuail, 2010). In China, however, most of Chinese 
traditional media outlets are owned by the state. Therefore, during this part of 
discussion, I mainly give emphasis on the influence of advertisers, market 
competition, and domestic and foreign investors. 
 
2.3.1 The influence of advertisers 
  As mentioned previously, media commercialization has pushed media to seek for 
their own commercial niches in market. One of the consequences is that media has 
established close ties with advertisers. By the end of 1980s, commercial advertising 
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profits had become the main source of income for both print and broadcasting media 
in China (Miao, 2011). In 1992, the Party decided to speed up media reform once 
again after the three-year tight control over media system caused by the 
pro-democracy movement in 1989. Chinese media outlets were hungry for both 
domestic and foreign advertising. Since then, the advertising market expanded 
dramatically. In order to meet advertisers’ demands for more space, newspapers 
expanded their pages, and television stations added the length for advertising packed 
between programs. In 1992 alone, more than 200 newspapers added pages. A 
four-hour session of prime-time television viewing contains one hour of advertising. 
Even Party organs, such as CCTV and People’s Daily, have become enthusiastic 
toward advertising. As described by Zhao, Y. (1998; 2008), advertisers provide media 
with their lifeblood.  
  The consequences of financing through advertising for media in China are 
perennially discussed. In the first half of 1990s, scholars tended to speak highly of the 
progressive aspect of advertising (e.g., Sun, 1995; Pollay et al., 1990; Hao & Huang, 
1996). First, they argued that the growth in advertising has fueled a boom in the 
development of all media sectors. For example, the number of television stations 
increased from 543 in 1991 to 837 in 1995 (China Statistical Yearbook, 1993). The 
rapid development has helped to create a thriving media market. Second, they 
accentuated that, since advertisers care about the sizes and characteristics of 
audiences, media had begun to place audiences in the center of their attention, and 
become more responsive and sensitive for audience demands, which directly 
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contribute to the diversity of media content (e.g., Swanson, 1996; Cheng, 1994).  
  With the expanding and deepening media commercialization, critical scholars 
noticed that the increase in advertising revenue has significantly altered the nature of 
news media operations. For example, many newspapers have begun to define 
themselves as “money-making business”, not to play politics. In order to attract more 
audiences, Chinese media, which used to be the instrument for political and cultural 
imperatives, have begun to turn to mass entertainment. This change has been praised 
as the decline of political nature of China’s media (Zhao, 1998).  
  At the same time, many scholars began to reflect on the negative effects of 
advertising for media content. Criticisms arise mainly in three aspects. First, many 
media failed to make a balance between commercial-oriented content (e.g., 
entertainment, consumption, etc.) and public welfare related content (e.g., education, 
environment protection, etc.) by giving too much space to entertainment. The blind 
pursuit of entertainment and commercial interests, as criticized by scholars, may lead 
to the vulgarization of media content and the anomie of media morality (see Zhang, 
2006; Wang, 2011). Second, advertising enters as the rivals for space against news 
content. Some even mingle with news content, which makes it difficult for audiences 
to distinguish advertisements from news. This has led to the decline of media 
credibility (see Sun, 2000; Wang, 2011; Lian et al., 2010). “Too much advertising” 
has become the most common complaint of television audiences, which has severely 
affected their viewing experience. Some of the newspapers even sell their entire front 
page to an advertiser for a day. Third, increasingly, scholars pointed out the issue of 
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advertising censorship. Zhao, Y. (2008, p. 85) argued: “advertisement is itself a form 
of propaganda for the market system, and it rivals… political propaganda as the 
dominant form of mobilization speech and subjectivity making.” Some scholars 
claimed that what Baker (1994, p. 99) observed in the United States, “advertisers, not 
governments are the primary censors of media content”, also exists in today’s China 
(see Zhao, L., 2008).  
  The alliance of media and advertiser is a necessary outcome in media’s pursuit of 
maximizing profits in fierce market competition. However, it is generally ethically 
disapproved when media stand too close to advertisers. Both can lose credibility and 
effectiveness “if a form of conspiracy against the media public is suspected” 
(McQuail, 2010, p. 293). In order to resist pressure from advertisers, scholars reach an 
agreement that media should depend on multiple channels of financing, thus different 
sources of revenue can balance each other (e.g., Yu, 2004a; Yuan, 2002). 
 
2.3.2 The impact of media market competition 
  Media marketization has also fostered domestic competition in media market. 
Before that, China’ s media received complete subsidies from the state. Party organs, 
such as People’s Daily, didn’t need to worry about circulation, since they are 
supported by compulsory subscriptions from public offices. With the introduction of 
market mechanism, as discussed before, media were pushed into market to compete 
with one another for audiences and advertisers. By the late 1990s, there had been an 
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intensive competition between proliferating television channels and all kinds of 
newspapers and magazines. Since early 2000s, Party organs and government offices 
started to launch their own commercial spin-offs, which had created a new round of 
competition in an already highly competitive local press market (Zhao, Y., 2008). In 
broadcasting outlets, fierce competition for viewership has put great pressure on 
broadcasters. Local television stations and even CCTV have all phased out programs 
with low ratings. In addition to competitors from domestic market, competition also 
comes from international media groups that are accessible to Chinese audience, 
through officially permitted or Internet channels.   
  As some scholars pointed out (e.g., Shirk, 2011; Lu, 2011), the fierce media 
competition has motivated the productivity and creativity of media outlets to provide 
diverse media content and change broadcasting or writing style in order to meet the 
tastes of audiences, which has broken the long-time monotonous content of party 
organs. Since the 1990s, Chinese television has begun to introduce new programs 
from overseas, including Taiwan, Japan, Europe, and America (Miao, 2011). More 
entertainment features are included to attract the public. A good example is the 
success of Hunan Satellite Television, which is described in detail by Zhao, Y. (2008, 
p. 87-88). Even news media were affected and started to change, as Zhan (2011, p. 
116) wrote, during the process of adjusting to a new competitive environment, 
“commentary-oriented journalism has gradually shifted to information-oriented 
journalism; traditional propaganda writing styles are declining; international-style 
investigative reporting and features are booming; …opinion writing with pluralistic 
18	  
values and perspectives is flourishing. ”  
  Different voices regarding media competition also exist. One criticism emphasizes 
that media competition and commercialization has led to bottom-line thinking and 
sensationalism. Commercial media need stories that sell. Under CCP’s news control, 
this imperative has effectively encouraged “sensational yet politically innocuous 
content” (Qian & Bandurski, 2011, p.44). Sensationalism has been generally 
disapproved by Chinese scholars. It is regarded as the result of media’s blind pursuit 
of profits, and exhibits media’s lack of sense of social responsibility (see Rui, 2007; 
Shi, 1994; Luo & Zhan, 2005). An ot 
her criticism lies on the homogenization impact of market competition on media 
content (Zhao, 1998). For example, the success of The Citadel of Happiness, a 
television show of Hunan Satellite TV, has triggered extensive imitators among 
television channels all over the country. Competition has well created “rivalry in 
conformity” (McCombs, 1988, p. 133). Zhao (1998) continued to argue that attention 
should be paid to the type and the level of competition in media market. As she noted, 
“without press freedom, competition often means merely rivalry in the format and 
presentation style of safe subjects” (1998, p. 185). Competition will become more 
meaningful with different opinions and diversified media sectors.  
 
2.3.3 The interaction between domestic and transnational investment 
  Domestic and foreign investors also play a significant role in influencing Chinese 
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media operation. The history of foreign investments on China’s media industry can go 
back to 1980. In that year, International Data Group (IDG), a transnational initiator of 
joint venture, and China’s Ministry of Information Industry set up a Chinese version 
of weekly publication Computerworld (Jiang, 2003). Since then, the party-state has 
accommodated and selectively incorporated foreign capital in different media sectors. 
Transnational investments are most common and popular in Chinese consumption, 
lifestyle, and business magazines. These publications are in areas that are deemed 
politically safe. More sensitive areas such as news and current affairs, and core media 
services such as broadcasting are still under tight control of the party-state. Most of 
these joint venture media grow rapidly and achieve market success. Especially, they 
have influenced the media advertising market, bringing threat of competition that 
mobilizes more Chinese media and even party organs to move toward self-sufficiency 
(Shen, Li, & Yao, 2009). Besides, the success of foreign capital in China’s media 
market also tantalizes the appetite of domestic investors.  
  Compared to foreign media investors, domestic private capital doesn’t have any 
privileges on media investment. Instead, it has been allowed less space to operate than 
foreign capital in many areas of media industry. Since 2001, the state has begun to 
explicitly encourage domestic private capital in some selected areas of media and 
communication industry, such as theater, museums, Internet cafes, online games, etc 
(Wang, 2004). Although the party-state still artificially sets high barriers for private 
investment to enter into print media, there already have been many cases of non-state 
and private investors owning print media. For example, Beida Qingniao has invested 
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50 million yuan to establish Jinghua Times, which is a spin-off of People’s Daily, and 
the business newspaper Econmic Observer received investment from Shandong 
Sanlian Group (Wang, 2004).  
  Although the government restricts the involvement of foreign and domestic private 
investors on publications’ editorial team, the influence of investors on media 
operation still exists. Typically these investors, especially the foreign collaborators in 
joint venture, control and manage the advertising business. As mentioned in former 
discussions, advertising usually has a critical impact on shaping the overall editorial 
orientation. Some scholars argued, the “marriage” of private capital and media could 
hinder social change and vulgarize the public taste because of private capital’s nature 
of pursuit of profit (e.g., Yu, 2004b; Fan, 2005). It was suggested that media are 
becoming the mouthpiece of foreign and domestic capital (e.g., Peng, 2013; Zhao, 
1998). One example from Russia cited by Zhao, Y. (1998, p. 186) is that, after the 
press freedom in the late 1980s, the print media in Russia have faced severe economic 
pressures and fallen under the control of domestic and international capital.      
  Nevertheless, no one can deny the progressive aspect brought by foreign and 
domestic private investment in China’s media industry. Not only do these foreign 
investments largely improve media’s financial vigor, but, as Yu (2004b) argued, they 
have brought in management expertise, and usually strength in negotiating with 
Chinese government. Notwithstanding the weakness and disorganization compared to 
transnational capital, domestic private capital investments have ensured the 
emergence of a strong and vocal business and financial press, thus providing a 
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platform on which the rising capitalist strata could express themselves to improve 
their political influence and discursive power (Zhao, Y., 2008).  
  One thing needs to be highlighted is that foreign and private investments on media 
industry are highly depended on state policies. As Yu (2004c) pointed out, any 
loosening and restraining on media investment policies will bring great impact on the 
rebuilding of competition structure and interest pattern, which may easily result in the 
short-term behaviors of investors. For example, in the first few years of WTO 
accession, China expanded the scope of foreign penetration in media industry (He, 
2008). But since year 2005, policy began to restrict foreign capital investment on 
media and cultural industry, especially on news media organizations (Yu, 2011). For 
instance, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) 
disapproved Murdoch’s unauthorized investment on Qinghai satellite television 
(Kahn, 2007). In short, as Zhao, Y. (2008, p.  80) argued, although these foreign and 
domestic media investors play important roles in “propelling and deepening the 
processes of commercialization and market-oriented restructuring”, their operation 
has been limited to “the peripheries of the media system”.  
 
2.3.4 Summary of market-media relationship 
  State deregulation on media industry has pushed media into the field of market to 
establish interactions with advertisers, sponsors, competitors, audiences, investors and 
all kinds of market forces. With investment, sponsorship, and revenues from 
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advertisements and circulation, media have achieved more financial independence 
from the state. However, as Zhao (1998) proposed, it’s important not to equate fully 
independent media with financially independent media or profit-seeking media. With 
the growing market forces and deregulation, market influence has expanded. Media 
become increasingly reliant on market forces to make decisions. They even have 
turned themselves into the mouthpieces and instruments of strong market forces, and 
have been censored by market. Just as Keane (1991, p. 91) stated, “those who control 
the market sphere of producing determine…which opinions officially gain entry into 
the marketplace of opinions”. Scholars from both China and abroad have reached a 
consensus that commercialization alone will not lead to a democratized system of 
media communication. How should media deal with the relationship with market? 
This question is of great significance in the era of global expansion of capital. Yu 
(2002, p. 38) once pointed out, in the context of accession to WTO, Chinese media 
industry should employ strategy of “wisdom + anxiety”, and learn to use the 
perspective of the market and the perspective of capital to reintegrate media resources. 
Rui (2007) echoed Yu’s view to some degree by saying, “we should both utilize 
market and remain vigilant to market; both develop capital and restrain capital”.  
  The media marketization has not only changed the relation between media and 
market, but also affected the relation between media and state. In the next part, I will 
focus on the examination of media-state relation.  
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2.4 Commercial Media and State  
As mentioned in the foregoing parts, the majority of research has focused on 
relationships between media marketization and state control in China (e.g., 
Stockmann, 2012; Winfield & Peng, 2005; Li, 2000). Indeed, it should be 
acknowledged that the role of the state as a censor and controller over media is 
especially noticeable and significant in an authoritarian regime. However, as Mosco 
(2009) pointed out, political economy studies should respond to the expansion of 
government control over media and communication industry. Since the media reform 
and open-door policy in 1978, the role of Chinese state in relation to media has been 
evolving. Although some scholars argued that commercial media must first 
universally follow the government’s propaganda guidelines (Miao, 2011), and media 
as Party mouthpiece will never change (e.g., Guo, 1997; He, 2008), there are plenty of 
evidences indicating that the state is moving beyond the single role of controller or 
supervisor to a multi-dimensional role including regulator, supporter, protector, 
cooperator and even competitor and consumer in relation to commercial media. 
Meanwhile, with further marketization and media’s increasing responsiveness to 
audiences, financially independent media with more autonomy are not satisfied with 
the atmosphere of submissiveness to the state control. Some of them have more 
incentives to challenge the limits on permissible content (Zhan, 2011; Zhao, 1998) or 
explicitly express their dissents toward state control. In the following discussion, I 
mainly review three aspects of the media-state relation, namely, state as controller, 
supporter and state competitor. 
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2.4.1 State control on media 
  Media control is an unavoidable and primary aspect whenever discussing the role 
of the state in an authoritarian regime. Before the economic reform, media in China 
were controlled through ideological means (see He, 2008). Regarded as a copy of the 
Leninist media model, the Chinese government administered all media’s finances, 
human resources, sales and distribution. Media, as propaganda instruments, were 
mainly used to reinforce the Communist ideology. Since the 1980s, China’s social 
and political situation has changed dramatically. With the media reform, some 
scholars argued that the effectiveness of government control has been challenged by 
marketized media (e.g., Qian & Bandurski, 2011; Zhan, 2011; Zhao, 1998). Chinese 
media are developing various strategies to advance their agendas, evade and even 
resist propaganda orders, which have posed great challenge to the party-state’s 
political and ideological media controls. The impacts of such resistance are significant. 
According to Zhao, Y. (2008), it not only helps marketized media to gain audiences, 
but more importantly, it shows the power of media in influencing government’s 
decision making and facilitating the democratization of China. However, it would be 
wrong to conclude that the state has lost its ability to exercise control over media 
(Stockmann, 2012). The state selectively tolerates responsiveness to market demands, 
while it also begins to employ more sophisticated, insidious, and ingenious techniques 
of media control to adapt to these new challenges (He, 2008).  
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  Winfield and Peng (2005) examined these new adaptions of media control in 
contrast with the past. They mainly categorized government controls into five ways: 
political and ideological controls, economic control, institutional control, legal control, 
and administrative control. Politically and ideologically, with the deregulation on 
media and the prevalence of Internet, nowadays the state tends to enforce censorship 
through media’s self-censorship and access blocking of websites. Economically, on 
one hand, the state limits each province and municipality to one Party newspaper as a 
monopoly, and encourages media organizations to become conglomerates in order to 
achieve financial independence and easy control. The government mainly exercises its 
institutional control over media through various media regulation agencies, such as, 
the State Administration of Radio Film and Television, the State Press and 
Publication Administration and the State Council’s Information Office. Legally, the 
state has constitution, state and civil law on media. Regarding the administrative 
control, the government still intervenes the employment process of major news 
organizations by appointing major editors and requiring ideological and political 
training for all new employees.    
  Government control of media is still in transition. The primary purpose of 
controlling media is, of course, to consolidate the political power of party-state and 
maintain social stability (He, 2008; Stockmann, 2012). It is because “thought control” 
as a significant element of Communist politics, is mainly realized through means of 
propaganda (He, 2008). Besides, implications of media commercialization have 
caused consternation among Party leaders who strongly believe that controlling media 
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means controlling public agenda, which is critical to maintain stability (Qian & 
Bandurski, 2011). Another purpose that the party-state seeks to complete by 
controlling media, as He (2008) posed, is to raise China’s international standing. 
Since the economic reform was launched, Chinese media have been assigned the 
important task of picturing a “China boom” in order to attract massive foreign 
investment.  
  Opinions are divided on the results of government’s media control. Winfield and 
Peng (2005) pointed out that media control is conducive to standardize chaotic media 
market. Miao (2011) argued that media control has both positive and negative aspects. 
It is positive in terms of active guidance of media content, and negative in terms of 
censoring content deemed politically dangerous or vulgar. Regarding the political 
impact of media control, some scholars mentioned that China’s tight media control 
policies, especially the censorship system, have generated resentment among the 
public. As Xiao (2011, p. 210) emphasized, such irritation toward censorship has 
inspired “new forms of social resistance and demands for greater freedom of 
information and expression”, such as the rise of online public opinion. However, 
some other scholars hold a different opinion. Stockmann (2012) argued that it is 
media control and propaganda that help authoritarian regimes arrive at high levels of 
support for their leadership among their citizens. He pointed out that both official and 
nonofficial media are controlled by politics, but nonofficial media are more effective 
in implementing political demands because they are more easily to gain public trust 
and credibility.  
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  Most scholars have reached an agreement that no matter how commercialized 
media become, Chinese news media are not solely commodities in the market and 
they are still instruments of the party-state’s authoritarian rule (e.g., Zhao, 2008; 
Stockmann, 2012; Winfield & Peng, 2005). Some scholars even insisted that in China, 
commercial media must first and foremost universally follow the government’s 
propaganda guidelines (Miao, 2011). Although China’s media policies appear to be 
more open since 1992, such government relaxation, as scholars analyzed (see 
Winfield & Peng, 2005), is based on the precondition that the Party’s ideology and 
leadership may not be threatened at least. Yu (1994) argued that China’s press control 
is even strengthened in the context of commercialization, since marketized media 
have more incentives to overstep political limits to provide critical reports, which has 
caused the party-state’s consternation.   
   Under such circumstances, compared with democratic states, Chinese traditional 
mass media have to serve two masters with diverging interests, the government and 
the audience. On one hand, media have to meet censorship and propaganda demands 
from the government; on the other hand, they need to win audiences and generate 
profit. Being caught in the middle of the state and the market, Chinese media have to 
always carefully strike a balance between political survival, financial success and 
their own professional ideals.  
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2.4.2 The interdependency of state and media  
  The relationship between the authoritarian regime and the media is often depicted 
as “a game of cat and mouse”. However, far more than an opposing relationship, the 
state and media also exist with interdependency and cooperation, especially when 
facing the competition from global market. 
  Compared with liberal democracies, Chinese media are always struggling under 
various state controls and surveillance, meanwhile also enjoying special protection 
and much support from the state. In China, early successful cases of 
commercialization of media, such as the Southern Weekend, are all supported by the 
official power (see Qian & Bandurski, 2011). Rather than financial support, political 
support is especially indispensable for media’s survival. Media with support from 
heavyweight official are able to weather political storms and react immediately. 
Additionally, adjustments of media policies from the state also have a great impact on 
the present and future of media organizations. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
since 2005, Chinese state tightened up the policies toward foreign investment on 
Chinese media, and also began to limit the import of foreign media products. This 
attempt of the state not only reduces the reliance on foreign capital and technology, 
but more importantly it aims at protecting and fostering the domestic media market 
(Miao, 2011). Zhao, Y. (2008) argued that protectionist measures from the state 
against foreign competitors indicate that China is still under the shadow of 
anti-Capitalist and anti-imperialist legacies. Furthermore, a global anti-Communism 
atmosphere also continues to feed Chinese forces of anti-Capitalism.  
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  Such kind of protection of national companies and trade unions is often seen as 
nationalism. Nationalism, together with terrorism and religious fundamentalism, are 
often regarded as three enemies of globalization, since it resists the pull of global 
markets and global culture (Mosco, 2009). However, as Mosco pointed out, 
nationalism is no longer just a tool of anti-globalization movement, but becomes a 
critical force in the spread of globalization. Countries now use national identity to 
mobilize all its resources and capital to better compete in global market. China has 
provided a good example for this new role of nationalism. After accession to WTO, 
with its massive mobilization of nationalism, China takes great effort to better 
position itself in globalization. Therefore, both Western and Chinese media scholars 
have affirmed that China has “substantial potential to cultivate its own globalization 
by exporting its cultural products” (Zhao, Y., 2008, p. 139). This is also the reason 
why Mosco (2009, p. 181) argued that “globalization does not undermine nationalism; 
rather, it sharpens nationalism, turning it into a tool to more effectively promote the 
interests of nations in global competition”. In 2009, with massive investment from the 
Chinese government, the global presence of Chinese major party media was greatly 
enhanced. This move was interpreted as China’s global strategy of media expansion 
(Qian & Bandurski, 2011). 
  In sum, Chinese state and media need each other and rely on each other. In a 
non-democratic country, media need to strive for their own political support and keep 
an eye on changes at policy level in order to survive in a complicated political and 
economic environment. The state also requires media’s obedience and cooperation to 
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maintain its political power at home and promote its international standing abroad. In 
exchange, the state offers protection to Chinese media for competing with global 
media.  
 
2.4.3 Competition between official media and commercial media  
  Although almost all of the Chinese media are involved into the tide of 
commercialization, most major media organizations continue to be registered as 
government or CCP-owned organizations. Consequently, Chinese media are not 
easily classifiable according to their ownership. Except for classifying media 
according to their corresponding administrative level (i.e., national, provincial, 
municipal, county), media scholars usually like to employ the terms “official media” 
and “commercial media” to classify Chinese media in terms of their degree of 
commercialization (e.g., Stockmann, 2011; Zhao, 1998; Peng, 2012; Qian & 
Bandurski, 2011). According to their definition, official media refer to those which 
are directly controlled by central government, usually receiving subsidies from the 
state. They are less commercialized due to their high ideological significance, such as 
People’s Daily, GuangMing Daily, CCTV, etc. Besides, official media also receive 
most rigorous examination from the authorities and hence can most represent the 
interests of central government. In contrast, scholars use the term “commercial media” 
to describe those which are more commercially liberalized, first and foremost driven 
by the market orientation. Most of these popular commercial media are local media, 
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registered or controlled by local governments, such as Guangdong-based Southern 
Metropolis Daily, Hunan Satellite Television, Shanghai-based DragonTV, etc. 
Therefore, the difference between official media and commercial media is the degree 
of commercialization and which administrative level (i.e., central government or local 
government) it stands for.  
  Local governments, far from the political and ideological center of the state, are 
usually more active and bold in commercializing their media. This is particularly 
noticeable in broadcasting media. Since early of this century, local governments have 
begun to invest heavily to build their own competitive satellite television, which has 
greatly diverted the audiences and advertises of CCTV in across the country (Zhang 
& Zhang, 2012). Therefore, some scholars pointed out that the competition between 
official media and commercial media is essentially the competition between central 
government and local government (Miao, 2011).  
  Compared to the rigid and dogmatic official media, commercial media are more 
responsible and likely to focus on controversial issues. They also tend to emphasize 
mass entertainment. In the late 1990s, commercial newspaper attracted massive 
audiences and far exceeded the circulation of party official newspaper (Stockmann, 
2011). Commercial media have achieved a higher degree of credibility and are more 
effective in shaping public opinion than their party counterparts. In order to seize the 
market and shape public opinion, the party-state strengthened its competitiveness in 
the local media market by setting up commercial media spin-offs and accelerating the 
program innovation in official media.  
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  With the increasing competition between the official media and commercial media, 
tension also rises. One typical example is the Super Girl’s case. The popularity of 
2005 Super Girl, a reality-singing competition launched by Hunan Satellite television, 
has helped the station to rank first among all provincial television stations and own 
3.4 percent market share (People.com, 2014). However, this program was greatly 
criticized by SARFT for its vulgar content which contaminated an elegant art genre 
(People.com, 2005). Some media scholars and observers pointed out the deeper 
reason why SARFT tried to oust Super Girl is due to the fierce competition between 
Hunan TV and CCTV (Miao, 2011). As a central government-owned unit, CCTV has 
to submit part of its profits to SARFT. Therefore, state’s protection for CCTV is also 
a protection for state’s own economic interests. Tension between official and 
commercial counterparts also rises in other aspects. Take the print media as an 
example. When some controversial events occurred, newspapers usually avoid 
publishing the story, following the censorship rules strictly. In contrast, independent 
commercial media are more willing to take some risks to reveal the truth, especially 
when crises break out. The attitude of official media often elicit animosity from the 
public (Qian & Bandurski, 2011). The commercial media have taken over the 
guidance role from the official media. But now with the increasing pressure from 
commercial media, CCP realizes that it’s urgent and important to win the battlefield 
of public opinion. Peng (2012) provided the rationale of the state being competitors in 
shaping public opinion. As she argued, “a healthy public opinion environment needs 
mainstream media and their authorities to avoid the polarized distribution of public 
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opinion. Only in this way, populism won’t become the mainstream”. 
  In sum, the state aims not only at competing for financial profit, but more 
importantly, competing for power to shape public opinion. This is consistent with 
what Zhao, Y. (2008) mentioned: the party-state is utilizing the principles of 
capitalism market to achieve its own ideological and political goals. Furthermore, as 
Peng (2012) argued, the potential of party media cannot be underestimated. Once they 
cast off the party-style tones and cater to the public taste, the capital and resources 
they own will make them a stronger competitor against commercial media.   
 
2.4.4 Summary of state-media relationship 
  With the deepening of media marketization, the influence of globalization, and the 
reform of internal and external media strategies and policies, the state-media relation 
has revealed its multifaceted nature. From the initial absolute control to the 
emergence of increasing support and even competition with commercial media, the 
nature and the character of party-state power have shifted significantly. Meanwhile, 
Chinese media’s attitude toward the state is also in transition. Compared with 
previous unconditional submission to state control, media now dare to challenge the 
authority of the state through negotiations and implicit expressions of their dissents. 
The examination of state-media relationship is basic to a systematic understanding of 
the media system. Furthermore, with the evolvement of such relation, the Chinese 




In this chapter, I first define the political economy approach to communication and 
take up its major characteristics. The suitability of the political economy of 
communication to this study is also discussed. Then, I historically examine the media 
marketization in China from four aspects - commercialization, privatization, 
liberalization, and internationalization. I proceed to describe the media-market and 
media-state relations in China’s commercial media context in the following sections. 
In the discussion of media-market relation, the influences of advertisers, market 
competition, and domestic and foreign investors on traditional mass media are 
examined respectively. Regarding media-state relation, I mainly review three aspects, 
namely, state as controller, supporter and competitor with traditional mass media. 
2.5.1 An integrated model: the hybrid of authoritarianism and capitalism  
  In liberal democracies, the media model is often defined by such characteristics as 
“an independent news media with legally sanctioned press freedom and formal 
institutional independence from the state” (Winfield & Peng, 2005, p. 265). In 
contemporary China, however, such a media model has no chance to emerge. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the media is a product of social 
construction. In China, the intertwining of various structural forces is much more 
apparent and complicated. Negotiations and contestations exist at every step of media 
production, distribution, and consumption. Just as Zhao (1998, p. 2) described, “it is a 
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scene full of contradictions, tensions, and ambiguities”. Both Chinese and foreign 
scholars tend to argue a model integrating both political and economic powers to 
understand the characteristics and nature of Chinese media system in transition (e.g., 
Zhao, 1998; Zhao, Y., 2008; Stockmann, 2012; Winfield & Peng, 2005).  
  The official ideology “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is often interpreted 
as a mix of party logic and market logic, or a hybrid of political authoritarianism and 
capitalism. Just as Winfield & Peng argued in their paper, the state continues to 
deregulate media, while it still exert strategic control over media market. The 
economic reform has provided more financial independence for media, while whether 
it brings more freedom to media is still under debate. Media have to conform to 
state’s propaganda principles and polices, which at the same time can affect state 
policy by representing their own economic interests. Such a market-authoritarian 
model emphasized the dynamics of changing political and economic factors, but more 
importantly the interplay between political forces and market forces.   
  Besides the party-state and market, the public should also be taken into account at 
this stage. The public could be the consumers of the media product, and also could be 
the citizens under control of the authorities. The ignorance of public interests and 
voices may bring financial loss for media organizations, as well as cause social 
grievance and distrust of the government and the media. Actually, with the growth of 
online public sphere enabled by Internet, the public plays an ever-increasing 
significant role in influencing the relationship between media, state and market.  
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2.5.2 New possibilities brought by new media   
  The political, economic, social environments within which media operate are still 
evolving. The emergence and development of the Internet has posed great challenges 
to China’s traditional media and the media system. The analysis of China’s traditional 
mass media sector and its relationships with the state and market presented in this 
chapter actually serves as a productive framework to help understand the differences 
and similarities between traditional media system and new media system and why the 
research problems regarding Chinese new media business are worth being studied.  
  The scholarship on political economy has begun to make transition to a focus on 
the new media platforms. Mosco (2009) summarized some major trends in studying 
new media in liberal democracies. Some political economists emphasized continuities, 
which mean old media issues endure in new media world (e.g., McChesney, 2007; 
Murdock & Golding, 2000, 2004; Schiller, 1999, 2007; Spark, 2007). They continued 
to focus on how power operates in new media and pointed out that new media deepen 
and extend earlier forms of capitalism by opening new possibilities to turn media and 
audiences into products for sale. For scholars who addressed discontinuities, they 
argued that the growth of the Internet has challenged and even disrupted capitalism, 
including its market rules and the authorities (e.g., Hardt & Negri, 2000, 2004; 
Lazzarato, 1997; Dyer-Witheford, 1999). Besides, there are also some scholars 
holding a skeptical view. They argued that much of what is considered new in new 
media is actually associated with every communication technology when old media 
were new (e.g., Winseck & Pike, 2007; Standage, 1998).  
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  Compared with western countries, research on Chinese new media, especially on 
new media business, only started to follow the perspective of political economy 
recently. But increasingly, scholars have recognized the power of the Internet in 
shifting Chinese political and social landscape. As early as 1998, Chen and Chan 
documented that the Internet poses technical difficulties for absolute control, making 
the media freer from Party-state monopoly compared to traditional media. Howard 
(2010) and Xiao (2011) also regarded the popularity of the Internet and new media as 
an alternative news source that has the power to subvert state control over the flow of 
information. Zhao (2011) commented that the Internet has dramatically broadened the 
terms of political discourse in China partly due to its participatory and interactive 
properties and its less easily controlled nature. Many communication scholars pointed 
out the Internet increasingly sets agendas for the entire Chinese media system, which 
challenges the top-down flows of the information and facilitates bottom-up 
communication (see Donald, et al., 2002; Zhao, 2011; Qiu, et al., 2009). The Internet 
is in fact catalyzing the transformation of Chinese society.  
  Confronting the challenges posed by the Internet, the Chinese government has 
carried out strategies and techniques to maintain dominance in cyberspace. Just as 
Zhao, Y. (2008, p. 23) documented, “the explosion of the Internet and the imperative 
to control these highly dispersed and versatile new media have further extended the 
depth and scope of the Chinese state’s role in the communication field”. Some 
scholars presented studies on Internet censorship and control in China (e.g., Qiu, 1999; 
He, 2009; Xiao, 2011; Zhao, 2011; Lagerkvist, 2012). Some of them emphasized the 
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importance of Internet companies’ self-censorship and delegated responsibility of 
social control from the state (see Zhao, 2011; Lagerkvist, 2012). Moreover, the state 
has strategically established websites for its core propaganda organs, which serve as 
competitors against private-owned portals. It is also worthwhile to notice that with the 
accelerated market reforms and global reintegration, more transnational capital and 
domestic private capital enter into Chinese new media sector. Nowadays, most of the 
major new media companies are privately owned and financially supported by both 
international and domestic venture capital.  
  Keeping all of these new changes brought by new media in mind, further questions 
need to be answered. How will these changes redefine the state-media and 
market-media relations? How will these changes contribute to reshaping the structure 
of Chinese media system? What are the continuities and discontinuities between the 
old media structure and the new media structure?  
  Keeping these questions in mind, a more comprehensive and systematic review of 





Chapter 3 Background Review and Research 
Questions 
3.1 Historical Review of China’s New Media Industry 
The new media industry has experienced explosive growth in China since the 
mid-1990s. Scholars tend to attribute this success to the highly controlled nature of 
traditional media, the promotion of information technologies by the Chinese state, and 
the operation of capital markets (see Wu, 2011; Zhao, 2011; Tai, 2006). Meanwhile, 
new media companies, especially those content providers, receive increasing 
censorship from the party-state and its security apparatus. In a word, state and market 
factors play a significant role in promote in the development of Chinese new media 
industry.  
 
3.1.1 State promotion and competition  
3.1.1.1 China’s telecoms reforms and the development of New Media industry   
  When looking in the nearly 20 years’ history of China’s new media business, we 
find out that the development of new media industry is much driven by the state. 
Actually, the birth and growth of China’s new media industry are closely bound up 
with every reform of China’s telecoms regime. 
  Back to 1995, with the deepening of overall economic reform, the traditional 
telecoms management system, as post-telecoms conglomerate and 
government-enterprise, cannot meet the needs of market economy. In order to 
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accelerate the market-oriented reform of telecoms industry, China 
Telecommunications Corporation (China Telecom) became a legal entity separated 
from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). China Telecom has since 
become an independent enterprise with its own accounting and personnel system 
(Wong & Wong, 2003). In order to explore new areas of growth, China Telecom 
fixed its sights on Internet business. In the same year, China Telecom launched 
ChinaNET, the backbone network operator and a wholesale provider of Internet 
bandwidth (Tan, 1996), and began to grant limited value-added telecommunications 
service licenses. Accompanied by these changes, the first privately owned retailing 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) appeared in China, including InfoHighway, Chinanet, 
ShenZhenXunYe and others. However, these early ISPs didn’t come to a good end, as 
the big boss, the state-owned ChinaNET, controlled large-scale information 
backbones. All the retailing ISP companies had to follow the price system and 
regulations developed by ChinaNET. In 1999, international leased-line fees for ISPs 
and the price of a second line for residential users were all reduced. However, 
unfortunately, the leased-line fees the providers should pay to use ChinaNET’s 
backbone network were higher than the retail Internet rates they could charge Chinese 
consumers. As a result, most of the first providers were marginalized or knocked out 
of the market. Scholars commented that the failure is a result of imbalanced market 
competition between the state and private actors (see Harwit & Clark, 2006; Wu, 
2011). They also pointed out that the state was practicing ownership control of the 
communication network, in the same way as what it did over traditional media. 
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Though these new media pioneers failed, they have cultivated the awareness of 
Internet among Chinese people and inspired more new media entrepreneurs. In 
summary, the separation of China Telecom from the MPT has directly propelled the 
rise of China’s commercial new media companies.   
  Learning from the failure of the early ISPs, the following new media companies 
shared one feature in common: maintaining an intimate relationship with state’s 
telecoms departments. Just as the early successful cases of commercialization of 
traditional media in China mentioned in Chapter 2, the success of NetEase and 
Tencent is partly because of enjoying support from official power. In 1997, Ding Lei 
established NetEase and decided to provide free e-mail service (Li, 2009). The 
successful self-promotion helped Ding Lei earn the servers, network bandwidth and 
investments from Guangzhou Telecom. This was the critical reason why NetEase and 
its e-mail service could grow rapidly since it was founded. Similarly, under the great 
support from Shenzhen Telecom, Tencent QQ (i.e., the leading instant messaging 
service in China) was launched successfully to market in 1999 (Wu, 2011). In order to 
survive, the subsequent new media companies learnt to seek support or cooperate with 
relevant government departments. Besides NetEase and Tencent, other big websites 
during this period such as 236.net, 21CN and Shanghai Online all absorbed start-up 
resources from relevant telecoms departments (Lin, 2008).  
  In 1998, the Chinese government established the Ministry of Information Industry 
(MII), created through a merger of the former MPT and Ministry of Electronic 
Industry (MEI), to promote and manage the rapidly growing information sector in 
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China (Sina.com, 2008). Such restructuring, interpreted by Zheng (2007), indicates 
the great determination of Chinese government in promoting information technology 
in accordance with market principles. In 1999, in order to realize the specialization 
and separate operation, the newly formed MII initiated the break-up of China 
Telecom into four parts: fix-line telephone, paging, mobile phone and satellite 
telecommunication (Telecoms restructuring, 2014). China Mobile Communication 
Corporation (China Mobile) was separated from China Telecom and became an 
independent state-owned telecoms operator to run the mobile sectors (Clotimes.com, 
2013). The MII also granted licenses to some new telecoms service operators. In 2001, 
China acceded to the WTO, in order to break the monopoly of China Telecom in 
fixed-line telephone market and enhance the overall competiveness of China’s 
telecoms sector, the state ordered China Telecom to be further broken into 
geographically north and south parts. After this restructuring, a new “5+1” structure 
formed in China’s telecoms industry, including China Telecom, China Netcom, China 
Mobile, China Unicom, China Railcom and China Satcom (Guan, 2003).  
  This round of telecoms restructuring has significant impact on the development of 
China’s new media business. First, the newly formed China Mobile helped the whole 
Internet industry get out of the difficulty. By the end of 2000, China’s Internet users 
had reached 22.5 million (Sina.com, 2001a). However, the business opportunities 
brought by new media market were quite limited. It is because that the new media 
market of that time lacked an effective profit mechanism. Most of the Internet service 
providers found it difficult to seek profit points and suffered from severe financial 
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problems (Wu, 2011). Some even struggled in the borderline of death. Even worse, in 
2000 and 2001, China’s whole new media industry was affected by the Nasdaq crash 
and experienced a murky time. Under such circumstances, the newly founded China 
Mobile launched its “Monternet (Mobile+Internet) Project” at the end of 2000. 
Stepping out of the traditional telecoms operators’ practice, “Monternet” went into 
close cooperation with ISPs and Internet Content Providers (ICPs), and provided them 
with wide access to an all-round upgraded net system, WAP platform and 
short-message platform (Peopledaily.com, 2000). In this way, the “Monternet” project 
helped the commercial new media companies solve the problems caused by unclear 
profit-model, opened the large number of mobile phone users to these new media 
companies, and thus saved the depressed new media market in China, and even sent 
some companies (e.g., Tencent QQ) to the top (Tencent.com, 2004). Second, after the 
telecoms restructuring, the MII issued the second-generation wireless telephone 
technology (2G) licenses and introduced the broadband Internet, which had especially 
promoted the rise of online games and video websites. The expansion of broadband 
led to the mushrooming of Internet cafés, thus facilitating the popularity of online 
games. In 2005, online game developers even directly work with the telecom 
operators to market their games in China (Online gaming in China, 2014). Meanwhile, 
the introduction of broadband was also accompanied with the increasing number of 
Internet users, offering conditions for the rise of Chinese video websites.  
  In the last round of restructuring, the original intention of the state was to break the 
monopoly of China Telecom. However, after the break-up of China Telecom, China 
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Mobile became the “oligarchy” in the rapid growing mobile business. Therefore, in 
order to fill in the gap among the carriers, enhance the competitiveness of local 
operators and clear the way for 3G licenses to be released, Chinese state initiated the 
new round of telecoms restructuring in 2008 (QQ.com, 2008). After merging and 
splitting the operations of the former six carriers, three new operators -- China 
Telecom, China Mobile and China Unicom -- that had both fixed-line and mobile 
services were created. After the restructuring, the broadband became more popular 
and faster than before. Operators with 3G licenses also accelerated the building of 
mobile network. These changes brought new opportunities for value-added 
telecommunications services. Mobile Web 2.0, mobile mailbox, mobile games, 
mobile news and mobile commerce were the new areas that ISPs got in (Sohu.com, 
2008). Besides, facing fierce competition, state-owned operators began to seek 
cooperation with commercial new media companies. New media giants, such as 
Baidu, Sina and Tencent, relied on their content, brand and technological advantages 
to push into the mobile arena (Lei, 2009). For example, in 2009, China Telecom and 
Tencent jointly created an online customer service network. Customers of China 
Telecom can add 800010000 as a friend on QQ and pay bills, sign up for new services, 
check outstanding balances and rewards points in real-time (Sootoo.com, 2010).  
  In recent two years, news about the possible further telecoms restructuring started 
to spread. Actually, observers pointed out that the current telecoms market is 
essentially still monopolized by the three state-owned operators. Even though there is 
competition among them, such kind of competition isn’t a real one. It is because 
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private players are still not allowed to become carriers in China (Sciencenet.cn, 2011). 
For instance, Singapore and Taiwai both have over 30 telecoms operators, which are 
either state-owned or private-owned. Monopoly leads to backwardness. The number 
of China’s broadband subscribers ranks top in the world. However, the broadband 
penetration rates and access speed are lower than the world’s average (C114.com, 
2011). Under such circumstances, it is believed that the new round of telecoms 
restructuring is imperative. However, different from the past, 4G licenses were issued 
before initiating new restructuring. In December 2013, the MII issued 4G licenses to 
the three telecoms operators, indicating the beginning of the new era in China’s 
high-speed mobile network (Xinhuanet.com, 2013). According to the latest report of 
CNNIC, the number of mobile Internet users had reached 500 million and kept 
growing (CNNIC, 2014). China Mobile announced that it planned to construct 
500,000 4G base stations by the end of 2014 (Ifeng.com, 2013). Just as the leader of 
China’s Internet Society announced in the 2014 China Internet Industry Annual 
Conference, 4G will lead the new revolution in China’s Internet industry, especially 
the mobile Internet sector (Sina.com, 2014a). Whereas, some observers emphasized 
that only when the new telecoms restructuring keeps up, will China step into the real 
4G era. They believed that China’s telecoms market needs more operators and 
competitors (see Mao, 2013).  
  In all, the new media business could not develop without the basic telecom 
networks provided by state operators. The market space of the services and products 
of new media business is closely connected with the quality of network resource 
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provided by state operators. Therefore, the whole new media industry strongly 
depends on the development of state-owned telecoms operators.  
 
3.1.1.2 State competition with privately owned new media companies 
  The rapid growth of China’s new media industry has generated great economic and 
political interests. On the one hand, China has the world’s largest Internet population 
and new media market. The new media industry ranks as the most lucrative and 
promising industry in China. In 2010, the average operating profit margin of China’s 
listed new media companies was nearly 40%, eight times bigger than that of China’s 
average enterprises and three times bigger than that of the US new media industry (Ji, 
2011). On the other hand, the development of new media, especially the popularity of 
social media, has directly accelerated the growth of online public sphere and thus 
challenged China’s political system and state-controlled mass media. Under such 
circumstances, the state speeds up their entry into this lucrative industry to gain more 
authority and more money. Through flexible policies and administrative control 
systems, the state steps into new media market not only by playing a role as 
supervisor and regulator but also as competitor against privately owned new media 
companies. 
  Back to January 1997, Chinese state built its first ever state owned news website 
People.cn, which is the official website of the flagship newspaper of the CCP, 
People’s Daily (People.cn, 2014). In November of the same year, the state-owned 
Xinhua News Agency also launched its web portal Xinhuanet (Xinhuanet.com, 2014). 
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Almost at the same time, China’s privately owned new media companies all began to 
construct web portals. Compared with state-backed People.cn and Xinhuanet, which 
focus on political news, privately owned Sina.com Netease.com, Sohu.com and 
QQ.com that are more entertainment focused have quickly become the four largest 
web portals in China. In order to compete with privately owned portals, Chinese state 
carried out both political and economic measures to support its own portals. First, in 
2005, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and the MII jointly issued the 
Regulations on Management of Internet News Service, providing that commercial 
websites can only reprint political and social news from print and broadcasting media. 
In other words, privately owned websites will not have the right of newsgathering 
(Xinhuanet.com, 2005). However, this regulation does not apply to state-owned news 
portals and websites. This action indicates the state’s intention on protecting 
state-owned news websites and prohibiting commercial new media organizations to 
conduct online journalism. Second, Chinese state actively encouraged its state-owned 
news media organizations to list in the domestic market. People.cn listed on Shanghai 
Stock Exchange in 2012 and Xinhuanet is ready to go public in the next two years 
(Sina.com, 2014b). The purpose of the state is to secure capital to improve services to 
compete with the commercial new media companies, and also to extend the state’s 
control in the free-wheeling new media sector (Inchincloser.com, 2012). According to 
the Alexa rank, by September 2014, People.cn and Xinhuanet ranks the fifth and 
seventh respectively among all the websites in China (Chinaz.com, 2014).  
  In addition to web portals, the state also builds its own new media companies to 
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participate in other areas of the Internet. In 2009, China Network Television (CNTV), 
a national web-based TV broadcaster under the banner of CCTV, was officially 
launched, emphasizing the official legality of the medium. The establishment of 
CNTV not only demonstrates the state’s political correctness in supporting copyright 
laws, but also indicates its intention to compete with privately owned video websites. 
Actually, just several days before the birth of CNTV, Chinese state suddenly cracked 
down many BitTorrent forums, including such as the famous websites BTchina and 
VeryCD, which were accused of lacking a license, carrying unauthorized programs 
and distributing pornographic and violent content (Sohu.com, 2009a). Besides these 
small-scale download websites, some big commercial video websites were also 
ordered to remove unauthorized programs. Observers said this campaign essentially 
cleared the way for the launch of CNTV (Xixik.com, 2009). Compared with privately 
owned video websites, the obvious advantages of these state-owned web-TV, 
including CNTV, Mango TV and BesTV, are that they are supported by one 
broadcasting group, granted with web-TV and mobile video licenses. Possessing these 
advantages and capital, CNTV could easily establish a copyrighted hierarchy and 
monopoly. They can negotiate for copyright at lower prices and then re-sell the 
copyright to private video websites with higher prices (Ma, 2010). For example, in 
2009, FIFA officially sold CCTV the broadcasting rights for the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup. As the subsidiary of CCTV, CNTV acquired both exclusive webcast and re-sale 
rights. Private video websites could only provide video-on-demand services by 
purchasing rights from CNTV (Cmmintelligence.com, 2010). By May 2010, video 
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websites Youku and Tudou and web portals Sohu.com and Sina.com all acquired 
rights from CNTV. CNTV fully exploited its World Cup copy rights. However, 
CNTV was widely criticized for its copyrighted hierarchy and monopoly. Ma pointed 
out that CNTV is “taking advantage of public resources for self-interest” by taking on 
the roles of both “contractor” and “distributor”, which would harm the healthy 
competition in the market. The copyright is abused by the state not for protecting the 
original but as a tool to make profit and compete with private players (Ma, 2010).   
  Besides, in social media sectors, Chinese state also officially launched its own 
companies. The year 2010 is generally regarded as the first year of weibo (i.e. 
Chinese title of microblog), due to the fierce competition in domestic weibo market. 
Major commercial web portal companies, including Sina, Sohu, NetEase and Tencent, 
all launched their own microblog services. In February 2010, People Weibo was 
established by People.cn. According to its official introductory webpage, People 
Weibo sees itself as the first weibo service launched by the key central news website, 
which describes itself as a “high-end, authoritative, interactive and efficient” platform 
(People Weibo, 2014). However, even with official support, People Weibo didn’t 
achieve good grades in the market. Lack of an experienced and technologically 
advanced team that can increasingly upgrade its products and enhance service is one 
reason. Another important reason is that the private weibo service providers as first 
mover into the market, especially Sina Weibo relying on their brand and technological 
advantages, quickly attracted a large number of users. As a follower without obvious 
advantages, People Weibo is difficult to shunt the users from the commercial weibo 
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platforms. Besides, compared with state-owned social media, commercial social 
media receive relatively less censorship from the authorities. This is also a reason 
why ordinary users don’t like People Weibo. Today, with increasingly number of 
officials, state and government agencies who register accounts and broadcast on Sina 
Weibo, People Weibo exists in name only.  
  With Google going out of the China market in 2011, in order to gain profit in 
domestic search engine market, Xinhua News Agency and China Mobile jointly 
developed a new search engine, ChinaSo, which was born from the merge of two 
preexisting state-owned search engines, Panguso and Jike (ChinaSo, 2014). However, 
even with the state’s backing, ChinaSo failed to gain a piece of China’s competitive 
search engine market which is dominant by Baidu and followed by Qihoo and Sogou. 
Some even criticized that ChinaSo is a “waste of taxpayer’s money” and 
“foreshadowing a tightening control on China’s Internet” (Ibtimes.com, 2014).  
  In all, we could see that Chinese state is always attempting to build its own new 
media companies, with some successes and some failures. It indicates the state’s 
ambition to integrate Internet, telecoms network and broadcasting. By being a 
competitor in new media market, the state essentially intends to extend its control 
through interfering with the market ecology.   
 
3.1.2 The power of capital in new media market  
  As mentioned in Chapter 2, capital market in China is highly related to state’s 
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policies. China’s WTO accession is a critical turning point for the restructuring of 
China’s capital market. In order to meet WTO standards, Chinese state set out 
fundamental competition rules and cleared away obstacles that barred foreign and 
private investment from entering the telecoms and new media sector. Since 2001, 
foreign investors were authorized to form joint ventures, investing up to 49 percent in 
basic telecom services and 50 percent in Internet services (Lu & Wang, 2003). 
Meanwhile, the state has begun to explicitly encourage domestic private capital in 
selected areas of media and communication industry, such as theater, museums, 
Internet cafes, online games, etc (Wang, 2004). The release of the entry barrier to 
capital has dramatically promoted the development of China’s new media industry. 
Nowadays, most Chinese new media companies are privately owned and received 
different levels of transnational investments.  
  In fact, many Chinese new media companies absorb start-up capital from 
transnational venture capitalists and are listed on foreign stock exchanges, such as 
NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange. As Zhao, Y. (2008, p. 152) noted, “the 
scope of foreign penetration in the Chinese telecommunication markets is much 
broader than in the mass media sector because of its centrality as the critical 
infrastructure for globalized capitalist production, its role as an important site of 
accumulation in its own right, as well as its apparently less political nature.”  
  Actually, back to the 1990s, China’s early new media entrepreneurs began to invite 
transnational venture capital. The investment of Intel, Dow Jones, CNET, IDG and 
dozens of other organizations helped China’s Internet Technology Company (i.e., ITC, 
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the predecessor of Sohu) get through the financial crisis in 1997 (Sohu.com, 2001). 
Similarly in 1997, Stone Rich Sight Information Technology (i.e., the predecessor of 
Sina) got its early foreign venture capital from Ivanhoe and Walden International 
(Sina.com, 2000). Alibaba got its critical investment from the US-based Goldman 
Sachs and Softbank of Japan in 1999 (Wu, 2011). Foreign venture capital contributed 
greatly to the survival and development of early new media businesses. Some of them 
began to import foreign managerial talents and completed self-reorganization of 
internationalization. More importantly, increasing Chinese new media entrepreneurs 
became aware of the importance of global capital.   
  At the beginning of the 2000s, China’s leading commercial portals, including 
Sina.com, 163.com and Sohu.com, all went public on Nasdaq, initiating the 
enthusiasms of China’s new media companies to list overseas (Wu, 2011). Foreign 
capital flooded into China’s new media market. In 2004, Chinese new media giant 
Tencent listed in HongKong and immediately became China’s largest new media firm 
by market value (Totaltele.com, 2004). In 2005, Chinese search engine operator 
Baidu.com vaulted 354% in the initial public offering (IPO) market in Nasdaq 
(Marketwatch. com, 2005). In 2007, online game business Giant Interactive became 
listed companies. Stepping into the 2010s, Chinese video websites began to go public. 
For example, Youku and Tudou were listed at the New York Stock Exchange and 
Nasdaq in 2010 and 2011 respectively (163.com, 2011). In April 2014, China’s 
biggest microblog service provider Sina Weibo began trading publicly in Nasdaq 
(CNN.com, 2014). In September 2014, e-commerce business Alibaba listed its shares 
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on New York Stock Exchange and became the world’s largest IPO (Siliconbeat.com, 
2014). Now China’s listed Internet businesses are mainly in areas of online 
advertising, online game, value-added service, B2B, online shopping and online travel 
(Picsays.com, 2012).  
  It’s true that going public allows the Internet businesses to attract attention of 
investors, quickly raise large funds and enhance the awareness of the brand and its 
credibility. Driven by these great interests, new media companies devote themselves 
into the preparation for the listing. Observers pointed out that the prosperity of current 
domestic new media market largely comes from capital operation (see Mi, 2000; Wu, 
2011). However, they also warn that capital market could be dangerous. The Internet 
bubble during the late 1990s finally led to the 2000 stock market crash (Wikipedia, 
2013). All the listed new media companies were involved in this disaster and 
experienced the toughest time since their founding. This stock crisis also affected the 
whole new media industry in China, which catalyzed the adjustment of business 
strategies of many new media companies as mentioned earlier in this chapter.  
   Besides, the behaviors of investors, especially the big shareholders, would also 
influence the future of an new media company. For example, ChinaByte, largely 
invested by Rupert Murdoch and his IDG, used to be a leading Chinese IT portal in 
late 1990s due to its big funding and smart team. However, in just two or three years, 
ChinaByte started to decline. Observers pointed out that the key reason of the decline 
of ChinaByte is the IDG’s change in business direction in China. Since 1999, IDG 
re-focused its business in China onto the Star TV, which led to the marginalization of 
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ChinaByte (Wu, 2011). 
   In all, capital influences Chinese new media companies by bringing in both 
opportunities and challenges.  
 
3.1.3 Trajectory of explorations of business model  
  After years of development since the first public Internet connection in 1995, 
China’s new media industry has grown up to a huge business with 618 million 
netizens 45.8% penetration rate (Cnnic.cn, 2014), and dozens of new media 
companies whose market value have surpassed USD 100 million. Starting from the 
Internet bubble era, China’s new media industry has gone through continuous 
exploration and innovation of business model.  
  Business model describes the rationale of how a company creates, delivers, and 
captures value (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010). The construction of business model is 
part of business strategy and of vital importance for the development of all kinds of 
businesses, especially for new media business. In China’s new media industry, one 
thing that seems always true is that once the early adopters latch onto something new, 
the rest of the population can quickly follow. 
   As mentioned earlier in this chapter, most of the early new media companies in 
China provided Internet access service. They made money by retailing Internet access 
service to customers. After they failed in competition with state-owned providers, 
they transformed to attempt other new business models, including a series of models 
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such as Bulletin Board System (BBS), mailbox service, instant messaging, search 
engine, etc. For example, Sina is derived from a popular BBS named Stone Rich Sight 
BBS. Netease started by providing free e-mail and free personal homepage. Tencent 
rose to prominence through instant messenger QQ. However, since most of the 
services during this period were free to customers, they didn’t bring substantial profit 
to new media companies. Furthermore, the market of online advertising at that time 
was limited. Most of the Internet service providers found it difficult to seek profit. For 
example, even though Tencent QQ had a large group of users, it didn’t develop an 
effective revenue model. Instead, maintaining such a huge number of users became a 
financial burden for Tencent. At the worst time, Tencent even considered to sell QQ 
for 100,000 US dollars (QQ.com, 2011).   
  Since 1998, inspired by the success of American web portals Yahoo and AOL, 
China’s new media industry had stepped into the era of web portal (Wu, 2011). Web 
portal is designed to bring information together from different sources to one platform, 
which is usually regarded as the starting point of surfing the Internet. In 1998, 
Netease started to transform from selling software to building web portals (163.com, 
2009a). In the same year, Sohu declared its intention to become the best web portal in 
China (163.com, 2009). In December 1998, Stone Rich Sight Information Technology 
merged with Sinanet.com, a US website company. The two merged websites later 
became world’s largest Chinese web portal Sina.com (Sina.com, 1999). In 2003, 
Tencent also launched its own web portal QQ.com and quickly caught up with the 
former three major web portals (Wu, 2011). Besides, some small sites also redesigned 
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themselves and transformed to web portals. Web advertising is the main sources of 
revenue for these web portals. By 2007, however, with the restructuring of online 
advertising market (e.g., the rise of search engine advertising), the growth of 
advertising revenue for traditional web portals had become smaller and smaller 
(Bianews.com, 2008). Therefore, China’s web portals companies began to explore 
more interactive and stickier business models.  
  In 2005, China’s first blogging service Blogchina, established by Fang Xingdong in 
2002, obtained USD 10 million venture capital, which greatly inspired China’s new 
media companies’ passion and enthusiasm towards blogging (163.com, 2009b). 
Within a few months, blogging websites mushroomed in China, including BlogCN, 
Blogbus, etc. Later, almost every major web portal and some independent online 
forums launched blogging service, such as Sina Blog, Sohu Blog, Netease Blog, 
Tianya blog, Qzone (i.e., blogging service hosted by Tencent). The grassroots nature 
and interactivity distinguishes blogs from other static websites and quickly makes 
blogs popular among Chinese netizens. However, one pending problem is that how 
blogs make money. Since blogs cannot directly generate valuable information, 
traditional web portal advertising model (i.e., web advertising) is not workable for 
blogs. Most of the small blogging service providers operate unprofitably and finally 
were kicked out of the market, like Meansys Blog (Sina.com, 2006). Several big blog 
websites founded by web portals survive until now and rely heavily on the support of 
the parent companies, such as Sina Blog and Sohu Blog.  
  In 2008, domestic SNS like Renren.com and Kaixin001.com, which modeled after 
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Facebook, became popular among Chinese college students and white-collars 
(163.com, 2009b). Other new media companies, including Sina, Sohu, Netease and 
Tencent, followed closely behind and launched similar social networking sites 
(163.com, 2009a). Compared with blogs, the sociability and interactivity of these SNS 
are stronger, which affords the operators to explore some new revenue channels. For 
example, Kaixin001.com, which is best known for its online games, implants in-game 
advertisements in its Web game apps, such as “Parking War” and “Friends for Sale”. 
Besides, similar to Facebook, Renren and Kaixin Network also open their platforms, 
allowing third parties to integrate with their platforms by adding functionalities and 
introducing modifications. The websites holders and the third party developers share 
the revenue (Sohu.com, 2009b). 
  As Twitter’s valuation sustained higher, China’s new media entrepreneurs, 
especially those web portal companies, began to adjust their strategy again. Since 
2009, microblog has become the standard component for major web portals 
(Chinaz.com, 2009). Wall Street also published reports to support the prospect of 
microblog in China (Imeigu.com, 2010). With the blockade of Facebook and Twitter 
in China, domestic microblog has become one of the dominant social networks for 
Chinese netizens due to its strong interactivity, low participatory barriers, relatively 
free speech, real time information, and bottom-up broadcasting mechanism. However, 
the revenue-model of these microblog companies is still not clear.  
  Tracing back through the development of China’s new media market, one of the 
most critical problems is the herding phenomenon (see Chen, 2010; Mu, 2009). New 
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media entrepreneurs jump on the bandwagon in a rush, and very soon they realize that 
such kind of business model is unprofitable, thus quickly getting out of the market. 
Nowadays, most of the Chinese new media companies adopt a diversified business 
model which is built on the blending of free and paid services. Free services are the 
basic for most kinds of new media businesses, which can help attract users, 
accumulate popularity and reputation, and receive venture capital. Only on such 
foundation, paid services might be profitable.  
  Currently the charging models can be divided into three categories (Zhou, 2012). 
First, value-added services which charge users is a common revenue source for 
commercial websites. Cooperating with telecoms carriers, commercial websites 
provide mobile phone users with color ring-back tone (i.e. CRBT) and content via 
short messages. As mentioned earlier, mobile value-added services used to save the 
whole Chinese new media industry during the Internet bubbles. Even today it is still 
one of the important revenue sources for many big new media companies. For 
instance, in 2012 Tencent’s revenues from value-added services were USD592.3 
million, 8.47% of the total revenues (Tencent.com, 2013). Besides, virtual product 
trading in online game, which has brought great profits for new media companies, is 
also a kind of charging value-added services. Players pay the game by purchasing 
Game Time Card (GTC) and game equipment. Many web portal companies, such as 
NetEase and Sohu, takes online game as their main profit channel. Paid high-end 
products and services are also a kind of value-added services charging users. Users 
are classified into different levels on many websites, and only paying users can 
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become high-level users and enjoy certain services. Second, platform usage fee is an 
important revenue source for e-commerce websites. For example, Chinese B2C 
website Tmall, launched by Alibaba, charges sellers store fees. On C2C website 
Taobao, if the sellers want their stores to be displayed on the home page of Taobao, 
they need to pay money. Third, similar to traditional media, advertising is also a main 
revenue model for new media companies. In 2013, revenues of China online 
advertising market amounted to 18.5 billion USD, in which brand advertising and 
search advertising accounted for the vast majority of market share 
(Iresearchchina.com, 2014). However, advertising revenue is easily affected by 
economic fluctuations. A company that is over-dependent on advertising revenue may 
be hit hard by the economic crisis. Take Sina Corp as example. Advertising revenue 
has taken up more than 60% of Sina’s total revenue since 2007. Influenced by global 
financial crisis in 2009, Sina Corp’s market value greatly dropped and its advertising 
revenue declined 8.3% year-on-year, which directly led to 2% decline of its total 
revenue. This is also one of the reason why Sina urgently sought more efficient and 
interactive revenue models after 2009.  
  China’s new media companies’ exploration of business model, though often blindly 
and randomly, has led to the development of Internet in China. Those major attempts 
in Web 2.0 context, such as blogging, microblog and other social networks, have even 
directly accelerated the emergence of civil society in the world of bits and bytes. This 
is what the new media entrepreneurs might not consider before. There are scholars 
pointing out that the arena of social networks can be seen as China’s first free speech 
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arena (see Richburg, 2011). With these new changes, China’s party-state and its 
security apparatus also enhance their vigilance and keep up with the pace of change. 
Under such circumstances, new media companies in China, especially those social 
media companies, need to not only serve customers, advertisers, and investors, but 
also address the needs of the state and governments.  
 
3.1.4 State regulation and control 
3.1.4.1 Internet regulation machinery 
  As mentioned earlier, the MII was established in 1998 to manage China’s 
information technology sector. However, with the growing economic and political 
significance of the Internet, issues become complicated.  
  Chinese state exercises its institutional control over the new media industry through 
both CCP organizations and state agencies. Under the CCP, Department of 
Propaganda (DOP) is the principal organization for media control. The DOP guides 
and supervises the work of several media-related state agencies under the Party 
principle, according to which “the media must adhere ideologically to the party line, 
propagate the party message, and obey its policies” (Zheng, 2007, p. 56). Under the 
State Council, the key state organization regulating the Internet is the State Internet 
Information Office (SIIO), founded in May 2011, which is a subordinate agency 
under the SCIO. The duties of this agency include “directing online content 
management; supervising online gaming, video and publication; promoting major 
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news Websites; overseeing online government propaganda; investigating and 
punishing violators of online content rules; overseeing the telecommunications 
companies that provide access for Internet users and content providers alike” 
(Nytimes.com, 2011).  
  However, before the establishment of the SIIO, China already has a welter of 
ministries and government offices that claim jurisdiction over parts of cyberspace. 
First, there is a high-ranking State Council agency, the State Information Leading 
Group (SILG) formed in 1996, overseeing the work of MII. Besides, there are other 
agencies that have some control over the Internet, including the MII, the SARFT, 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Commerce, State 
Press and Publication Administration (SPPA), State Secrecy Bureau, etc. Each of 
them has provincial or lower-level bodies. For example, under the SIIO, there are 
provincial equivalents, such as Beijing Internet Information Office and Guangdong 
Internet Information Office. Every level of the public security department has its own 
Internet censorship department.  
  Actually, the relationship between these different agencies and their division of 
power on new media industry is quite unclear. Observers explained the underlying 
cause for the current situation in new media regulation (see Zheng, 2007; Nytimes, 
2011). The mushrooming growth of China’s new media business has generated great 
economic and political interests. Therefore, many government agencies seek to step 
into this lucrative industry to gain more authority or more money.  
  Besides the above government and party organizations, there is also a nonofficial 
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-governing body for China’s new media industry -- that is Internet Society of China 
(ISC), founded in May 2001 (ISC, 2014). By now, at lease 14 organizations can point 
a finger at the operation of new media business (Nytimes, 2011). Sometimes, these 
agencies may even collaborate or work with each other to launch national campaigns 
to curb the dissemination of undesirable information on the domestic Internet network, 
which is considered to affect national security and social stability.  
 
3.1.4.2 Internet censorship policies 
  Internet censorship in China is conducted under a wide variety of laws and 
regulations, which all serve the principle that “Internet security is a prerequisite for 
the sound development and effective utilization of the Internet”, raised by Chinese 
government (Gov.cn, 2010).   
  Zheng (2007) classified these laws and regulations on the Internet issued between 
1994 and 2005 into three categories. The first category is the administrative 
provisions for Internet content censorship. These provisions mainly prohibit the 
discussion and spread of any information that is believed to be a “state secret”. 
However, the definition of “state secret” remains vague, which means that any 
information that the authorities deem harmful to state security could be censored. 
Besides, this category also involves rules that are used for collective actions. 
“Information inciting illegal assemblies, demonstration, marches, or gatherings to 
disturb social order” and “information released in the name of illegal civil 
organizations” is forbidden (Zheng, 2007; 62).  
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  Another category Zheng summarized is the rules governing operation of the 
Internet service. In order to filter the information that is offensive to the state, 
provisions have been carried out to prohibit unapproved individuals and institutions 
from establishing or using non-MII gateways for Internet traffic. Moreover, the 
provisions require that any entity that intends to launch an Internet business should 
apply for an operating license from the MII. Besides, provisions also provide that 
individuals and entities engaging in international wiring “shall not commit violations 
or crimes concerning endangering national security or disclosing state secrets and 
shall refrain from making, checking, copying, and transmitting pornographic 
information”, otherwise they will be punished by law (Zheng, 2007; 63).  
  The last category is the rules for the users of the Internet services. The provisions 
require that individuals and entities should register with relevant government agencies 
before they can connect to Internet. Besides, they are not allowed to publish, discuss, 
or spread any state secrets on cyberspace.   
  Besides what Zheng summarized, in 2005, the SCIO and the MII jointly issued the 
Regulations on Management of Internet News Service, providing that news websites 
and commercial websites can only reprint political news from print and broadcasting 
media. In other words, they don’t have the right of newsgathering (Xinhuanet.com, 
2005). This move aimed at prohibiting new media organizations to become online 
news provisions.   
  In May 2010, the SCIO released a 31-page white paper on the Internet in China that 
continued to emphasize “state secret”. It requires all Internet users, including both 
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individuals and new media companies, to abide by relevant laws and regulations. No 
one may use Internet to “engage in activities that jeopardize state security” (SCIO, 
2010). Moreover, the white paper also supports new media industry’s self-disciplinary 
organizations. Actually, as early as in 2002, as an effort to protect themselves under 
government pressure, a group of Chinese new media companies under the ISC 
voluntarily signed the “Public Pledge on Self-discipline for China Internet Industry” 
to resist producing, releasing and disseminating information that is “harmful to 
national security and social stability” (ISC, 2002; Tai, 2006; 101). Since then, more 
new media companies joined this “self-disciplinary pact” in order to protect 
themselves.  
   
3.1.4.3 Internet control measures 
  In addition to these above formal laws and regulations, the Chinese government has 
also employed enormous measures of controlling the Internet, including technical 
methods such as blocking of access to websites, keyword filtering, bandwidth 
throttling, and more coercive moves such as website closure and police arrests. These 
methods are not only exercised in routine control, but also strengthened during 
heightened security or sensitive periods.  
  Blocking is a widely used technical method against online dissidents, towards both 
domestic websites and foreign websites. Since November 2003, the MPS has imposed 
its Golden Shield Project, a censorship and surveillance project derisively termed  
“the world’s largest firewall” or “the Great Firewall”, that can block access to a 
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certain IP address that is believed to contain “harmful information” (Qiu, 1999; 
Wikipedia, 2014). By May 2014, more than 3000 domains, 2000 Google searches, 
1600 HTTPS, 900 IP addresses and Wikipedia pages are or were blocked in mainland 
China (excluding HongKong and Macau) under China’s policy of Internet censorship 
(greatfire.org, 2014). Among them, there are some notable websites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, Youtube, Google, etc. Besides, the government also frequently blocks some 
news websites or BBSs during heightened security times, such as the annual meetings 
of the National People’s Congress and the National Party Congress and the 
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.  
  Another commonly used technical method for censorship is filtering. “The Great 
Firewall” can also automatically filter online content by targeting at certain keywords 
deemed obscene, pornographic, or politically sensitive such as “June Forth”, leaders’ 
name of China, Falun Gong, etc. Through filtering, only the content deemed 
appropriate is accessible for Internet users in China. For example, if one searches for 
“June Forth” on China’s domestic search engine Baidu, one would get “according to 
local laws and regulations, some of the search results are not displayed”. According to 
the research Real Time Filtering in China, conducted by Edelman and Zittrain (2005) 
from Harvard Law School, China’s Internet filtering regime is the most effective and 
sophisticated in the world.   
  Besides these technical methods, the authorities in China also use more coercive 
means to control Internet. For those websites who gravely violate rules and 
regulations, the government may close them for a few days or forever as a punishment. 
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Most of these closed websites are deemed politically incorrect, spreading political 
scandals, anti-party speech, democratic free speech, social protests, or other contested 
and critical opinions. For example, YTHT BBS, a popular Internet forum created by 
students of Peking University, was banned many times by the government because of 
its hot discussion on political topics (Bcchinese.net, 2004). Other free speech websites, 
like The Field of Ideas and China Finance Information Network, were permanently 
closed (Zheng, 2007; Li, 2003).  
  In addition to Internet closure, the CCP has long been strongly criticized for its 
arrests and imprisonment of Internet users. These are more drastic coercive methods 
to punish those who produce or spread undesirable information on the Internet, and 
also remind other Internet users and website owners that they are all being monitored 
and should behave cautiously. According to the statistics provided by Zheng (2007), 
there were 54 reported Internet arrests in China during 1999 to 2003. Some of them 
were sentenced a few days, and some were imprisoned more than 10 years. These 
detained people are mostly arrested for “subverting the state” and considered as 
“Internet dissident” because they criticize the government, advocate democracy and 
human rights, communicate with overseas dissident, supporting anti-CCP forces, or 
organize social protests.  
 
3.1.4.4 Summary  
  Although China’s Internet control regime is very sophisticated, it does not mean 
that the party-state can always exercise effective control. On the one hand, Chinese 
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authorities do allow some information criticizing or complaining about the status quo, 
especially in non-mainstream media (MacKinnon, 2008). Such tolerance for 
outspokenness outside official channels shows that the government intentionally 
relieves social pressure by allowing troublemakers to let off steam in marginal media 
(see Hassid, 2012a).  
  On the other hand, many factors can hinder the effectiveness of this control regime. 
First, China never really has a tradition of rule of law. Many Internet rules and 
regulations are not implemented at the operational level. For example, the real-name 
registration policy, which is originally planned to exorcise “bad speech” from the 
Internet, has never been enforced effectively (Theatlantic.com, 2013). Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, new media industry is a big market and field of 
power that many government agencies want to have their hands on. The conflicts and 
discord among different interests within the government can also become the 
difficulty of law enforcement. Zheng (2007) pointed out that the commercial interests 
of Internet regulatory regime sometimes might conflict with the political interests of 
Internet control regime. More specifically, the primary goal of regulatory regime is to 
promote the prosperity of new media industry while the priority of control regime is 
to limit the political impact of new media. Sometimes one prevails over the other, but 
other times do not. Second, the rapid development of new technology has enabled 
Chinese Internet users to “engage in ‘guerrilla warfare’ with the control regime” 
(Zheng, 2007, p. P68). Various processes for evading censorship are used. For 
example, the Internet users disguise their references by using nicknames for the 
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leaders they cannot mention. Domestic users can also use anti-censorship software to 
circumvent the firewall and access banned materials. The popularity of cellphone also 
enables information to be disseminated via short messaging service (SMS for short). 
Besides, within recent years, all kinds of social networking services, such as blog and 
microblog, are easily updated to spread difficult-to-censor information.  
  In all, factors both internal and external to the political system and circumstances 
can affect the party-state to exercise control over new media. Furthermore, the 
complications in Internet regulation and control could occur in such issues as the 
interaction between different interests within the authorities, the conflicts between 
social forces and the state, and the ambivalent attitude of new media business to 
Internet control.   
  Besides, especially noteworthy is that now China’s new media industry has stepped 
into the era of social media. Both big new media corporations and small businesses 
launched different kinds of social media services to take a share of this market, 
including collaborative projects (e.g., Baike), content communities (e,g., Youku and 
Tudou), social networking sites (e.g., Renren and Douban), blogs and microblogs 
(e.g., Lofter and Weibo), etc. Since social media allows the creation and exchange of 
user-generated content (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010), the popularity of social media has 
directly accelerated the growth of online public sphere and thus challenged China’s 
political system and state-controlled mass media. The public plays an increasingly 
significant role in affecting the interaction between different factors around social 
media business. For this reason, this study will particularly pay attention to social 
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media business in new media industry. A big picture of the evolution of the political 
economy of Chinese new media is attempted to draw.  
 
 
3.2 Sina Weibo 
Studying all the social media businesses in China through ethnography is a huge 
project. Given that impossibility, I only look at one social media platform and one 
type of social media business in this study. Even though many Chinese new media 
companies have launched social media services, Sina Weibo has several features that 
make it particularly interesting as an object of study. 
  Currently, in China’s increasingly lucrative social media sector, microblog service 
Sina Weibo and instant messaging service Tencent WeChat are the biggest players, 
standing out above the rest especially in popularity (Daonong.com, 2013). According 
to the companies’ second quarter 2014 reports, Sina Weibo had 156.5 million 
monthly active users (MAUs) and Tencent WeChat had 438 million MAUs 
(Techinasia.com, 2014). However, they differ in their functionality, core user base, 
and user behavior. Weibo is an open platform, akin to Twitter. It allows users to post 
short messages which are up to 140 characters long, and users may follow any 
number of other users. Users on Weibo can also forward posts from other users, reply 
to others, mention other users by using the @ symbol in their posts, and participate in 
topic discussions by using hashtag “#” in their posts (Sina Weibo, 2016). WeChat is a 
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closed loop with private chatting and photo-sharing among small circles of friends, 
akin to WhatsApp but with more features. A WeChat user’s friends are invisible to 
others, even to his own friends. Other users cannot see the comments on your own 
WeChat page, unless the comments are from mutual friends (WeChat, 2016). Due to 
these differences, the social use and impact of Weibo and WeChat in China are also 
different. Compared with the more private WeChat, Weibo is more like a public 
media where information can be produced and disseminated rapidly and widely. 
Today, social protests, political scandals, and other contested issues spread ever faster 
and wider through the platform of Weibo in China. Observers point out that Sina 
Weibo can be seen as the first free speech arena in China. Some even claim that the 
microblog sphere in China has become a “virtual political system” due to the 
formation of public opinion and the participation of party and government (Economy 
& Mondschein, 2011). Frequent online public incidents have drawn Sina Weibo into 
the tension between the public and state. In contrast, WeChat has the feature of 
closed-loop and voice messaging, which make it difficult to form large-scale public 
opinion and censor the content. This is the first reason why I choose a public 
microblogging service Sina Weibo, not a private messaging service Tencent WeChat 
as my research focus.  
  Next, Sina Weibo is one of the major business subsidiaries of Sina Corp, which is a 
typical Chinese online media company. Like most of the big new media companies, 
Sina Corp absorbs start-up capital from overseas, explores diverse business models, 
lists on stock market, faces fierce competition, and has to deal with the intervention of 
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the party-state. The story of Sina Corp is significant for the entire Chinese new media 
industry. In December 1998, Sina Corp was founded by the merger of a Chinese 
software company Stone Rich Sight Information Technology and a US website 
company Sinanet.com. After that, Sina.com was born and later became the world’s 
largest Chinese language web portal. In November 1999, Sina Corp announced that 
they had closed USD 60 million in the Series C financing round, with Dell Computer 
being the lead investor (Sina.com, 2001b). In 13 April 2000, Sina Corp was approved 
for listing on the NASDAQ stock exchange. After its listing, Sina Corp stepped into a 
period of rapid growth. According to the survey of Gallup China in 2003, sina.com 
has approximately three billion page views every day, ranking it as the most popular 
website in China (Friedrichsen & Mühl-Benninghaus, 2013). In the same year, it was 
awarded the “Chinese Language Media of the Year” by the leading newspaper 
Southern Weekend for its contribution to the formation of online public opinion on 
public incidents (Sina.com, 2003).  
  In 2005, Sina.com launched its blog service Sina Blog, featuring the blogs of 
celebrities. It quickly became the dominant blog service in China (Cnbeta.com, 2007), 
bringing Sina Corp to prominence once again. However, with the rise of social 
networking sites such as Kaixin001 and Renren in 2007, traditional blogs lost many 
users owing to their relative lack of interactivity and unclear profit model 
(Chinaz.com, 2008). Influenced by the global economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, the 
market value and advertising revenue of Sina Corp dropped sharply, which pressured 
Sina Corp to seek new products.  
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  On 14 August 2009, Sina Corp launched the tested version of Sina Weibo. One 
year later, Sina Weibo launched an application programming interface (API) platform 
for developing third party applications (Techweb.com, 2010). In April 2011, Sina 
Weibo replaced its old domain “t.sina.com.cn” with the new one “weibo.com”, 
indicating Sina Corp’s intention to separate Sina Weibo from its parent company 
(Sina.com, 2011b). In April 2013, Sina Weibo and Alibaba Group signed a strategic 
pact in which Alibaba acquired 18 percent of Sina Weibo for USD 586 million with 
an option to buy up to 30 percent in the future (Morningwhistle.com, 2013). By 
December 2013, Sina Weibo’s monthly active users and daily active users had 
reached 129.1 million and 61.4 million (QQ.com, 2014), pushing its competitors out 
of the market. Meanwhile, due to the low user activity, Tencent and NetEase, the two 
competitors of Sina Weibo, began to decrease investment in their microblog services 
and shifted focus to other projects (Hexun.com, 2014). This represents that Sina 
Weibo has outperformed all its competitors in China’s microblog market.  
  In 2014, Sina Corp has taken a series of moves in preparation for Weibo’s entry 
into the American stock market. First, in March 2014, Sina Weibo dropped “Sina” 
from its name and is now only officially known as “Weibo”. Then, Sina Corp 
announced a spinoff of Weibo as a separate entity and filed an IPO under the symbol 
of WB (Scmp.com, 2014). On 17 April 2014, Weibo as a company began trading 
publicly on the NASDAQ. After IPO, Sina Corp and Alibaba retain 56.9% and 32% 
ownership in Weibo respectively (Hexun.com, 2014).  
  Moreover, since 2009, Sina Weibo Night, a Weibo related awards ceremony whose 
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slogan is “micro power can change the world”, has been held annually by Sina Corp. 
The award categories include Weibo Trending Topics of the Year, Weibo Celebrities 
of the Year and Weibo Grassroots of the Year, covering almost every aspect of 
contemporary Chinese society, especially touching on the public incidents that most 
concerned the public during the year (Sina.com, 2013a). Sina Weibo shows a desire to 
build up an image of responsible social media in the eyes of the public. Undoubtedly, 
Weibo has brought great opportunities for Sina Corp which started as an infotainment 
web portal. However, problems arise during Sina Corp’s transition from a Web 1.0 
news and entertainment portal to a social networking service. The unclear profit 
model and continuous financial loss have put a heavy strategic burden on Sina Corp. 
The event of Alibaba purchasing Sina Weibo’s stake has led to great controversy 
among both industrial players and societal members. Some observers think that the 
speeding up of Sina Weibo’s monetization will create negative effects on user 
experience, and even destroy the independence of Weibo as a public media platform 
(see Tian, 2013; Liang, 2013).  
  Since Weibo was launched in 2009, it has attracted a lot of attention from China’s 
domestic scholars, and even from some foreign scholars. Most of the existing 
academic research has focused on information dissemination (e.g., Qu, et al., 2011; 
Guo, et al., 2011; Long, et al., 2011; Liu & Liu, 2011; Wu, et al., 2011), user behavior 
(e.g., Zhang & Pentina, 2012; Gao, et al., 2012; Guan, et al., 2014), Internet policy 
(e.g., Mou, et al., 2011; Wu, et al., 2011), online activism and grassroots mobilization 
(e.g., Hassid, 2012b; Yang, 2012; Wang, 2013; Li, 2011; Qiang, 2011; Mou, et al., 
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2013), government electronization (e.g., Liu & Zhou, 2011; Cao & Wu, 2012), and 
journalism and Weibo (e.g., Fu & Lee, 2014; Zhang & Negro, 2013; Bei, 2013). Only 
a few systematic and scientific studies examine the dynamics of Weibo and other 
social media in China with an emphasis on the political and economic practices of 
social media business. Research begins with little awareness of the specific context in 
which the social media platform originates. Most of the previous studies discuss the 
role of social media without considering the behavior of the companies themselves 
and take the social media content as granted. Such a situation is unsurprising. There 
are difficulties inherent in obtaining the abovementioned information. The 
predominant method of this kind of research has been participant observation of 
social media professionals at work or in-depth interview of involved informants, but 
this method requires co-operation from social media companies under study and this 
has been increasingly difficult to obtain (MacQuail, 2010).  
  Arguably, however, social media companies play a significant role in shaping 
social media platforms. The values, perspectives, strategies, and practices of social 
media professionals do have a great impact on the social media’s content and form. 
Besides, the social media companies also serve as an intermediate party between 
different structural actors. What the social media business do significantly affect 
relationships between the state, market and public. Therefore, it is not comprehensive 
to understand China’s new media system without gaining insights into the new media 
companies.  
  So far, several academic studies have taken the behaviors of China’s social media 
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operators into accounts to see the role of social media in relation with the state control. 
Lagerkvist’s (2011, 2012) studies placed the social media companies in the center to 
understand its relationship with the state control. He identified that the social media 
sector cooperates with the party-state in China by exercising the delegated 
responsibilities of social control from the state. He concluded that such cooperation 
with the state is the norm but cracks in cooperation are emerging due to state’s 
continued negotiations on policy. The studies of Bamman et al (2012), Benney (2013) 
and Sullivan (2014) mentioned the behaviors of social media companies, but they 
didn’t place much emphasis on it. These three scholars also agree that such 
cooperation exists by arguing that the process of Weibo censorship should not be 
understood as a reactive process forced by the state but something that is being 
performed by Sina Corp in cooperation with the state. The abovementioned studies 
provided some understandings of why and how state delegate censorship to social 
media operators. However, only Lagerkvist’s studies focused on the role and decision 
making of social media business. None of these studies present comprehensive works 
on how the social media business practices self-censorship at the operational level and 
the problems in exercising self-censorship in real-world cases. Furthermore, in recent 
two years, new changes have taken place in China’s social media sphere. Large-scale 
deletion of Weibo posts is increasingly rare. A growing number of state and 
government agencies appear on Weibo and directly talk to the public. Now the state is 
not only the controller of social media but also a consumer of it. All the new changes 
should been taken into accounts when examining the relationship between state and 
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social media business. Moreover, market forces, such as the investors, advertisers and 
competitors, also have a great impact on the decision making of social media 
companies and should be taken into consideration in order to draw a more 
comprehensive picture of Chinese social media. Therefore, this paper attempts to fill 
the gap in Chinese social media studies through centering the social media companies 
such as Sina Weibo.  
  Considering all the above, I have chosen Sina Weibo as the research object of my 
study. Although Sina Weibo obviously cannot be seen as the whole new media sector 
in China, some generalizable insights may nevertheless be drawn. 
 
3.3 Research Problems and Questions 
The research problem of this study concerns the strategies, perspectives and values 
that Chinese social media companies adopt to construct their own business practices 
to form a complicated relationship with the state, market, and the public. The 
historical review above presents the growing track of China’s new media industry in 
relation to different social and structural factors, from which several problems and 
dilemmas are highlighted in view of the survival and development of China’s social 
media industry.  
  First, problems and dilemmas exist in the interaction between the state, social 
media business and pubic. Although China’s social media outlet was born without the 
burden of state ownership, which means that they don’t need to rely on state 
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investment and have the party officials as board members, its relationship with the 
party-state is not simple at all. As discussed earlier, facing the world’s largest social 
media market, Chinese state is torn between its massive drive for marketization and 
the need to curb online dissent. China’s social media industry has a great deal of 
support from the state policies, while also need to take part of the responsibility of 
social control and introduce censorship into their business processes in order to stay in 
the government’s good graces. However, exercising censorship usually requires costly 
human and hardware resources, which are both financial and administrative burden 
for new media companies. Moreover, when taking the needs of the public into 
consideration, the problems facing social media business would become more 
complex. For the profit-driven social media companies, in order to achieve 
commercial success they need to publish materials that can attract high traffic. This 
will inevitably involve pornographic, vulgar and even politically sensitive content, 
which may be offensive to the authorities. Dilemmas arise here. If these social media 
entrepreneurs stand by the public who demands unfiltered news, they may offend the 
Chinese officials and even be threatened with a shutdown. If the social media 
companies are more inclined to meet the needs of the authorities, they may probably 
suffer a loss of users and be accused as the “political stooge of the government” by 
the public. Additionally, as discussed in the former chapter, social media in China 
was born and grows up in the social expectation that it is the most free and 
independent media, which shoulders the responsibility of facilitating free speech and 
civil society. Accordingly, besides making profit, China’s social media companies 
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also care about building a responsible and independent image in the eyes of the public. 
Their relationship with the state not only influences profit making, but also reputation 
winning. Therefore, particularly noteworthy is the paradoxical role of China’s social 
media business in allying with the party-state or the public. Actually this dilemma has 
been discussed by some scholars both in the traditional media (see Zhao, 1998; Zhao, 
Y., 2008) and social media context (see Lagerkvist, 2011, 2012; Zheng, 2007). Thus 
the research question that follows on this problematic will resonate the main concern 
of Lagerkvist’s study (2012), but will be explored more broadly and deeply. The 
question is:    
  RQ1: How does Sina Weibo practice self-censorship and the duty delegated from 
the state to control media content?  
  Second, problems rise in interactions between market, social media business and 
public. Different from the traditional media sector, the entire China’s social media 
industry was born and grows up in the context of marketization and globalization of 
capital. Market influence is hence significant on the survival and development of 
China’s social media business. Conflicts come up in the interaction between social 
media business and different market forces, including advertisers, sponsors and 
investors, especially when taking the public into this picture. As discussed in Chapter 
1, media’s public could be the citizens under control of the authorities, and they are 
also the consumers and users of the media product. Accelerating monetization is a 
necessary outcome in social media business’ pursuit of maximizing profits and 
supporting themselves in fierce market competition. Inevitably, social media 
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companies would stand close to advertisers and other kinds of commercial partners, 
such as domestic and transnational investors. Whereas, over-monetization, such as 
excessive implantation of online advertising and commercial elements into social 
media product, may affect user experience and even incur users’ antipathy towards 
this product. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, many big Chinese social media 
companies started from absorbing capital from domestic and transnational venture 
capitalists and achieved further development from being listed on foreign stock 
exchanges. The capital flows not only bring strong capital to China’s social media 
entrepreneurs, but also bring in the risks and other uncontrollable results. Immature 
Chinese social media players, on the one hand, have to meet the expectation of their 
investors and stakeholders. On the other hand, they make best efforts to scramble for 
and maintain their managerial and administrative autonomy. All the interaction with 
different market forces will eventually affect the form of a social media product in 
front of its users. Sometimes, the needs and interests of the market and the public can 
reach agreement. But mostly, social media business is pulled into the situation where 
the demands of monetization and the public conflict each other. Similarly, allying 
with the market or the public is a thorny question. Thus, the second research question 
this thesis examines is as follows:  
  RQ2a: What are the interests, conflicts and problems occurring in Sina Weibo’s 
pursuit of monetization? 
  RQ2b: How do the conflicts between the needs of users and monetization manifest 
themselves and affect the development of Sina Weibo? 
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  China’s social media companies are actually serving three “masters” with diverging 
interests, namely the state, market and public. It is both a financial, administrative and 
strategic burden for these companies. They should always take precautionary 
measures so they walk a fine line between the demands of different actors that can 
exert influence on the survival and development of these new media companies. To 
answer these two research questions, two dimensions need to be taken into account: 
1): how Sina Weibo interacts with different social actors, 2) how the interactions 
affect the survival and development of Sina Weibo.  
   














Chapter 4 Research Methods 
Ethnographic field work, a combination of in-depth interviews, participant 
observations and analysis of textual materials, was employed as the key method in 
this research to gain insights into the values, strategies and practices of Sina Weibo, 
and also to observe the mechanisms and dynamics of Weibo sphere.  
 
4.1 Why Ethnography? 
In general, ethnography refers to the description of people and their culture (Schwartz 
& Jacobs, 1979). It is a method for grasping “the native’s point of view” (Malinowski, 
1922, p. 25). Ethnography enables the investigator to go into the field and collect data 
from the view of the participants (Stablein, 1996). To answer the research questions 
of this study, it requires going behind the scenes of Sina Weibo to reveal the 
complexity of forces, constraints and conventions that influence the social media 
outputs. Insiders’ viewpoints and values are needed. Being able to find out the 
operating norms and practices of a media organization calls for a relatively 
continuous presence among and close familiarity with the social media practitioners. 
Only by accessing the media organization, can the researcher obtain firsthand 
accounts of the organization, explore more details that may be hidden to outside 
observers, and gain novel insights. In this sense, ethnographic methodology is the 
only way by which the normally invisible realm of social media production can be 
recorded and made available for wider consideration. Participant observation will 
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allow the researcher to see what the social media practitioners do and say in their 
working setting; interviews with key informants help describe what the social media 
practitioners themselves think about what they do and say; and what sense they make 
of those actions and interactions. Observations and interviews come close to provide 
access to the values, beliefs, strategies and practices of the Sina Weibo company. All 
in all, ethnography yields insights that cannot be obtained by any other means.  
 
4.2 In-depth interviews 
  In January, April and June 2014, in-depth interviews were conducted with 
twenty-three interviewees, including fourteen professionals from Sina Weibo, four 
professionals from other Chinese social media companies, three active and popular 
microbloggers on Weibo, and two journalists from traditional media organizations. 
The professionals of Sina Weibo interviewed are either current or former employees, 
holding positions in either the Operational Department or Weibo Department of Sina 
Corp with a minimum of two years work experience in Sina. I intentionally sought for 
diversity in terms of their administrative levels (both in junior and senior positions) 
and work area (e.g., marketing, editing, censoring, advertising, and designing). I also 
interviewed four professionals from other social media companies in China (e.g., 
NetEase and Tencent) as a comparison and complement of the interviews of the Sina 
Weibo employees. Furthermore, two journalists from China Central Television 
(CCTV) and People’s Daily, the most influential and authoritative traditional media 
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in China, were also interviewed about their personal views, as well as the views of the 
CCTV and People’s Daily leadership, on the popularity of social media especially 
Weibo in Chinese society and among traditional journalists. For the recruitment of 
these interviewees, I first relied on my personal contacts within Sina Corp. After that, 
snowball sampling technique was utilized to further recruit eligible participants. I also 
identified three popular grassroots microbloggers on Weibo and interviewed them 
about their personal views on the censorship and monetization of Weibo. All 
interviews were under the condition of maintaining the anonymity of the interviewees. 
The sample size is calculated based on the progress of the interviews. I intentionally 
sought for diversity in terms of personal background, administrative level, type of 
work, length of working life, etc. I stopped when information reached a saturation 
point at which no new information and themes are observed.  
  Among the 23 interviews, 16 were carried out face-to-face in Beijing, and the rest 
were conducted via telephone and instant messaging tools (e.g., Weibo messages), 
depending upon the interviewees’ personal preference. The interviews were 
semi-structured and each took from 45-90 minutes with an average of one hour. An 
open-ended interview question guide was used as a rough guideline during the 
interviews, but not all questions were asked of each of the interviewees, and new 
questions were added occasionally varying from interviewee to interviewee.  
  The interviews began with asking basic demographic questions such as age, gender, 
education, etc. Then, interviewees were asked to discuss their views and opinions of 
some general issues, such as the new media industry and social media market in 
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China, techno-nationalism in China, ideological and institutional impacts on China’s 
new media, the role of new media in Chinese society, new media and democracy in 
China, etc. Next, the conversation moved on to cover relations with the party-state 
and government agencies. Questions related to China’s Internet regulation and 
censorship policies were asked, such as the blockade of foreign popular social media 
(Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, etc.), the relationship with government regulators, such 
as the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) and Department of Propaganda (DOP). 
Questions about relations with market factors were also posed, such as the 
monetization of new media, advertising market, investors’ impact, etc. To facilitate 
the conversation, interviewees from Sina Corp were asked more specific issues about 
their daily work, how they exercise self-censorship, how they deal with free speech 
and public incidents, how Sina Weibo makes profits and faces competition from other 
social media companies, the efficiency of Weibo related regulations and policies (e.g., 
City of Beijing’s Rules for Development and Administration Regarding Microblog 
Clients), Sina Weibo’s future strategy and planning. The interviewees from other 
social media companies were asked about their opinions toward the strategies and 
practices of Sina Weibo and the competition between different social media services. 
The three influential microbloggers were asked to discuss their user experience of 
Weibo and their perceptions of Weibo regulation and censorship. For all the questions, 
I encouraged the interviewees to provide real-world cases and examples.  
  Most of the questions posed were open-ended and broad to allow the interviewees 
leeway to offer more information and express their perspectives. Additionally, the 
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semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for flexibility in deviating from the 
list of questions if the conversation necessitated it, and further probing relevant topics 
to elicit richer data. The face-to-face and telephone interviews were audio-recorded 
with the interviewees’ consent. For interviewees who did not agree to the audio 
recording, field notes were taken instead. All the interviewees’ statements were 
cross-checked against other contextual materials and readings, such as the income 
reports of Sina, policy statements and requirements made by the government and state 
official media, the notices by Sina Weibo to its user base, etc.  
  All the recordings were transcribed verbatim and analyzed through open, axial and 
selective coding. Specifically, the transcripts were classified into different themes 
such as state and new media, market and new media, and public and new media. The 
instances that could not be classified were identified and the themes were refined to 
include such deviant cases. The classification and revision were repeated in each 
interview transcript and the coding themes were constantly revised until no 
unclassifiable texts emerged. Different interviews then were compared to each other 
and examined for similarities and differences. This analytic process is known as 
“inductive category development” (Mayring, 2000), which allows for salient and 
recurring themes to emerge from the text (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
 
4.3 Participant observations 
  As a key method of ethnographic research, participant observation helps the 
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researchers gain an intimate familiarity with the study population by entering their 
cultural environment as an “insider” while remaining an “outsider”, which is useful 
for obtaining an understanding of the cultural, social, political and economic contexts; 
“the relationships among and between people, contexts, ideas, norms and events”, as 
well as the study populations’ behaviors and activities (Mack, et al., 2005: 14). 
Therefore, in order to discern the mechanisms and dynamics of Sina Weibo, I 
conducted participant observation in both Sina Corp offline and in the Sina Weibo 
online community.  
  Regarding the participant observation in Sina Corp, my position as a former 
full-time employee of the Operational Department of Sina Corp at the Beijing 
headquarter from July 2011 to April 2012 has allowed me to establish a close rapport 
with the professionals of Weibo on a personal basis. As part of my job involved the 
product of Weibo, I am familiar with their operating norms and practices, values and 
perspectives. Since then, I have followed closely the trends of Sina Corp’s strategies, 
the decisions and changes in the management team of Sina Corp and Weibo, and the 
changes in the party-state’s regulatory policies on Weibo. My work experience in 
Sina is one of the motivations why I selected this research topic, because it has 
offered me interesting background insights into the working of the company. 
Compared with other researchers who haven’t worked in Sina before, it is easier for 
me to get access to the working environment of Sina Weibo and the professionals. 
Besides, I can also quickly find out what to observe and how to observe in the 
working environment of Sina. This gives me the added advantages of being able to 
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formulate first hand accounts of this media company, explore more details that may 
be hidden to the outside observer, and gain novel insights. What needs to be clarified 
is that although I used to work in Sina, all the data in this study were collected after 
my resignation. 
  I also conducted participant observation in the online community of Weibo. 
Participant observation in the online environment, often regarded as part of virtual 
ethnography, has been shown to be an effective method to “develop an enriched sense 
of the meanings of the technology and the cultures which enable it and are enabled by 
it” (Hine, 2000, p. 8). Researchers can take advantage of this method by entering the 
field to observe the mechanisms and dynamics of the online community and to 
“become familiar with the technologies and communication tools the community 
members use to make their activities possible” (Zhang & Mao, 2013). I registered a 
Weibo account in October 2010. To date, I have been a user for six years with 1,338 
tweets, 292 followings, and 7339 followers on Weibo. I took advantage of my 
experience to fully explore the activities on Weibo, such as reading, writing, 
forwarding, commenting and liking posts, participating in topic discussion, watching 
videos, browsing through images, in-site messaging, searching archives, and many 
others. I also kept a close eye on the daily trends of Weibo. When public incidents 
occurred, I paid special attention to the trends of public opinions on Weibo, the tweets 
posted by the accounts of government agencies, and the reactions of Weibo as a 
company. When Weibo’s design, structure or features were updated, I paid particular 
attention to the users’ reaction and feedback. When the state launched large-scale 
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campaign against online rumor, pornography or vulgarity, I kept an eye on the actual 
implementation by Weibo company and the debate among its users. These years of 
observation and participation in Weibo have allowed me to become familiar with the 
dynamics and mechanism of the Weibo ecosystem where different actors intertwine, 
conflict, and negotiate with each other, especially the interaction between the state 
and public.  
  Overall, my participant observation contributed to many rich insights into Sina 
Corp and the Weibo community. As discussed in Chapter 3, all the internal and 
external factors of an Internet company and the interaction between them will 
eventually affect the form of an Internet product in front of its users. For this reason, 
there is value in engaging in both online and offline participant observation. If 
participant observation in the Weibo community allows the researcher to focus on the 
phenomena online, participant observation in the social media organization provides 
the researcher with opportunities to explore the organizational reasons behind these 
phenomena. Participant observation both online and offline thus contribute 
significantly to a more comprehensive understanding of both Weibo ecosystem and 
new media system in China.  
  
4.4 Archival Documents  
  The in-depth interviews and participant observation were complemented by 
analysis of archival data. These textual materials, including posts and comments on 
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Weibo, Weibo site documents (e.g., notice and announcement to respective user base, 
help, and FAQs), companies’ annual reports, government policy papers, news reports, 
news interviews with key social media entrepreneurs, some internal documents of 
Sina provided by interviewees, and many more, were collected to serve as 
background information. The time frame of these documents was from year 2009 to 
2015.  
  The legal texts carried out by the government and Sina Corp, especially the laws 
and regulations that specifically regulate the dissemination of online information, 
were also examined. These documents included City of Beijing’s Rules for 
Development and Administration Regarding Microblog Clients, Sina Weibo 
Community Administrative Rules, the papers released in the 2014 Anti-pornography 
Campaign, and many others. All the interviewees were asked about these papers’ 
content and efficacy. Moreover, the speeches of the Chinese political leaders 
regarding ideology, propaganda, cultural and Internet industry were also examined in 
order to understand the relevant policy moves. All these documents and speeches are 
of great significance for doing in-depth qualitative studies in an authoritarian country 
such as China. Finally, news interviews with key social media entrepreneurs, news 
reports about Weibo and other social media by authoritative traditional media such as 
People’s Daily, Southern Weekly and CCTV were also studied.   
  To contextualize the questions in my interview guide, I carefully chose several 
controversial media events and public incidents on Weibo. The debates on these 
events both on Weibo and in traditional mass media were studied as important textual 
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materials to understand the power game behind these incidents.  
  The first is the 2013 Southern Weekly incident, which refers to the dispute between 
the Propaganda Department of Guangdong Province and the Southern Weekly 
newspaper, where the latter’s original new year special editorial was significantly 
changed by the propaganda officers bypassing the normal publication flow, with the 
modified version containing many basic mistakes. This incident led to the strike by 
the newsroom staff to protest against censorship, and attracted extensive attention 
both offline and online. The exposure of this incident on Weibo caused a huge stir, 
with many celebrity and common users expressing support for Southern Weekly and 
condemning the government’s propaganda department. Resulting from the incident, 
related keywords such as Southern Weekly and the name of the propaganda chief 
became sensitive words and were blocked by Sina Weibo, which caused the 
resentment of the public toward Sina Weibo. The public discontent also forced Sina to 
stand out to defend itself. As one of the most important events in China in recent 
years, the Southern Weekly incident does not only reflect the conflict between the 
Chinese government and the cry for free speech by media practitioners and the public, 
but also disclose the social media companies’ self-censorship practices and their 
difficult position in balancing the interests of the state and the public.  
  Another event is the Sina Weibo’s strategic alliance with Alibaba. After Alibaba 
purchasing the stake of Sina Weibo in 2013, the two companies have formed strategic 
alliance based on the integration of their user accounts. This event is generally seen as 
the speeding up of Sina Weibo’s monetization. The cooperation has not only brought 
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in interests, but also uncontrollable results. The users complained that too many 
advertisements on Weibo site were annoying and distracting. Some were worried that 
over-monetization might damage Weibo’s image as an independent media in the 
public’s eyes. Therefore, this event was chosen for my study to understand the 
relationship between the market, new media and public. Interviewees were all asked 
about their views on these events. 
 
4.5 Ethical Procedures 
  Almost all  studies of media organizations have the same ethical concern – 
whether the study will reveal the secret of the company and damage the interest of the 
business in political, economic and reputational terms? In order to avoid such 
negative influences, interview questions were carefully tailored to avoid any sensitive 
information (e.g., trade secret related issues), and interviewees were also reminded 
that they do not have to answer any questions they do not wish to or they think are 
inappropriate. All the information and opinions provided by interviewees only 
represent their personal views and not that of Sina Corp’s.  
  Regarding the participant observation, because I was in the company of Sina 
through my connections to former colleagues, I had to be careful not to interrupt their 
work, not to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, and not to cause troubles for 
them. In order to avoid unnecessary troubles, I stayed out of the working area of Sina, 
spending time with the professionals in lounge, cafeteria – during their free time such 
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as at lunch, and after work. 
 
4.6 Reflexivity vis a vis this study 
  Reflexivity is the process by which the researcher reflects upon his or her research 
journey. It is “an examination of the filters and lenses through which you see the 
world” (Mansfield, 2006). Reflexivity in ethnographic research helps the researcher to 
assess and understand what personal beliefs, values, thoughts and acquaintances the 
researcher brings into the research and how they influence the data collection and 
interpretation process (Harvey, 2012). A major theme in my study is the mechanisms 
and dynamics of a social media organization and how the organization plays its role 
in the interaction with different political and economic forces. My research paradigm 
and methodology are qualitative, participative and inclusive of the insiders’ voices. 
Therefore, it is significant to use reflexivity to provide a sort of quality assurance 
check within this study.  
  My previous work experience in Sina and my passion about Sina Weibo as an 
active user have introduced me to this research topic and research paradigm. My time 
spent in Sina as a full-time employee has opened a door for me to get to know how a 
new media organization operates and maintains its business. From that time, I’ve been 
interested in China’ new media industry and concerned about the issues and problems 
occurred in this industry. My background in journalism during my undergraduate 
study and the internships as a journalist in newspapers and television stations lead me 
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to exploration and discovery in this research.  
  As a former China’s social media practitioner, I’ve already had my own opinions 
and values toward Sina Weibo, the whole social media industry and their relations 
with the state, market and public. My personal perspectives, on one hand, are 
advantages that can enrich my descriptions and help me flesh out multiple plausible 
interpretations. However, on the other hand, this “advantage” may influence my 
position in relation to this topic and my informants, to some extent. For example, my 
former insider identity may lead to my ignorance of some of the basic issues about 
China’s social media industry, and thus influence the design of interview questions 
and the interaction with the informants. In order to avoid such influence, I tried not to 
privilege my own experiences, opinions, and judgment in data collection and analysis 
over others’. Open-ended questions were asked to encourage a full, meaningful 










Chapter 5 Balancing State and Public 
Under the topic of how Weibo balances the demands from state and public, three 
sub-themes, namely Weibo business and free speech, Weibo business and censorship, 
Weibo business and Government Weibo accounts, emerged from the data generated 
during my ethnographic fieldwork.  
  
5.1 Why Weibo Becomes the Most Popular Public Sphere in China 
5.1.1 Weibo’s news media gene and public sphere function 
  In comparison with other social networking sites in China (e.g., Renren, WeChat, 
Tencent Weibo, etc.), Sina Weibo was born with more features of news media, which 
contains more current affairs and politics. It is generally regarded as the origin of 
citizen journalism and also the most popular public sphere where Chinese netizens 
talk about the social events. 
  Some of my interviewees who have been working in Sina for more than five years 
argued that such apparent features of news media are closely bound up with the ideas 
of the top business leaders of Sina Corp. Charles Chao, the Chairman and the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of Sina Corp, is the main promoter of the launch of Weibo. 
According to archival data collected from the website of Sina.com, Charles holds a 
M.A and B.A. degree in journalism and used to work as a television reporter. One 
senior editor, who has been working in Sina for over eight years, said: “Charles likes 
to describe himself as an ‘Internet company’s CEO with news media complex’. I think 
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the choice of Weibo was based on his understanding of news media.”  
  Besides, quite a number of employees from Sina mentioned that Chen Tong, the 
former Executive Vice President and Chief Editor of Sina Corp, played an important 
role in the development of Weibo. According to archival data collected from the 
website of Sina.com and relevant news reports, Chen Tong joined Sina in 1997 and 
transformed Sina to a leading news portal in China. He has thus been honored as the 
“father of news portal”. An interviewee who is a senior editor in the Operational 
Department of Sina told me that Chen Tong likes to call himself as “news enthusiast”. 
When Weibo was launched, he was the primary person in charge of both the content 
of Weibo and the news portal. As one interviewee, who is an editor from the 
Operational Department of Sina, discussed:     
Sina’s operation of Weibo largely relies on Chen Tong’s experience of operating the 
news portal Sina.com, though they are totally two different things. I think this is one 
of the reasons why Weibo can grow up as a suitable soil for free speech and online 
public opinion. It does inherit some news media features from Sina’s news portal.  
  In addition to the leaders’ personal preference, the built-in features of the platform 
and the Sina user base enable Weibo to encourage user-generated content and serve as 
a convenient platform for users to follow and participate in online conversation.  
  During my online participant observation in Weibo sphere, I found that unlike 
Twitter, on Weibo, all the comments and replies dedicated to one post are listed under 
the entry in the same place, similar to Facebook. That means the entire discussion can 
be seen with only one simple click. This empowers users with a better chance to 
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interact with others and greater access to building public will. Next, Weibo supports 
multimedia posts in a more straightforward way. Visual attachments (image, video, 
audio, vote, etc.) can be uploaded in the same post, and are integrated below the text 
in the same page rather than being stored in hosting sites. This feature can assemble 
information to form vivid posts which are much easier to be disseminated and of great 
efficacy. Moreover, feature of tagging, supported by a search engine within Weibo, 
enables people to find congenial fellows, obtain target information, thus help form 
online groups that can promote large-scale participation. Besides, Weibo’s portal page 
also displays the trending Wei-topics (the heated topics under discussion) in a rolling 
mode, which helps users get to know the trending news and share with other users in 
time.  
  Besides, I also found that huge user base is another factor contributing to Weibo’s 
popularity. My online participant observation data showed that Weibo’s active users 
range from ordinary public to journalists, from students to well-known academics, 
from office workers to prominent business people, from NGOs to government 
agencies, almost covering every field in China. One of the interviewees, who is a 
Weibo specialist, told me that the formation of the huge Weibo user base partly 
benefits from the previous accumulation of audiences of Sina Blog and Sina portal, 
and partly relies on Sina’s vigorous promotion of Weibo. This Weibo specialist 
argued that large user base, on one hand, helps information travel ever faster and 




5.1.2 Challenges to state’s information order and authoritarian rule 
  According to archival data collected from news reports and Weibo sphere, a lot of 
cases can be found to support that Weibo presents challenges to state’s information 
order and authoritarian rule. In December 2010, when the news came that Qian 
Yunhui, a village head in Zhejiang Province who had a long history of petitioning 
against local officials died in a freak traffic accident, online activists organized citizen 
investigation groups against official statements through Weibo and disseminated 
information regarding this incident. In March 2011, a campaign was launched by 
Nanjing residents through Weibo to stop the local government’s plan of cutting the 
French plane trees down lining the city’s avenues. In July 2011, the crash of two 
high-speed trains in Wenzhou was first reported by Weibo users, four hours earlier 
than official sources. People also utilized Weibo to pressure the government to 
provide the real reasons of the crash. Just as one of the interviewees, who is a 
journalist from People’s Daily Overseas Edition commented:  
In the older days, Chinese people passively waited for the mainstream media to 
disclose the truth and uphold justice. Today, people proactively utilize Weibo to 
gather public pressure and seek the truth on their own. This change is of great 
significance to China’s democratic process. Of cause, it also poses great challenges 
to CCP’s ruling order. 
  Weibo’s 61.4 million daily active users and its forwarding function make it easy to 
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trigger information cascades and bring an obscure incident to the front of public 
attention within a short period of time. Actually, the monitoring result from the 
Institute of Public Opinion of Renmin University of China showed that the influence 
of a public incident related post may run over from the Weibo online world to the real 
world once it is reposted over 10, 000 times or its comments exceed 3, 000 (Fan et al, 
2013).  
  The impact of Weibo on Chinese society is far beyond the expectations of Sina’s 
entrepreneurs. In the interview with Sina’s CEO Charles Chao by the magazine Blog 
Weekly, Charles admitted that the great social and political success of Weibo has 
brought this privately owned new media company not only achievement but also 
responsibility to the society and public (Zhang et al, 2014). 
  As the key component of the “soft power”, media information along with diverse 
forms of propaganda and censorship are always leveraged by the authoritarian 
governments to “maintain their claims to legitimacy, and delegitimize their opponents” 
(Sullivan, 2014, p. 29). In China, the doctrine of current leadership toward Chinese 
Internet is to promote the healthy, orderly, harmonious and sustainable development 
of Internet industry. However, in recent years, Chinese government has increasingly 
concerned about its inability to curb free speech and subversive expression on Weibo 
and other social media sites. An interviewee, who is an editor from the News Center 
of Sina, said:  
More than 100 million posts are published on Weibo every day, including text 
messages, as well as numerous images and videos that are difficult to censor. 
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However, the more difficult to censor these content, the more frightened the 
party-state becomes. 
   
5.2 Weibo Censorship and Conflict of Interest 
Perry Link’s famous description of Chinese censorship as “the anaconda in the 
chandelier” serves as a fair reference to the tense atmosphere that was caused by the 
Chinese state’s deliberate absence of explicit rules and regulations on what cannot be 
said in public (Link, 2002). Compared with what Link described in 2002, the situation 
has changed as nowadays Chinese increasingly dare to speak in public because of the 
rise of middle class and the popularity of Internet, especially social media, which 
provides them with a convenient platform. 
  However, tension still exists due to the ambiguity of what is forbidden. For 
example, the most important regulation regarding Weibo - City of Beijing’s Rules for 
Development and Administration Regarding Microblog Clients - stipulates that no 
organization and individuals shall use microblog to spread rumors, whereas the 
definition of “rumor” is still very ambiguous. Any information that has not been 
published via official government channels or the authorities deem harmful to social 
stability could be considered as rumor. 
  Nowadays, on the one hand, there are free speech and lively debates on social 
media sites; on the other hand, there is also constant battle between censors, social 
media service providers and users due to the ambiguity and arbitrariness in censorship 
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policies of social media. This has created a much more dynamic context. 
 
5.2.1 State delegating the censorship power to social media companies 
  According to the archival data collected from international news reports, Chinese 
state’s censorship of social media networks should be traced back to 2009. Before 
2009, foreign social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook could be freely 
accessed without any special restriction in China. In the summer of 2009 just after the 
twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Incident, large-scale riots, which were 
triggered by an article posted on US-based social media sites, broke out in Xinjiang, 
killing nearly 200 people. After that, the Chinese government quickly blocked many 
overseas SNSs including Facebook and Twitter, as well as cracked down some local 
microblog services such as Fanfou. A former channel chief editor of Sina indicated 
that Sina Corp quickly filled in the gap in domestic microblog market in this period, 
thanks to its entrepreneur’s close personal relationship with the state officials, and 
acquired from the state the assurance of delegated responsibility of social control, 
which implies exercising self-censorship to maintain information flows under control.  
  Quite a number of interviewees from Sina agreed that Weibo actually enjoyed two 
years of “wild time” – no censorship from the government. The party-state did not 
fully anticipate the great impact of Weibo on Chinese society and its threat to 
authoritarian rules until the Wenzhou High-Speed Train Crash incident in July of 
2011. In this incident, citizens’ criticisms about the way the crash was handled by the 
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government explosively grew on Weibo and lasted more than a week. Millions of 
posts and comments of this topic flooded the website, making it difficult for Weibo 
employees to delete them all, as one of an editor from Sina recalled. This incident is 
generally seen as a landmark case which drove the government into a serious 
“legitimacy crisis” and marked the end of “the era of confidence” that was ushered in 
by the successful hosting of 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (see Shank & Wasserstrom, 
2011).  
  In the wake of the public opinion storm around the train crash incident, the central 
authority started to pay attention to Sina Weibo and tighten control over it. As 
recalled by a Weibo specialist:  
It is hard to say from which day everything started to change. But I remember that 
two of the high profiles of the CCP visited our company within one month in the 
summer of 2011. This had never happened before in any of the social media 
companies in China. I think it is enough to suggest the attitude of the central 
leadership towards Sina Weibo. 
  The information provided by this interviewee was crosschecked with the archival 
news reports. One of the high profiles he mentioned refers to Zhou Yongkang, a 
standing committee of the CCP Politburo that was in charge of domestic security. In 
August 2011, Zhou visited Sina Weibo’s headquarters in Beijing to know more about 
the operation of this platform. In the same month, Liu Qi, the CCP Beijing Committee 
secretary, also visited Sina Corp and said that social media companies should “use 
new technology to better manage their users” and “resolutely block any fake, 
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misleading and harmful information” (Digicha.com, 2011). Although Liu Qi didn’t 
provide any details of what the central party wanted, only three days later Sina Corp 
announced that it would put more effort into attacking all kinds of rumors. In fact, 
besides these two CCP high profiles, the standing head of the State Internet 
Information Office Wang Chen emphasized again two month later in a conference 
that “microblog sites must strengthen the management of information distribution” 
(People.com, 2011). The increasingly frequent attention from the high-profile 
indicated that the CCP began to worry that the explosive growth of Weibo may 
threaten its media control. 
  On 16 December 2011, the Press Office of the People’s Government of the Beijing 
Municipality, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, the Beijing 
Communications Administration and the Beijing Internet Information Office jointly 
issued the first formal policy specifically aimed at microblog services in China, City 
of Beijing’s Rules for Development and Administration Regarding Microblog Clients 
(Beijing.gov.cn, 2011). The articles in this policy include that microblog service 
providers shall “assist and cooperate with relevant departments in the execution of 
their administrative work”, “establish a department that is responsible for information 
security, and allocate personnel with the requisite professional knowledge and skills”, 
and “establish a comprehensive system of exposing false information and the timely 
publication of truthful information” and so on (Digicha.com, 2011). When asking 
about their attitude towards this policy, an editor from Sina replied:  
Certainly, this regulation brings a lot of troubles for Weibo’s operation. But I think 
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the launch of this regulation is not a surprise. Everyone knows that such kind of 
regulation could come sooner or later. I think the top management (of Sina) was 
prepared for the day’s coming. 
  Another interviewee, who is working in the News Center of Sina, told me about his 
opinion towards this policy. He stated that the aim of the state is to establish an 
all-round systematic microblog censorship mechanism that requires the collaboration 
of social media companies to exercise censorship.  
   
5.2.2 Exercising self-censorship: survival strategy but burdens  
  Practicing the delegated responsibilities from the state for information control 
through continuous development of self-censorship techniques is a survival strategy 
of social media companies, whereas it also puts extra financial and administrative 
burdens on these operators. 
   
5.2.2.1 Why Sina accepts self-censorship 
  When asking about why Sina Weibo accepts self-censorship, respondents from 
Sina mostly emphasized that the state constantly utilizes the threats of shutting down 
or adding onto blacklist to force upon social media companies the compliance with 
exercising self-censorship. An important case that was mentioned by several 
interviewees is that in April 2012, Chinese government asked Sina and Tencent to 
shut down the comment function of their microblog services, a key feature for 
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discussion, for three days, because rumors of military vehicles entering Beijing and 
something wrong going on in Beijing were spread on these websites. Two of the 
interviewees from Sina also mentioned another case that Google quit the market of 
Mainland China in 2010 in part for not doing a good job of self-censorship. They 
thought Google’s case rung alarms for domestic Internet companies. As an 
interviewee who is a manager at Sina Weibo division noted: 
Sina is a private owned commercial company whose primary goal is to make profit. 
Acting against the government is just like asking for trouble. The financial cost of 
being shut down is much bigger than the cost of any other matters. Although there 
isn’t any big Chinese Internet company being shut down in the last ten years, Sina 
still doesn’t want to challenge the state about this. Practicing monitoring is actually 
a survival strategy for Sina Weibo to stay in business. 
  Another reason cited by a few interviewees is that social media enterprises’ 
submission to state control may bring them some benefits, such as profitable contracts 
and more market share. One interviewee who is working at the General Office of 
Editor argued that this is actually the carrot-and-stick strategy adopted by the 
government. However, she said that such deals are usually done under the table, and 
ordinary employees like her won’t know the details. 
  One interviewee, who is a former journalist in an official newspaper and now 
works as a senior editor in Sina, pointed out another possible reason at macro level. 
He argued that exercising self-censorship is essentially helping the state uphold the 
social and political stability, which is a prerequisite for the growth of national 
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economy as well as the development for the private business.  
 
5.2.2.2 How Sina practices self-censorship 
  Practicing self-censorship is not an easy job. Instead, it requires financial and 
human efforts. Especially when a big news event breaks out, the whole company has 
to devote energy to cleansing the site of sensitive content to meet the government’s 
elaborate requirements. 
  One interviewee from Sina Weibo’s monitoring team introduced that currently 
there are about 100 employees (the figure was much higher in 2012 and 2013) 
specifically responsible for monitoring content on Weibo 24 hours a day and cleaning 
any posts deemed pornographic, offensive or politically unacceptable, with an 
average monthly earning of USD700. Usually, the back-end system of Sina Weibo 
does the first part of the job by scanning each tweet before it’s posted. There is a 
blacklist of the most sensitive keywords, including terms of political dissents such as 
communist bandit, terms and people related to the Falun Gong spiritual movement 
such as Falun and Li Hongzhi, terms and people associated with the Tiananmen 
Square Incident such as Chai Ling and WuErkaixi, etc. Tweets containing these 
keywords are autonomously blocked from being published. After automatic filtering, 
tweets containing other sensitive keywords (e.g., the names of the leaders of China’s 
central authority such as Xi Jinping, Jiang Zemin, Hu and Jintao, and the names of 
famous political dissents such as Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei) will be read and 
manually censored by censors. The censors decide whether to delete these posts or not. 
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Usually the censors choose not to completely delete the sensitive posts, but make sure 
that the sensitive posts remain visible only to the author while being blocked from 
other users so the author is unaware of the censorship. For those users who 
continuously post offensive content, the monitoring team also has the authority to 
block them from using posting and commenting functions temporarily or even shut 
down the accounts permanently. Approximately, over a 24-hour period, the Weibo 
monitoring team needs to process about three million posts and each censor at least 
3,000 posts per hour. If they miss a sensitive post that is disseminated widely, the 
censors in question will be punished with fines or even dismissal. 
  Besides the routine censorship every day, Sina Weibo also enhances their 
censorship during some highly sensitive days, such as the June 4 anniversary of the 
1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. One interviewee who is a censor from the 
monitoring team of Sina said that during the weeks before June 4 every year, Sina’s 
monitoring team will receive a series of notices and orders from the Beijing Internet 
Information Office emphasizing to tighten control of speech on Weibo. Many 
keywords related to the event are blocked on Weibo around June 4, such as tank, 64 
(short for June 4), Tiananmen, 89, rebellion, martial law, candle-lit, Flower of 
Freedom, and other alternative ways to write these keywords. When users attempt to 
search on Weibo for these keywords, the search interface will return the message: 
“According to relevant laws, regulations and policies, search results cannot be 
displayed.”  
  Mostly, the monitoring team of Sina implements the work of censorship. 
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Sometimes when big media events break out, employees of the whole Sina Corp will 
be involved in post deletion. A typical case that was mentioned by an interviewee 
from the Operational Department of Sina is the incident of Dalian PX Protest. The 
Dalian PX Protest (also known as 8/14 event), which took place on August 14, 2011, 
was a public protest organized by the citizens of Dalian (a city in northeastern China) 
to oppose a paraxylene (PX) chemical plant built in Dalian. At least 12,000 people 
joined in the protest, which was the largest political gathering in northern China since 
1989. The protesters utilized Weibo to spread the information and photos and to 
appeal to more people for joining in. Confronting the rapid increase in posts and 
comments about this event emerging on Weibo, Sina Corp swiftly messaged at least 
600 employees to get them involved into site cleansing of relevant content in order to 
meet the central authorities’ requirements. As this interviewee recalled, since August 
14 was a Sunday, Sina had to offer extra overtime pay for all the employees engaged 
in this work. 
  A censor from Sina’s monitoring team said that usually the government does not 
issue any formal document ordering them to delete posts; instead, it delivers the 
censorship orders through phone calls or instant messages such as QQ, secretly, 
arbitrarily and urgently. This also means that Sina Corp must always be on call. 
 
5.2.2.3 Disadvantages of practicing self-censorship 
  When asking about what effect has exercising self-censorship on Sina, an 
interviewee who is a senior editor of Sina’s web portal mentioned a case. She 
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mentioned that Sina Weibo established a “Weibo rumor-refuting group” specifically 
dedicated to verifying the widespread information on Weibo, as a response to the 
government’s anti-rumor campaign. She said, however, at times the employees of the 
group need to collect evidence on site to support their judgment, which is very costly 
and time-consuming. Another employee from Sina commented: 
Self-censorship of sensitive content is much of a headache for us. It leads to a cost 
increase, while doesn’t bring in any profits. It triggers dissatisfaction and criticism 
from the users and the public. It may also impose risks on advertisers and investors. 
But if we don’t do an enough good job of self-censorship, it may offend the 
government. All in all, self-censorship is the most thankless task for Sina.  
  This employee raised a case to further illustrate that practicing self-censorship is a 
thorny issue for Sina. In November 2011, a group of Chinese Internet intellectuals, 
economists, and writers co-signed and published an open letter to the investors of 
Sina Corp, criticizing Sina’s cooperation with the government in controlling the free 
speech on Weibo, and calling on the investors to cut back on the stocks of Sina in 
order to force Sina to reduce censorship. He argued that as increasing investors take 
business ethics and corporate social responsibility into account in investing, carrying 
out self-censorship might have a negative effect on Sina’s performance in capital 
market. 
  Now it is evident that although acceptance of state’s delegated public opinion 
monitoring responsibilities is essentially a survival strategy of commercial media 
organizations to stay in operation in authoritarian regimes, considering the troubles 
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and costs caused by exercising self-censorship, Sina as a profit-seeking company is 
reluctant to do so. Chen Tong, the chief editor of Sina, used to indicate that Sina’s 
principle was to delete as few posts as possible in a interview by the newspaper 
Southern Weekly (Fan et al, 2013), though things always go contrary to their wishes. 
During the interviews, almost all the respondents from social media companies 
argued that all the Internet companies who were doing media related business wanted 
more freedom and less censorship. Therefore, it’s more appropriate to regard such 
relationship as social media companies’ submission to the state rather than 
cooperation between them, as it is not built on a voluntary and mutually beneficial 
basis. 
 
5.2.3 State or public: the paradoxical role of Sina Weibo in 2013 Southern 
Weekly incident 
  Currently, China is at a stage of transformation, which implies numerous social 
problems caused by the conflicts of interests between different stakeholders in the 
society. Among them, the conflict between the government and the citizens is the 
most prominent one in recent years. 
  Social media as an effective speech instrument for citizens can rapidly amplify 
their voices and dissents towards the government, thus it serves as a “pressure cooker” 
on social problems and can intensify the tensions between the authorities and citizens 
to some extent. Letting the social media companies be in the frontline of censoring 
content and monitoring the trends of public opinions on social media is “a 
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cost-effective strategy of monitoring deviancy in an emergent, rapidly pluralizing 
civil society” (Lagerkvist, 2012, p. 2640). Because of this, social media providers also 
“take the bullet” shot from the public for the state. According to the data collected 
during my online participant observation in Weibo, most of the time, when content is 
blocked, citizens tend to blame the social media companies for deleting their posts 
and accuse them as the “political stooge” of the government. An interviewee who is 
working in the News Center of Sina argued: 
I think China’s social media companies are playing an embarrassing and paradoxical 
role. As commercial businesses, they are often caught in the middle of the state and 
the public. They have to meet the needs of both sides but always falter on both 
counts. 
  The dilemma of social media companies manifests itself most when politically 
sensitive incidents take place, due to the increase of both the imperatives of the state 
for speech control and the demands of the public for free speech during the incidents. 
Therefore, a better understanding of how the social media companies deal with its 
relations with the state and the public can be acquired through the analysis of some 
public incidents. The 2013 Southern Weekly incident was a typical public incident in 
recent years as suggested in Chapter 4. This incident will be analyzed in details in 
order to understand the role of social media companies in the conflict between the 
authorities and the public, and the way how social media companies deal with their 
delegated censorship duty from the state and the demands of the public for free 
speech in a real-world case. 
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5.2.3.1 Incident exposed on Weibo 
  According to the statement issued by the Southern Weekly News Ethics Committee, 
in December 2012, during the preparation process of the annual New Year Editorial, 
which is a longstanding tradition at Southern Weekly, the newspaper had already been 
requested by the Propaganda Department of Guangdong Provincial Party Committee 
to make revisions for many times. Changes to the editorial draft included deletion of 
politically sensitive names, deletion of sensitive policies, replacement of the title and 
headline photo, etc. On January 1, after the editorial staff had finished all the editing 
work and signed off on the final proofs, many alterations and replacements were 
further made by the Guangdong CCP Standing Committee member and propaganda 
chief Tuo Zhen directly to the new year special without informing the editors and 
reporters. For example, the New Year special title was changed from Dream of 
Home-country to Chasing Dreams. Texts rife with errors were also inserted by force. 
  On January 3, after the newspaper went on sale, some readers identified several 
errors in the special issue, including “2000 years ago King Yu combatted the floods,” 
which should be 4000 years. After these mistakes were posted and widely reposted on 
Weibo, some reporters from Southern Weekly posted on this social platform 
disclosing that Minister Tuo Zhen's distortion of their articles caused severe factual 
mistakes and protesting against his ultra vires acts. Since the New Year Editorial of 
Southern Weekly enjoys a high reputation among the readers, this incident quickly 
burst out online. 
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  Following these posts, a group of prominent former editors and reporters of 
Southern Weekly co-signed and published an open letter on Weibo, criticizing 
Minister Tuo's strangling the vitality out of the media in Guangdong for a long time, 
and calling for Tuo Zhen to step down. Within one day, many intellectuals, journalists 
and common netizens signed the open letter, condemning censorship and the lack of 
press freedom. 
  On the following day, a second online petition was issued on Weibo by 27 
prominent scholars to protest the interference at Southern Weekly. This petition 
continued to gather signatures from a wide range of supporters including journalists, 
lawyers, academics, students and even migrant workers. 
 
5.2.3.2 Incident intensified on Weibo 
  More outrage was ignited when the Southern Weekly's official Weibo account was 
later seized by state officials and some fake posts were sent out by this account, 
denying the changes were made by the censorship officers. 
  On January 6, a post appeared on Southern Weekly’s official Weibo account 
claiming that the controversial New Year editorial was written by its staff and was not 
altered by the propaganda officials. However, just before this post, a journalist from 
Southern Weekend, wrote on his own microblog stating that he had been forced to 
hand over the password for the official account of Weibo. Following this post, another 
post was sent out by the account of the economic news department of Southern 
Weekly, confirming that Southern Weekly’s Weibo account had been seized by 
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propaganda officials, and the posts appeared on the official account were fake. Later 
on a statement from Southern Weekly staff was released via Weibo. In this statement, 
the staff denied the official account and announced a strike until “the issue is 
resolved”. This statement also disclosed that in 2012 alone, a total of 1,034 news 
reports had been revised or cancelled by the censorship officers. More than 100 
reporters signed on this letter calling for an investigation on this incident. 
  Since the fact surfaced on Weibo, the incident was intensified. Public figures and 
common users started to post their support or doubts around the incident. The Big Vs 
(i.e., influential verified Weibo account) and celebrity users’ posts speaking up for 
Southern Weekly were widely reposted by common users. Many other media 
organizations also posted supportive messages on their official Weibo accounts. 
  As anger intensified and public support grew on Weibo, the Chinese authorities 
attempted to resume control over the controversy, which led to Sina’s self-censorship 
on related discussions on Weibo. As early as January 3, when the incident first 
surfaced on Weibo, 15 reporters’ accounts were blocked or deleted, with the 
protesting posts got removed. On January 6, after the fake posts by Southern Weekly 
official account, all the posts denying the official account were deleted from Weibo. 
Beginning on January 4, a series of relevant keywords were blocked on Weibo, 
including Southern Weekend, Tuo Zhen, open letter, propaganda department, etc. 
Meanwhile, many Big Vs’ posts were deleted. For example, posts by the famous 
blogger Li Chengpeng, who is an opinion leader in Chinese online society and has 
over 6 million followers on Weibo, were deleted three times by the Weibo censor. 
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Besides these influential accounts, many common users’ posts related to this events 
were also deleted. 
  During these days, the whole Weibo site was filled with “This post has been 
deleted” notices. Sina was thus condemned for its censorship and its role as the 
running dog of the propaganda department. More outrage toward Sina was ignited 
when NetEase, a popular news portal, published a special report of Southern Weekly 
incident. Netizens attacked on Sina’s cowardice and praised NetEase for its courage. 
Some netizens even claimed that they would quit Sina Weibo and register NetEase 
Weibo. Outraged netizens also came to the Weibo page of Sina’s top management 
and commented with cursing and criticism.  
 
5.2.3.3 Sina’s self-justification for censorship 
  During these days, Sina suffered an unprecedented crisis of credibility as a 
responsible medium in the eyes of the public, as one interviewee who is a senior 
editor from the Operational Department of Sina recalled.  
  On January 7, 2013, one Weibo user @zhengbanyuyang, who was verified as the 
manager of Sina Weibo, posted a long message on his own Weibo page to disclose 
the inside story of Sina’s self-censorship and explain Sina’s difficult position in this 
event.1 First, he emphasized that Sina is not the one who makes censorship criteria 
and issued deletion orders. If Sina didn’t delete those sensitive posts, the alternative 
was that the entire topic would be deemed off limits. As he wrote: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   The original Weibo posted by @zhengbanyuyang (@正版于洋) was deleted several days later. I restored it 
during my participant observation on Weibo. It can also be retrieved from http://app.secretchina.com/node/497679	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Since the day when the comment function of Weibo was banned for three days, the 
authorities decide on the criteria for throwing up the yellow light and deducting 
points on Weibo, and can make Weibo “game over” without considering the 
demands of the public, just like smashing an ante. So when they issue the urgent 
orders, you have no choice but to execute their order. 
  He argued that Sina can only survive within the boundary of rules that are set by 
the authorities, and thus someone is doomed to be sacrificed.  
  Next, he indicated that Sina actually adopted “smart” strategies of the deletion of 
the posts in order to earn more time for the dissemination of the information. As he 
wrote: 
You keep publishing posts crazily and the Weibo censors keep deleting your posts. 
However, does it successfully prohibit you from seeing the messages? If we directly 
block the accounts instead of deleting the posts one by one, we could have saved 
more time and energy, and have better served as a running dog of the authorities. 
You can see the posts before they are deleted, right? Your accounts haven’t been 
shut down, right? Most of you are experienced Internet users, so you know that it’s 
not difficult to delete a message in a second with today’s technology. So please 
consider this carefully. 
  Last, he noted that during the whole incident, Sina tried its best to resist pressure 
from the authorities and let the information spread, which was a hard-fought 
accomplishment already. As he mentioned, when the incident broke out, one of Sina’s 
official accounts @SinaMedia quickly reported the takeover of the account of the 
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Southern Weekly, which was immediately reposted by Sina’s most influential official 
account @TopNews. This post was reposted more than 30,000 times within ten 
minutes. Even though the original post was required to delete by the propaganda 
department, this information had already been spread.  
  Although this long post was deleted later and the author’s account was shut down, 
it has disclosed the inside story of Sina Weibo’s self-censorship to the public. One 
interviewee who is from the Operational Department of Sina indicated that publishing 
this long post could not be simply understood as the Sina employee’s individual 
behavior; it was authorized by senior management and essentially represented the 
attitude of Sina Corp in this crisis. Since it was not appropriate for Sina to publicly 
issue an official statement to defend itself, an employee was authorized to give a 
public explanation in the name of the individual. 
  From this incident, it is evident that Weibo as a social platform plays a significant 
role in public incidents by serving as an effective instrument utilized both by the state 
to maintain control and by the public to organize dissents. Hence it is difficult to 
conclude whether Weibo can facilitate or contain free speech. Viewing Weibo as a 
commercial company with its motives being taken into account makes things clear. 
Even though social media entrepreneurs are accustomed to submitting to state control, 
it doesn’t mean that they will yield to the authority unconditionally. Minor crack may 
emerge in the relationship when they perceive such information control as a threat to 
their material benefits. In this incident, Weibo professionals developed some methods 
to facilitate free speech tactfully, such as deleting posts after it had been widely 
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spread. The essential motive was for its own commercial interests. A former editor of 
Sina who is now a freelancer noted that for the social media companies, users are the 
basic source of their interests, and thus they need to care more about the voices of the 
users. If they don’t do so, the users may abandon them. Therefore, it is the pursuit of 
commercial interests that drives the social media companies to facilitate free speech 
in the face of state control. As an interviewee who is a Weibo specialist from Sina 
described: 
Whenever a media event or public incident breaks out on Weibo, we examine the 
nature of the event. If the event has nothing to do with politics or is not so politically 
sensitive, there is no reason for us to contain free speech. If the event is politically 
sensitive, it’s highly possible for us to control speech because it prevents a cost that 
is higher than the benefit if we do not. But in both cases, we give ourselves some 
wiggle room. After all, we can offend neither the state nor the public. 
  This is true that in some less politically sensitive events, such as the 
environment-related PM2.5 incident2 and the protection of plane tree in Nanjing 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Sina took its effort in supporting the public appeals 
by highlighting and recommending such topics on Weibo. 
 
5.2.3.4 Developing gentle and targeted censorship methods 
  The pressure from both the state and the public has forced social media companies 
to invent subtler and more ingenious censorship methods and tactics in order to better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The PM2.5 incident broke out in October 2011 and lasted over half years in China. It was an online grassroots 
movement aiming at changing China’s current PM10 standard into PM2.5 standard. Weibo has been widely 
praised for its power in facility free speech and influencing government decision-making during this incident. 
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fulfill its legal obligation to exercise self-censorship but meanwhile not affect user 
experience and offend public interests. 
  According to my interviews with employees from Sina, instead of large-scale 
deletion, Sina now pays special attention on the speech management of Big Vs, who 
often serve as online opinion leaders in public incidents and media events. An 
interviewee who is working as a senior editor in Sina said that Sina now decentralizes 
the management of Big Vs to every employee. Each employee is responsible for 
several influential verified users. They need to check the messages posted by these 
Big Vs they are in charge of regularly. If there is sensitive content, they need to 
contact this Big V via phone and persuade them to delete the messages in question.3 
If missing any sensitive posts, the employees will be punished with fines. This 
requires the employees to develop and keep a friendly relationship with the Big Vs 
they are responsible for. Some of the influential verified users had reached a tacit 
understanding with Sina. Another editor from Sina mentioned: 
If the Big Vs agree that there is a strong need to delete their posts within a second, 
they will allow us to do so. If it’s not so urgent, we will also allow some additional 
time for the dissemination of their posts. We are pleased that some of them 
understand our difficult situation. 
  Compared with direct and large-scale deletion, this attempt is apparently more 
gentle and targeted. 
  Apart from methods targeting on verified users, Sina Weibo has also developed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Every verified account on Weibo is required to provide his or her cellphone number in use during application 
stage. After successfully verified, they also need to update their cellphone numbers regularly.  
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other methods to control sensitive information on the site. In May 2012, Sina Weibo 
introduced a community code of practice (CoP) demerit point system, which is a 
virtual community management system. An interviewee who is from the monitoring 
team of Sina introduced that this system is established to punish users who breach its 
rules and regulations, including those spread “rumors”, commercial spams, and other 
indecent information. A Community Committee has been set up to assist Sina to 
manage Weibo content. The committee members are generated through open 
recruitment. Anyone who has satisfied a certain set of conditions can be an applicant.4 
The system encourages users to report the abovementioned irregularities. The reports 
will be delivered to and reviewed by the Community Committee and the website to 
decide whether or not to dock the reported user’s credit points. Users with low credit 
score will eventually get a “low-credit user” icon displayed on their Weibo home page 
or even be banned. According to the statistics published by Sina, from May 2012 to 
May 2013, the Community Committee received over 15 million reports, with more 
than 200,000 users being deducted credit points, and the daily number of reported 
rumors had been reduced by 87% (Sina.com, 2013b). 
  This attempt of crowdsourcing censorship to encourage users to censor themselves 
has largely reduced the administrative and financial burden of self-censorship on Sina. 
As the interviewee from the monitoring team commented: “Sina values CoP system 
very much. Now most of the posts that are involved with pornography, violence, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 According to Sina Weibo Community Committee System (Trial), individual users who have completed real 
name verification, reached 18 years old, with a registration time longer than 180 days, published Weibo more than 
100 posts, with more than 50 followers, had logged-in activities for 15 days of the previous natural month, can be 
an applicant for Community Committee. Retrieved from 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/sina-weibo-community-committee-system-trial/ 
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rumors rely on the users’ active report. CoP is indeed more efficient and effective 
than our monitoring team’s own work.” 
  More importantly, with the implementation of the CoP system, the contradiction 
between Sina and its users caused by Sina’s practice of censorship has partly been 
turned into the conflicts among the users. To some extent, Sina has tactfully freed 
itself from the conflict between the authorities and the public by delegating part of its 
responsibilities to the users. 
 
5.3 Government Weibo: A Real Cooperation between State and 
Social Media Companies 
Social media’s power in forming and directing public opinion has changed China’s 
media landscape originally dominated by official and traditional media outlets. On the 
one hand, the party-state has been forced to enhance its censorship over social 
networking sites; on the other hand, the party-state has also been inspired by the 
significance of taking advantages of social media to conduct online propaganda, 
improve social management and enhance their political legitimacy. According to the 
data collected during my ethnographic fieldwork, I find that the setup and growth of 
government social media accounts has not only exerted influence on the state and the 




5.3.1 Sina’s promotion in the development of government Weibo 
  The setup and growth of government Weibo accounts are largely attributed to the 
great promotion of Sina Corp. As one interviewee who is a senior editor of Sina said, 
Chen Tong and Sina first tried to invite government agencies to open accounts on 
Weibo in 2009 with the consideration of creating possibilities to establish friendly 
relations with the authorities and thus directly lobby for company positions on the 
state’s important policies. With Sina’s invitation, Yunnan province launched the first 
government official account on Weibo @Weibo_Yunnan in November 2009. 
However, most of the government agencies and officials refused to accept the 
invitations of Sina at this period. A former senior Weibo specialist, who is now 
working in a mobile live video stream start-up, explained: 
The CCP doesn’t have a tradition of transparency and public participation in 
decision making. They decline to swallow their pride to talk to the public, and more 
importantly, they are afraid that social media and the free speech on it may generate 
troubles for their control and damage the image of the officials.  
  Hostility and fear are the government’s attitude toward social networking sites in 
the early stage. 
  The Wenzhou High-Speed Train Crash incident in July triggered widespread public 
anger toward the Ministry of the Railways over the lack of transparency in dealing 
with the accident. According to a Weibo specialist, China’s whole railway system set 
up their Weibo accounts to communicate with the public directly after this incident. A 
journalist from the News Channel of Chinese Central Television argued that the 
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government was forced to open Weibo accounts to some extent. “Only when crisis 
breaks out will the government realize the necessity of talking to the public directly,” 
said this journalist. According to the archival news, in the wake of the rain crash 
incident, as well as the Arab Spring and the Chinese Jasmine Revolution5 in 2011, 
Wang Chen, the deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department and the head 
of the State Internet Information Office, first encouraged the local propaganda units to 
take advantage of Weibo and “occupy Weibo” in order to conduct online propaganda 
and maintain a “healthy” Internet. Encouraged by the central authorities, more local 
governments started to register official accounts on Weibo.  
  The 2011 Government Microblog Annual Summit Forum was held by Sina in 
Beijing on December 12, 2011, with the attendance of nearly 200 government 
representatives from 23 provinces of China. Sina claimed that the purpose of 
organizing this conference was to provide better service for the government accounts 
and to jointly plan the direction for the future development of Chinese government 
Weibo accounts (Gov.cn, 2011). In fact, as suggested by a senior editor from the 
Operational Department of Sina, Sina’s organization of the conference can be viewed 
as a strategy to show its loyalist credentials and further enhance the friendly relations 
with the state. “The top management of Sina believe that more government accounts 
registered, less risks of Sina Weibo being shut down,” as this editor discussed.    
  Sina has devoted the whole company’s efforts to promote the development of 
government Weibo. According to my participant observation in Sina and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Chinese Jasmine Revolution, inspired by and named after the Tunisia Jasmine Revolution, refer to the 
protests in a dozen of cities in China in February 2011, calling for the democracy and equality of Chinese society. 
The protesters utilized Internet forums and social networking sites, such as Weibo, to spread related information.  
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interviews with Sina’s employees, over one-third of the employees of Sina’s 
Operational Department have been set aside as “Weibo specialists” and specifically in 
charge of the promotion of government Weibo accounts.6 The Weibo specialists are 
divided into small groups and each group is responsible for one or two provinces of 
China. They need to contact the government agencies in the province they are 
responsible for, persuade them to register official accounts on Sina Weibo, and teach 
them how to use Weibo to communicate with the netizens. Apart from the local 
government Weibo, the setup of central government departments Weibo accounts, 
such as the accounts of Ministry of Land and Resources, the People’s Bank of China 
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission, mainly relies on Sina leadership’s 
personal relationship with the central officials. Charles Chao, the CEO of Sina Corp, 
used to be invited by the Central Party school and teach the officials how to use 
Weibo. Additionally, Sina has also published a Government Microblog Operation 
Handbook to teach its government Weibo users how to use Weibo, how to standardize 
their Weibo practices and how to deal with emergencies.  
   
5.3.2 “Occupy Weibo”  
  Almost all of the interviewees from Sina agreed that the positive attitude of the 
CCP and central government leaders has greatly facilitated the development of 
Chinese government Weibo. According to the archival news reports, in March 2013, 
Premier Li Keqiang emphasized the urgency and significance of making government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As one of the core divisions of Sina, the Operational Department is mainly in charge of the portal Sina.com. 
124	  
affairs transparent in the era of Weibo. Besides, the leaders from the Central 
Propaganda Department, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of 
Justice all stressed the necessity of incorporating Weibo into governments’ 
administrative operation to guide public opinion and improve governance.  
  By June 2014, the number of official government accounts registered at Sina 
Weibo had reached 119,169, including 84,377 organizational and 34,792 individual 
accounts, almost covering all the administrative levels and regions, according to the 
archival document of 2014 Mid-Year Government Microblog Report released on July 
24, 2014 (Cpd.com, 2014). Among these accounts, the largest group of government 
Weibo is maintained by public security agencies, such as 
@Jiangning_PublicSecurity_Online and @Safety_Beijing. 7  Besides, government 
Weibo of administrative entities, such as provincial and municipal governments, also 
accounts for a large proportion, for example, @Shanghai_Announcements and 
@Guangdong _Announcement8. These government accounts are utilized to publish 
information, collect public opinions, refute rumors, deal with official business, and 
interact with users. 
  As a social networking site open to everyone in the world, Weibo integrates the 
voices of different stakeholders into one platform. The public can acquire the 
government’s information and interact with the officials without moving to another 
platform. It is a more direct channel for the conversation between the public and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 @Safety_Beijing (@平安北京) is the official government Weibo account of Beijing Municipal Public Security 
Bureau. @Jiangning_PublicSecurity_Online (@江宁公安在线) is the official government Weibo account of 
Jiangning branch of Nanjing Municipal Public Security Bureau.  8	   @Shanghai_Announcements (@上海发布) is the official Weibo account of the Information Office of the 
Shanghai Municipal Government. @Guangdong_Announcements (@广东发布) is the official Weibo account of 
the Information Office of the Guangdong Provincial Government.	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government than previous e-government portals.  
  One interviewee who is a senior Weibo specialist in charge of promoting 
government Weibo concluded four major motivations why the governments adopt 
Weibo: 1) assisting administrative operation and servicing the public; 2) monitoring 
public opinion and perceiving the pressure form the public; 3) guiding the public 
opinion and refuting the rumors; 4) conducting crisis management and resolving 
conflicts. 
  In fact, the data collected during my online participant observation has shown that, 
before the governments’ collectively joining in Weibo, the public opinion on Weibo 
had long been directed by opinion leaders and Big Vs, including liberal intellectuals, 
political thinkers, journalists, scholars, and influential grassroots. Without official 
voices, it was easy to form large-scale anti-government speeches on Weibo. The setup 
of government official Weibo can help make the government voice heard. One 
archival document which is an article written by Ren Xianliang, the Deputy Director 
of State Internet Information Office, published on the party’s key journal Red Flag 
Manuscript9 has indicated the key intention of the setup of government Weibo. Ren 
said: “We must push party and government members to get online, open up Weibo 
accounts and speak on behalf of the party and the government, foster our own group 
of ‘thought leaders’ on the Internet and occupy the new media, this new public 
opinion front.” (Chen & Shi, 2014).  
   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Red Flag Manuscript is a spin-off of the party’s central journals Seeking Truth. Ren’s article was published in 
April 2013 with a title of How the party’s and government leaders deal with the new media.  
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5.3.3 Benefits for social media companies 
  With the promotion of both central authorities and social media service providers, 
China’s government Weibo has stepped into a stage of stable development and 
effective operation since 2014. According to the interviews with Sina employees, the 
development of government Weibo has also brought a lot of benefits for the Weibo 
service provider, Sina Corp. 
  First, as most of the respondents from Sina mentioned, the increase of government 
Weibo accounts has ensured the safety of the social media service provider. 
Previously, Weibo’s risks of being shut down mainly came from the party-state’s fear 
of the free speech and political dissents spread on it. The growth of official Weibo 
accounts has balanced the official discourse and civil discourse in the social media 
world by breaking up the monopoly of grassroots and other nonofficial speech and 
making the government’s voice heard. An interviewee who is a Weibo specialist 
commented: “At first, the governments regard social media as ‘great scourges’. This 
is essentially the fear of the unknown. As time goes by, they have grasped the 
mechanism of Weibo and realized that Weibo is not as terrible as they thought.” 
  In fact, during my participant observation in online Weibo sphere, I found that in 
the last two years, the governments have become increasingly sophisticated in taking 
advantage of Weibo to conduct online propaganda and social management. They do 
so by embedding themselves in the public’s daily lives, not only publishing policies 
and serious information, but also providing cultural and life information such as 
transportation, food, safety, etc., replying to the public questions and complaints 
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timely, posting heart-warming stories and funny jokes. A highly friendly tone is 
adopted in order to display friendly image and foster closeness in the relationship with 
the public. By doing so, the governments on Weibo are no longer hidden behind a veil 
of secrecy and the public does not second-guess the government as they used to. 
Some government official accounts, such as @Jiangning_PublicSecurity_Online and 
@Shanghai_Announcements, have achieved great success by attracting millions of 
followers, and what they say are usually agreed by the public and reposted many 
times. Peng Shaobin, one of the vice presidents of Sina, mentioned in the interview by 
the magazine Phoenix Weekly that what the government values the most on Weibo is 
its power in leading the mainstream value of the society (Phoenix Weekly, 2012). 
Therefore, the political risk of Weibo shutdown or curtailing of service has been 
largely reduced.  
  Second, the rise of government Weibo has eased the burden of the delegated 
responsibilities of information and social control on Sina Corp. In recent two years, 
the growth of government official accounts on Weibo has enabled the governments to 
monitor the public opinion and perceive the pressure from the public directly. When 
public incidents occur, the governments utilize their official Weibo to handle the 
crisis through voluntarily releasing the truth, refuting rumors and replying to the 
public’s questions and complaints, thus guaranteeing the public’s right to know and 
resolving the conflicts between the authorities and the public. 
  For example, after the Shanghai 2015 New Year’s Eve stampede incident, a 
message spread on Weibo and other Internet platforms saying that the local 
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government had concealed information about the actual number of death in the 
stampede by citing the number of the death in previous incidents as evidence and 
claiming that according to the hidden rules in CCP’s officialdom, if the number of the 
death exceeded 35 in an incident, related officials would be punished. This message 
had been widely spread by netizens, including some verified users with thousands of 
followers, thus creating some people’s discontent of the government. Within the same 
day as the message spread, one influential government official account 
@Jiangning_PublicSecurity_Online published a long post on its Weibo stating that 
the “35 deaths” message was a false rumor and the government didn’t conceal the 
truth by providing a massive amount of rebuttal evidence from previous incidents and 
a rational analysis (Jiangning Public Security Online, 2015). This post of refuting the 
rumor was reposted more than 20,000 times within two days and many netizens 
expressed their support to government and condemned the people who made and 
spread this rumor. This is only one of the many cases that the government utilizes 
Weibo to refute rumor and temper the crisis. 
  For social media service providers, some of the burdens and troubles caused by 
playing as an intermediary between the state and the public such as refuting rumors 
and monitoring public opinion have been reduced due to the direct conversation 
between the authorities and the public. The interviewees from Sina’s monitoring team 
admitted that compared with the year 2011 and 2012, they have less workload and 
work stress now, and hardly receive orders of large-scale post deletion in last two 
years. The party-state is changing its ways of social media control by replacing 
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coercive deletion and blocking with the guidance of public opinion and conversation 
with the public. This is a good thing for social media service providers. 
  Third, Sina’s strategy in promoting the governments’ Weibo has deepened its 
friendly relationship with the state, and thus expanded Sina’s business, increased Sina 
Corp’s status in the eyes of the party-state and its ability to negotiate with the state on 
important policy issues. Just as discussed earlier, Sina Corp has taken great efforts to 
help the governments establish and operate their official Weibo accounts. On the 
request of related governments, Sina also delivers training programs to government 
users on how to operate official accounts. Being a consumer of Weibo, the 
governments rely on commercial provider Sina Corp to solve the problems that they 
encounter. With the growing influence of Weibo in every region of China, some local 
governments even come to knock on the door of Sina and ask for cooperation. One 
interesting case that was mentioned by an employee from Weibo is that the Municipal 
Propaganda Department of Chong Qing cooperated with Sina Weibo by inviting a 
group of travel enthusiasts on Weibo to do an in-depth tour of Chong Qing in order to 
restore the image of the city and local government, which had been damaged by Bo 
Xilai scandal. 
  Through the interaction and cooperation with the governments, Sina has gained the 
governments’ trust, especially the local governments and officials. One Weibo 
specialist mentioned that directly benefited from this, Sina has accelerated the 
construction of its localized portal sites with the support from local government 
bodies. According to the statistics provided by this Weibo specialist, by the end of 
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2013, Sina had set up 22 local portal sites based on provinces, such as Sina Henan and 
Sina Sichuan, to offer localized content, better serve the local users and government 
partners, and attract local advertisers and investors. This Weibo specialist admitted 
that Sina’s national business expansion is largely benefited from the success of Weibo 
and the amicable relationship with local government established during the promoting 
of government Weibo. 
  Furthermore, the contribution to the construction of government Weibo has helped 
Sina get in the good graces of the central authorities and increased Sina’s ability of 
directly presenting its industry concerns to policy makers. Peng Shaobin, the vice 
president of Sina, mentioned in the interview by Phoenix Weekly that previously Sina 
passively responded to the orders from government of information control, but now 
Sina has begun to purposefully persuade the government not to be so sensitive to 
some information, and the government is willing to take their advices (Phoenix 
Weekly, 2012). In fact, the central government has increasingly valued the views and 
suggestions from the entrepreneurs of leading new media companies on important 
policy issues. One case that was cited by a senior editor from the Operational 
Department of Sina is that Charles Chao, the CEO of Sina Corp, was invited to attend 
the first World Internet Conference presided by Premier Li Keqiang in 2014. Charles 
suggested to Li Keqiang that the government should protect fair competition, 
encourage innovation and strengthen the construction of network infrastructure, 
which received a favorable response from Li Keqiang. The presence and speech of the 
entrepreneur of Sina has best demonstrated Sina’s important status in the eyes of the 
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central government. 
   
5.4 Summary 
Social media in China has been regarded as a great challenge to the party-state’s 
information order and the authoritarian rule. One of the core strategies the Chinese 
state adopted to prohibit social media from becoming autonomous political force to 
oppose the rule of the CCP is that the party-state tries to incorporate these social 
media entrepreneurs into its ruling system by outsourcing responsibilities of 
information control to them. Therefore, the obligation to implement censorship 
delegated from the state whilst meeting the needs of the public for free information 
flow becomes a key dilemma for Chinese social media business.  
  I have found that these social media providers struggle to make a balance in 
practicing delegated surveillance whereas not offending the public interests by 
utilizing clever tactics of self-censorship including: 1) “deferred implementation” of 
the deletion orders from the state in order to protect the dissemination of important 
posts; 2) deliberately strengthening the control of some online opinion leaders in 
order to avoid offending the majority of the public; 3) crowdsourcing censorship to 
ordinary users in order to free itself from the conflicts between the government and 
the public.  
  Additionally, I have also seen that Chinese social media companies try to solve the 
dilemma and unfetter themselves from the conflicts and tension between the 
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authorities and the public by introducing the government voices into the social media 
platform to facilitate the direct interaction between the government and the public, 
and also to balance the free speech of the grassroots and the official voice of the 
authorities. Therefore, although the popularity of social media has amplified the 
conflicts between the public and the authorities, a series of strategies taken by social 
media companies based on a consideration of self-preservation have actually helped 
alleviate the tension between the public and the authorities.  
  Regarding the state, it has also changed its online control methods from coercive 
ways to more flexible and tactful ways. However, it doesn’t mean that the state 
relaxes the vigilance on Internet. Instead, the Chinese state has tightened its control on 
the Internet especially on social media since Xi Jingping held the top offices of the 
party-state. This can be seen from Xi’s keynote speech to a nationwide conference on 
ideology and propaganda held on August 19 in 2013, in which Xi declared war on 
“rumor-mongers” and ordered the CCP to raise a “strong army to seize the ground of 
new media” (Forbes.com, 2013). After Xi’s speech, the party-state launched a war 
aiming to attack those posting defamatory comments on the Internet with threatened 
fines and even imprisonment. The most draconian is the clampdown on “Big Vs” 
users, Weibo-based opinion leaders who have at least 100,000 followers, including 
controversial writers, artists, entrepreneurs and businesspeople, public intellectuals, 
lawyers, and professionals who often criticize the party and the governments and 
make sharp points on social and political issues. According to the report published by 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, about 300 Big Vs, who are more influential 
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than official media on public issues, dominated the public opinion on Weibo (CASS, 
2014). In 2013, hundreds of Big Vs were detained by the police on account of 
“spreading rumors” or “disturbing the public order”. Some of them were forced to 
make confession on television (for example, Xue Manzi, an investor and U.S. citizen), 
and some were sentenced to jail term (for example, Qin Zhihui, known as Qin 
Huohuo on Weibo). Many Big Vs feel tremendous pressure as a result of this 
nationwide crackdown and most have veered away from the sensitive and 
controversial topics. Since Weibo traffic grew largely because of the Big Vs, this 
event generated financial implications for Sina. Ordinary users spend less time on 
Weibo because the Big Vs they follow are posting fewer sharp comments. The 
decrease of Big Vs had not only affected Weibo’s traffic, but also Weibo’s 
advertising revenue and its ability to adequately monetize services or brand equity, as 
well as the performance of Sina in stock market. Besides Sina Weibo, many other 
social media platforms were also involved into and affected by this campaign. This is 
actually a very effective method used by the party-state. The state did not seek social 
media companies’ cooperation and offend the mass public in this case. It does hurt 





Chapter 6 Increasing Profits or Preserving User 
Experience？ 
Under the topic of how Weibo deals with market needs and consumers, four 
sub-themes, namely motivations for Weibo’s monetization, Weibo’s monetization 
moves, interests and benefits generated in Weibo’s monetization, problems and 
conflicts in Weibo’s monetization, emerged from the data generated during my 
ethnographic fieldwork.  	  
6.1 Motivations for Weibo’s Monetization 
  According to the interviews, the strongest force that drove Sina to monetize its 
Weibo service was to solve the problem of Weibo’s weak profitability.  
  In fact, despite an enormous user base of over 500 million microbloggers and the 
high monthly and daily active users, Sina Weibo has long been trapped in the red 
since it was launched, as is evident from Sina’s earnings reports since 2010. The 
continuous loss of Weibo also dragged down the overall performance of Sina Corp in 
stock market. Although Weibo as a public media has a profound influence on Chinese 
society, a senior Weibo specialist from the Operational Department of Sina pointed 
out that Sina’s aim is not to run Weibo as a charity. This interviewee emphasized that 
both Sina Corp and Weibo are privately owned commercial companies listed in 
Nasdaq, which have basic responsibility to their stakeholders, so increasing profits is 
their most important and fundamental purpose at any time. In fact, as the archival 
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news report from the Wall Street Journal noted, Sina’s sluggish efforts to monetize 
Weibo have disappointed investors (Mozur, 2014). However, Sina failed to find a 
suitable profit-model for its Weibo service for a long time. One interviewee, who is a 
senior editor from the Operational Department of Sina, told me that after Weibo 
launched, Sina’s management continued to use the marketing concept of web portal to 
operate Weibo for a long time. Specifically, the management believed that only good 
content could enhance the brand, thus attract more advertisers. “In fact, such 
marketing concept of web portal is too conservative to make profits in the era of 
social media”, this senior editor argued. Another respondent from Tencent echoed the 
viewpoint by commenting that selling advertising space is the simplest revenue-model 
and growth based on it will be slow. He argued that Sina failed to find effective ways 
to monetize Weibo taking advantage of the character of the product. During the 
interviews with employees from Sina, the majority of them admitted that how to 
transform Weibo’s high online traffic and influence into greater profit is the most 
pressing problem that Sina seeks to solve.  
  In addition to the issues of financial deficit and profit pressure, another reason of 
Weibo’s monetization that most interviewees from Sina mentioned has to do with 
Weibo’s biggest rival Tencent WeChat.  
  WeChat, combining the instant messaging function of WhatsApp with some of the 
social network features of Facebook, was first released to market in 2011 and quickly 
gained high popularity in China, which has significantly diverted Weibo’s user traffic. 
According to the archival data from CNNIC, 28 million users stopped using Weibo in 
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2013, and 37.4% of Weibo’s lost users switched to WeChat (CNNIC, 2014). Almost 
all the respondents from Sina mentioned that WeChat’s rising has posed a great 
challenge to Weibo and now the whole Sina company considers Tencent WeChat as 
its only true rival. A product manager from Weibo, who was also an active user of 
both Weibo and WeChat, described the challenge well in details:    
In fact, what Sina worries most is not the loss of the amount of Weibo users, but 
WeChat greatly constrains the amount of time that mobile users spend on Weibo. It 
is also what the advertisers value the most. WeChat’s rising popularity will 
inevitably affect the return on investment for Weibo’s advertisers and the potential 
growth of advertising revenue per user.  
  Monetization does not only mean making profit, but also providing opportunities to 
comprehensively enhance the competitiveness of the product. One interviewee 
employed in the Operational Department of Sina explained that monetization could 
bring in sufficient financial support that allows Sina to better upgrade Weibo with 
more functions to compete with its rivals.  
  In all, monetization is both the need of the company itself and a response of Weibo 
to fierce competition in domestic social media market.   
 
6.2 All-rounded Monetization of Weibo  
In 2012, Charles Chao, the CEO of Sina, started to push the company to make money 
from Weibo through a series of monetization moves. In the same year, Sina launched 
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a reform of high-rank executives and organizational structure. In an internal email 
sent out by Charles Chao to all the employees provided by my interviewees, Charles 
said Sina would separate its core business into two major areas: web portal and Weibo, 
and each business would be run as a separate division and split into PC and mobile 
arms. Moreover, Jack Xu, who served as the vice president of Cisco and the former 
vice president of Engineering & Research of eBay, jumped ship to join Sina as its 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and co-president in charge of Weibo. 
  When asking about the significance of this reform, a chief editor from the 
Operational Department of Sina pointed out that it has actually paved the way for 
Weibo’s monetization. The reform, as discussed by her, reflects the growth and 
decline of internal power in appearance, but in nature it means to make the optimal 
allocation of resources in order to achieve the highest efficiency. She emphasized that 
it indicates Sina’s strategy and determination in propelling the monetization of Weibo 
through enhancing Weibo’s overall product and technological capabilities. 
  In June 2012, Weibo introduced a premium paid membership service. For a 
monthly fee of 10 yuan (US$1.61), subscribers can enjoy some privileges including 
personalizing their pages, managing information flow and followers, getting better 
security, sending voice posts, having access to premium games, etc. Before that, 
Weibo also launched its own virtual currency (known as Weibo Credit) and tried to 
sell Weibo IDs (named Weihao). When asked to evaluate these monetized attempts, 
one interviewee specialized in Weibo product promotion commented that the 
above-mentioned profit models actually copied the membership model of QQ, which 
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serves as a good revenue source for Tencent for many years. However, she admitted 
that the membership model of Weibo does not bring large revenue for Sina and fails 
to replicate the success of QQ due to their different user bases.  
  In March 2013, Sina launched its Twitter-like in-stream advertising product, which 
called “Fen Si Tong” (FST). Advertisers can log into the system and target users 
based on gender, age, location, interests, device type, social interaction, etc. The 
sponsored Weibo post will appear in targeted users’ news feeds.  
  Besides, Sina also incorporates third-party apps, especially third-party games, to 
the platform of Weibo. Most interviewees saw a bright future of this attempt. One 
interviewee from the Operational Department of Sina argued that compared to 
WeChat, Weibo is an “open” social media platform, which is more suited to 
cultivating the “share with the world” functionality, and opening the platform to 
third-party developers has allowed Weibo to capitalize on this asset.  
  These above-mentioned attempts of monetization have achieved some initial effect. 
The income reports of Sina have shown that, since the second quarter of 2012, Weibo 
began bringing revenues to Sina, racking up a total revenue of US$68.5 million in the 
last three quarters of the year, with 77% from display advertising and the rest from 
value-added services, membership subscription and third-party games (Sina.com, 
2013c). In 2013, promoted posts accounted for 10% of Weibo’s total advertising 
revenues (163.com, 2013a). However, as analysts noted (see Gui, 2013), “annual 
revenue of several tens of millions of US dollar would be capable of meeting the 
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expectations of the capital market. However, the revenue is not proportionate to the 
scale of Sina, a major company with more than 5,400 employees”.  
 
6.3 Profit-making or Public Interests: Sina Weibo in Strategic 
Alliance with Alibaba   
  In April 2013, Alibaba, China’s biggest e-commerce player, acquired an 18% stake 
of Weibo for US$586 million, with the option of increasing its stake to 30% in the 
future. According to Sina, this alliance was expected to generate approximately 
US$380 million in e-commerce advertising revenues and social commerce-related 
revenues for Weibo over the next three years. Weibo also promised that they would 
create a dedicated advertising inventory for the retailers from Alibaba, which 
wouldn’t compete directly with the existing advertising outlay on the site of Weibo, 
and the revenues would be shared between Weibo and Alibaba. When asking about 
the significance of this alliance, all our interviewees from Sina used at least one of the 
following statements: “It is the most important move in Weibo’s pursuit of 
monetization”, “It speeds up the pace of Sina Weibo’s monetization”, or “ It decides 
the life and death of Sina Weibo”. 
  In the case of Alibaba and Sina Weibo’s strategic alliance, different forces, 
including domestic and transnational capital, advertisers, Weibo’s users, Weibo and 
Alibaba’s competitors, and internal forces of Sina, interact and conflict with each 
other. Interests and benefits come hand in hand with threats and problems. Therefore, 
140	  
the alliance with Alibaba will be analyzed in details in order to understand the role of 
Sina Weibo in the interaction among different market players and the public, and the 
way how social media companies deal with the pressure of profit-making and the 
demands of the public and users in a real-world case. 
 
6.3.1 Why Alibaba?  
  According to the interviews, dissatisfying monetization effect and pressures from 
the capital market and competitors are major problems that force Sina Weibo to tie up 
with Alibaba in order to seek new streams of revenue in booming e-commerce market. 
One respondent from Sina Weibo’s Commercial Product Department explained:  
Although Weibo now only contributes a small portion of Sina’s total revenue, as the 
era of portal websites has faded, Weibo may be almost the only product that can 
support the company’s future earnings. In fact, as far as the capital market is 
concerned, Weibo is Sina. However, neither the fee-based services for ordinary 
users, such as Weibo ID and the value-added services, nor those for the business 
customers, such as Fen Si Tong, have achieved good effects. This has greatly 
discouraged the momentum of Weibo’s monetization. The unfavorable monetization 
process has increased the pressure of the capital market’s investment on Sina. The 
realizable value of Weibo has been questioned and undervalued, and the investors 
have begun to lose patience with Sina Weibo. At such times, Sina has no choice but 
to partner with a Alibaba. 
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  According to a statement issued by Sina’s CEO Charles Chao, Sina regards 
e-commerce as key in building an eco-system around Weibo’s open platform 
(Sina.com, 2013d). In fact, one of Weibo’s major attempts of monetization is the 
self-service advertising system. If Sina wants to make money from this system, what 
it needs is to attract advertising from large amounts of customers of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and this is what Alibaba possesses. Meanwhile, 
Alibaba can also provide the payment channel (i.e., Alipay) that Weibo’s 
monetization needs. Besides, an archival report of the Wall Street Journal also 
showed that investors generally believe that Weibo will be more valuable as a 
platform for e-commerce than simply as a platform for Chinese people to vent their 
opinions (Chin, 2013). 
  Regarding the advantages for Alibaba, most of the interviewees from Sina believed 
that the investment on Weibo can help Alibaba push into the social networking sector, 
which allows millions of merchants on Alibaba leverage on Weibo as a customer 
relationship management platform to interact with current and future customers, 
conduct online marketing campaigns and process Weibo payment. Therefore, the 
collaboration is a win-win for Sina Weibo and Alibaba, and the two companies will 
together explore opportunities in social commerce market in China, according to the 
statement of Charles Chao (Sina.com, 2013g).  
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6.3.2 Integration of the two platforms 
  A respondent from Weibo’s Commercial Product Department well summarized that 
the cooperation beween Weibo and Alibaba in social commerce is mainly developed 
in the following areas: 1) integrating the account systems of Weibo and Taobao (the 
consumer-to-consumer online shopping site of Alibaba) to enable the users of these 
two services to have one universal sign-in; 2) integrating Weibo’s plug-in with 
Taobao’s plug-in so that Weibo users can like and share product links of Taobao on 
Weibo; 3) integrating Weibo Wallet and Alipay in order to make Alipay the top 
priority of third-party payment when Weibo users pay with Weibo Wallet; 4) 
integrating advertising across the two platforms.  
  The partnership with Alibaba has greatly accelerated the pace of building an open 
commercial platform on Weibo. An interviewee, who is a senior manager of Weibo’s 
Commercial Product Department, mentioned that building an open commercial 
platform can provide a low-threshold marketing system for all the e-commerce 
enterprises, especially for SMEs, which have been regarded as the important support 
for the monetization of Weibo. He mentioned Enterprise Weibo as an example of 
Sina’s effort in building an open commercial platform. Any companies can open free 
enterprise Weibo accounts to gather and distribute information, build brand awareness, 
and engage with other users on Weibo. Enterprise Weibo is appealing, especially to 
SMEs, due to its low threshold for businesses to do online marketing. 
  An interviewee employed as senior editor in the Operational Department of Sina 
admitted that ever since mid-2013, employees of Sina are no longer required to 
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recommend Weibo to individual users (both ordinary users and celebrity users) in 
their daily work as before; instead, they are required to promote Enterprise Weibo to 
business users, especially those small and medium businesses.  
  By teaming up with Alibaba, Sina Weibo is aiming to construct an open 
commercial platform, providing conveniences to online merchants who do business 
on Weibo. “Attracting SMEs to advertise on Weibo is actually the long-tail marketing 
strategy. Each advertiser pays little money but the total quantity is large”, another 
employee from the Operational Department explained.  
 
6.3.3 Interests brought by the alliance 
  The monetized effect of Weibo’s alliance with Alibaba has quickly emerged. 
According to Sina’s income report of the forth quarter of 2013, the revenue of Weibo 
increased 151% to US$71.4 million, and the revenue contributed by Alibaba reached 
US$23.5 million, accounting for 33% of Weibo’s total revenue (Sina.com, 2013e). 
The financial results of 2013 show that Weibo’s ad revenue growth in 2013 was 
especially pushed higher due to the advertisements brought by Alibaba, achieving a 
186% jump from the previous year. It’s worth noting that Weibo recorded an 
operating profit of US$3 million for the first time in the forth quarter of 2013.  
  The construction of payment system under the help of Alibaba has attracted more 
active users to Weibo to some degree. An interviewee specialized in Weibo product 
promotion raised an example of the “2015 Let Red Envelope Fly” campaign jointly 
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launched by Weibo and Alipay during the 2015 Chinese New Year. 5490,000 virtual 
cash red envelopes were given away on Weibo within eight hours on February 2, 
2015. Weibo users who get a red envelope can withdraw cash and transfer to their 
associated Alipay accounts. She emphasized that the number of daily active Weibo 
users surpassed one hundred million twice during the 2015 Chinese New Year, an 
increase of 46% from the previous year, largely due to the red envelope campaign.  
  Besides, the partnership with Alibaba also accelerated the listing of Weibo. In April 
2014, Weibo began trading publicly in Nasdaq, and Alibaba increased its holding in 
Weibo to 32%. A senior product manager from Weibo commented: “Weibo recorded 
its first net revenue in the end of 2013 with the support of Alibaba. It is significant for 
a successful IPO of Weibo since it gives a signal to capital market and investors that 
Weibo is capable of making profit. It is no exaggeration to say that Alibaba is the 
direct driving force of Weibo’s listing.”  
 
6.3.4 A chess piece of Alibaba? 
  Though the alliance has been established, the exact result cannot always be 
completely controlled. Besides the interests mentioned above, there are also negative 
results generated by the partnership.  
  Many interviewees from both Sina and other social media companies agreed that 
behind the seemingly win-win alliance, Alibaba is the biggest winner and Weibo has 
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been taken as an important piece of Alibaba’s social media strategy, as well as a 
wining card for Alibaba to compete with its rivals. 
  The e-commerce giant Alibaba has been interested in becoming more social for 
some time, as evidenced in its previous investment in Chinese chat app Momo and its 
acquisition of music-streaming service Xiami in 2012. A respondent from Weibo’s 
Commercial Product Department discussed the advantages Alibaba can benefit from: 
Weibo has a huge amount of users who spend much time on the platform and also 
possesses a massive database of all its users’ demographic information, interests and 
behaviors, which are all what Alibaba needs to optimize marketing and maximize 
sales. 
  He also reminded me of a fact that before Weibo’s IPO, Alibaba increased its stake 
in the company to 32%. “I think this indicates Alibaba’s strong desire to increase its 
presence on social media in China,” as this respondent argued.  
 
6.3.4.1 Exclusive partnership 
  Another employee from the Operational Department of Sina viewed this alliance 
from a different perspective. She believed that Alibaba wants to leverage its 
partnership with Weibo to attack its rising e-commerce rivals in China such as 
Jingdong, which recently teamed up with Tencent WeChat to enhance its mobile 
presence. 
  Although both Alibaba and Sina claim that the former will not interfere in the 
operation of Weibo, the alliance between the two companies is essentially an 
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exclusive partnership. According to the information provided by two interviewees 
from the Operational Department of Sina, Weibo has made some concessions in 
cooperation with other e-commerce platforms. Before Weibo partners with Alibaba, 
any independent e-commerce platforms could conduct activities like sales promotion 
and marketing on Weibo. After Alibaba invests in Weibo, most of the e-commerce 
platforms have stopped their cooperation with Weibo. For example, in August 2013, 
Jingdong, the second largest shopping site in China, stopped its cooperation with Sina 
Weibo and users could not use their Weibo accounts to log in Jingdong anymore.  
  In this case, Alibaba has leveraged its exclusive partnership with Weibo to clear up 
its competitors and monopolize Weibo in the era of e-commerce business. There is no 
doubt that Alibaba is the biggest beneficiary. However, for Sina Weibo, the situation 
is different. As the second largest e-commerce giant, Jingdong should have been 
Sina’s cooperative partner other than rival. With the establishment of alliance with 
Alibaba, Sina has lost a great number of former commercial partners, especially in 
e-commerce area. It is actually not a good thing for Weibo users because the users 
have fewer options than before.  
 
6.4.3.2 Trapped in the battle between Alibaba and Tencent 
  Another noticeable point, which was emphasized by many interviewees, is that 
Alibaba’s fundamental purpose of helping Weibo establish its online payment system 
is to better compete with another Chinese online giant Tencent, whose mobile 
messaging service WeChat has launched WeChat Payment and struggled to gain 
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ground under the dominance of Alipay. A respondent, who is a product manager from 
Tencent, argued: 
In fact, the competition between Alibaba and Tencent has lasted for several years. 
Though Sina gets some benefits from Alibaba’s attack on WeChat, I would say that 
Weibo has fallen under the control of Alibaba to some degree by being utilized as an 
instrument for Alibaba to compete with Tencent. 
  As I observed, throughout the battle between the two online giants, Alibaba and 
Tencent, in recent two years, a lot of evidence can be found to support this 
interviewee’s argument. Alibaba has obviously escalated the fight with Tencent since 
2013 because of its teaming up with Weibo. In mid 2013, before WeChat launched its 
5.0 version which would add new features to better support in-app shopping, Alibaba 
blocked its Taobao sellers from subscribing to marketing and promoting apps linked 
with WeChat. As a support to its partner Alibaba, Weibo temporarily blocked its users 
from sharing Weibo content to the platform of WeChat. Subsequently, in 2014, 
Alibaba cut all the links between Taobao, Alipay and WeChat. As the battle between 
Alibaba and WeChat escalated, Sina Weibo banned its users from disseminating 
WeChat QR (quick response) codes on its platform. In February 2015, Tencent cut 
links between WeChat and Alipay and Xiami as a strong response to the banning 
from Alibaba. Now, Weibo allows its users to share Weibo posts to their WeChat 
friends, but WeChat still forbids its users to share the content of WeChat subscription 
accounts to Weibo.  
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  A senior designer from the User Research & Experience Design Center (UDC) of 
Sina Weibo said that they often receive users’ complaints and inquiries about why 
they can neither share WeChat content to Weibo nor Weibo content to WeChat in 
well-organized format. This designer commented: “China’s two biggest social media 
platforms do not support their users to share content across platforms. This sounds 
really unreasonable for ordinary Weibo and WeChat users. It does bring 
inconvenience for the users.” 
  Although the alliance has made Sina Weibo much more visible in international 
capital market, Sina Weibo is actually playing second fiddle in the battle between 
Alibaba and Tencent. This is not really a win-win situation. The stage still belongs to 
these powerful Internet giants.  
 
6.4 Conflicts and Problems in Weibo’s Monetization 
With the support of Alibaba, Weibo has greatly accelerated the pace of monetization. 
Being utilized as an instrument of Internet giant is a critical problem in Sina Weibo’s 
pursuit of monetization. However, the problems in monetization are much more than 
this.  
 
6.4.1 Excessive advertising and conflicts with users 
  Whether conducting monetization by itself or teaming up with Alibaba, user 
experience is one of the key issues that Weibo cannot avoid. Weibo’s monetization 
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requires a high volume of advertising displays. After partnering with Alibaba, more 
advertising spaces have appeared on Weibo. Although Sina believes that the building 
of an open commercial platform will attract more potential users to Weibo, its 
existing users have felt disgusted at the excess amount of commercial advertising.    
  According to the data collected during my online participant observation in Weibo, 
promoted advertising in users’ information feeds, private messages and trending lists 
in the discovery channel10 receive most loathing from Weibo users. Many users have 
posted complaints about the commercial advertising on Weibo. For instance, one 
active Weibo user with 426 followers and the “Weibo age” of six years posted 
(Ayako_Yaer, 2013):  
Sina, can you be worse? Why does the post published by an enterprise account that I 
don’t follow appear in the information feeds on my homepage? What I hate most are 
such commercial advertising posts! Never appear again! I get angry! 
  Another highly active Weibo user with 375 followers and a “Weibo age” for five 
years wrote (Huaidanyaoxuehao, 2015): 
Sina is depraved. I used to read the hot news and explore new things on the trending 
lists every day. Now when I open the list of “Hot Posts”, I can only see plenty of 
insignificant posts and embedded ads. Weibo will eventually go out of business if 
they continue doing like this. 
  Another complaint from users is that their posts are often forwarded or commented 
by advertising accounts. An increasing number of celebrity accounts and significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Weibo’s discovery channel contains the most popular feeds that are aggregated by category, which enjoys high 
hits. 
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grassroots accounts also have started posting advertisement in their daily posts. Ning 
Xiaole, who is an Internet observer and used to be a Weibo user, described the 
proliferation of display ads on Weibo’s user interface as the “plague of locusts”, 
which is also the reason why she stopped using Weibo (Ning, 2014). An interviewee 
employed as senior designer from the User Research & Experience Design Center 
(UDC) of Sina Weibo said that they had received thousands of user complaints since 
they started to test promoted feeds advertising at the end of 2012, and he also 
admitted that in recent two years, a portion of users stopped using Weibo because 
they found advertisements distracting. 
  A popular microblogger under contract with Sina Weibo with over 260,000 
followers argued that it was not hard to understand why users showed great antipathy 
towards promoted advertising on Weibo. In his reply to my interview questions via 
private messaging on Weibo, he explained:  
People visit online shopping sites such as Taobao usually with a clear consumption 
intention, so they are not annoyed by the promotions, but receptive to them. 
However, things are different on social networking sites such as Weibo and WeChat. 
Obtaining information and maintaining friendships are the main purposes for Weibo 
users. Unless they have intent to consume, they will find promotions a nuisance. 
  Weibo’s current advertising model is at the expense of user experience to some 
degree. However, “a social network platform without a satisfactory user experience is 
unlikely to sustain its network effect over the long term,” as an investment analyst 
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two years may support this view. A former product manager of Sina, who is now 
working for Baidu, described Weibo’s monetization well:   
Sina Weibo has got trapped in a vicious circle. After its share dropped, Sina 
accelerated the pace of monetization. However, over-commercialization has led to 
the decline of user experience and user traffic, and thus the monetization of its 
products and services may be delayed, which will eventually affect Weibo’s 
performance in the stock market. 
  In fact, after Weibo’s IPO, its shares failed to provide an explosive growth as many 
people had expected to see. Weibo’s share price remains stagnant since its debut with 
a 49-week range from US$12.50 to US$24.34, and stood at US$12.50 per share on 
January 15, 2015 with a comparison of US$20.24 in the first day of trading (Yahoo 
Finance, 2015). Although there is no strong evidence to say that the poor stock 
performance has direct relation with Weibo’s over-commercialization, some 
observers (see Zhao, 2014; Morningstar.com, 2015) pointed out that the investors do 
have a concern over the sustainability of the company’s current profit-model.  
   
6.4.2 Chaotic product development and internal power strife 
  Another problem that came up in the pursuit of monetization is Weibo’s cluttered 
product architecture resulting, from its unclear positioning and Sina’s severe internal 
power strife.  
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  When asked how Sina positions Weibo, interviewees from Sina provided with 
different answers. Some of the interviewees believed that Sina still positions Weibo as 
a Twitter-like “public square” where users can share information, discuss and debate 
about social trends and political issues. For instance, one interviewee, who is a senior 
editor from the Operational Department of Sina, argued:  
 Although positioning as an online public platform focused on media is hard to 
generate non-advertising revenues, Weibo has attracted millions of users thanks to 
its big influence on the society. User is the relying basis for the development of an 
Internet product. So I think the top management will continue to focus on Weibo’s 
media functions in the future. One proof is that Sina values the discovery channel of 
Weibo, which leads media trends in Chinese society. 
  Some of the interviewees, however, presented an opposite answer by pointing out 
that Weibo is taking on more social features, making it more like a Facebook-like 
social networking site other than a “public square”. One respondent from Weibo’s 
Commercial Product Department said that there is no future if Sina continues 
positioning Weibo as a simple media platform. She presented an example to support 
her viewpoint. In 2012, Sina Weibo proposed its plan aiming at constructing a “social 
mapping plus interest mapping” platform, which provided users with a two-way 
communications system like Facebook. The realization of this plan requires strong 
technological capabilities especially in big data mining. “The new appointment of 
Jack Xu, who has rich experience in data mining, as the CTO of Sina, has best 
indicated Sina’s intent in doing social mapping on Weibo,” said this respondent from 
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Weibo. In 2013, a new feature was added to Weibo’s user interface called “Page”, 
which aggregates the data of users’ social interests into a page, such as hot topics, 
places, music, books, movies, etc. “This is what the top management wants Weibo to 
be”, as this respondent argued.  
  Another interviewee from the Operational Department of Sina agreed that Sina now 
tends to position Weibo as a social networking site. He particularly reminded me of 
the fact that Sina has added the function of private sharing to Weibo so that its users 
can share their views and personal lives within their friend circle and use it more like 
WeChat, and the fact that the function of voice messaging, which is the core function 
of WeChat, has also been developed and added onto Weibo. When asking about 
Sina’s motivation for these moves, he explained: 
Sina tries to integrate more social functions to Weibo to enable ordinary users to 
better make their voices heard and interact with their friends. There has always been 
an accusation that Weibo values Big Vs and celebrity users over ordinary users, and 
the voices of ordinary users are easily drowned out by the posts of Big Vs. This is 
also one of the reasons why some of the users withdrew from Weibo and migrated 
towards WeChat. 
  In addition to these two views, there are also some interviewees indicating that Sina 
is quite likely to position Weibo as a shopping recommendation site in the future, 
especially after its partnering with Alibaba. A product manager from Weibo said: 
“Nowadays, a general consensus in China’s Internet circle is that e-commerce makes 
the most money. Sina, of course, also wants to take a piece of the pie.”  
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  The different answers to the question how Sina positions Weibo from the 
employees of Sina just indicates that Sina lacks a clear strategic plan of how to 
develop Weibo. The current Weibo contains the features of Twitter, Facebook, 
WeChat and shopping recommendation sites like Pinterest. The latest PC version of 
Weibo has three columns, showing a complete profile that’s typical of a social 
network site. Actually, more products and services are pushed out and added on the 
navigation bar of Weibo in recent years, such as Weibo Charity, Weibo Radio, Weibo 
Games, Weibo Questions, Weibo Groups, Weibo Magazines, Weibo Search, Weibo 
Bar, Weibo Fans Club, etc. Although Charles Chao, the CEO of Sina, publicly 
claimed that Weibo would retain its media function as a “public square” in an 
interview via The Wall Street Journal (Mozur, 2012), plenty of commercial attempts 
in other aspects have already distracted users from this core function.  
  A former senior Weibo specialist, who is now working in a mobile live video 
stream start-up, said the fact that Sina integrated so many features to Weibo had 
implied Sina’s uncertainty and ambiguity in which profit model was suitable to 
Weibo. “‘Fighting on several fronts’ is not a smart move in fierce competition 
because the core competence of a company would be weakened,” as this former 
employee argued. A user commented (Zhihu.com, 2015):  
I think Weibo is going the wrong direction. Now it is a confused mixture with too 
many functions. At the very beginning, I chose to use Weibo mainly because it 
provided ‘fast, good, rich and controversial user-generated content’ just like Twitter. 
But now I am bothered by the complex interface and the functions that I will never 
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use. 
  A former designer from the User Research & Experience Design Center (UDC) of 
Weibo explained that currently Weibo’s confusing positioning and chaotic product 
architecture partly resulted from the conflicts among different factions and 
departments of Sina.  
  In fact, besides this former designer, there are also other interviewees from Sina 
holding the same view. An interviewee, who is in charge of a channel of Sina’s web 
portal, commented: “The corporate gene of Sina decides that plenty of problems will 
come out during Weibo’s monetization.” According to her explanation, the “gene” 
here refers that Sina is an organization with severe power strife and frequent 
adjustment of high-rank executives and organizational structure. Unlike Baidu, 
Alibaba and Tencent, whose founders are still the heart and soul of their company, 
Sina’s founder and former CEO, Wang Zhidong, was terminated from his post and 
left Sina in 2001, due to the power strife. After that, frequent changes of top 
management have plunged the whole company into a state of disunity and 
fraction-fights. “Every structural adjustment can be seen as the result of fraction fight 
and reflects the growth and decline of internal power,” as this channel chief editor 
discussed.  
  When asking about why power strife has a negative effect on Weibo’s monetization, 
the former designer from the UDC of Weibo said: 
Internal strife usually leads to internal consumption. For example, your department 
head asked you to conduct a new project last month. However, he left this 
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department next month and a new head took over. Do you still need to continue with 
this project? A lot of times the new head rejects the previous project and launches 
his or her own project. This happens fairly frequently in Sina. Every department or 
faction has its own pursuit of interests, which are all placed above the good of the 
company. If you take every product as a small company, you will understand why 
Weibo’s product architecture is in a mess and disappointed its users. Many products 
were launched but soon abandoned. For example, the product Wei Women, I had 
never heard of this product until it was taken offline. This is actually a great waste 
of financial and human resources.   
  The former channel chief editor commented that if Sina wants to make Weibo’s 
monetization go smoothly and successfully, it first needs to balance its various 
internal interests well.   
   
6.4.3 The challenge for Weibo’s independence as a public media platform  
  When Weibo started monetization, there were concerns about the risk that Weibo 
might become mouthpieces of whoever can pay and gradually lose its independence 
as a public media platform. According to the data collected during the interviews and 
my online participant observation in Weibo, as monetization progresses and 
commercial elements are increasingly introduced to this platform, some of the 
concerns turn into reality.      
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    According to the information provided by the employees of Sina and the 
observed results, there is less room on Weibo left for discussions about social and 
public events than before. Sales promotion (such as advertisements and network 
marketing) has the most posts and reposts. Jokes, videos, and entertainment gossips 
also take up a large proportion in the hottest Weibo topics. Though there are still 
many Weibo users that are interested in hot social events such as natural disasters, 
public health and political news, the volume of posts and reposts is smaller than that 
of other categories. 
  An interviewee, who is an editor in the Operational Department of Sina, 
commented that Weibo’s monetization would inevitably lead to more sales promotion 
and entertainment content which had ties with commercial benefits. Serious social 
and political content could not generate direct profits and might only get Sina into 
trouble with the authorities.   
  Weibo’s Discovery Channel is also losing its value as a window for users to get to 
know what is happening at home and abroad. The three most widely read lists in 
Discovery Channel - hottest search, hottest trending topics and hottest posts - now 
become partly tradable commodities with an offering for sale of getting on the lists. 
These three lists used to be determined by an algorithm, which was calculated based 
on the real daily search and post volume on Weibo. Now, Sina puts ads in the form of 
promoted posts and topics in these lists with the “promoted” sign appearing at the top 
left or in blue color to indicate a post or a topic as an ad. 
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  An interviewee from the Operational Department of Sina informed that if given 
enough money or strong connection, Sina could also help remove certain posts and 
topics from the lists of hottest posts and trending topics at any time behind close doors, 
which has become an increasingly important way for enterprises or celebrities to 
address online criticism. For example, Sina prevents negative news about its 
important cooperative partners and investors such as Alibaba, Baidu and China 
Mobile from spreading on Weibo as a form of protection to them. This is an unwritten 
rule and must be abided by all employees of Sina. As the interviewee indicated, even 
if the related topics are being discussed by many people on Weibo, Sina will take 
technical measures to prevent such topics from getting on the lists of hottest search, 
trending topics and hottest posts. 
  Besides, as mentioned by many interviewees from Sina, fake account is the most 
troubling problem facing Weibo. Many posts and topics can be displayed on the 
trending lists due to the continuous reposts of fake accounts. These fake accounts are 
registered to artificially propel certain topics and posts into the trending lists. Actually, 
many accounts with commercial purposes (e.g., selling products, gaining followers, 
promoting movies, etc.) are employing fake accounts to inflate their posts to be 
displayed on trending lists, thus gaining prominence as top trendsetters and being 
more visible to Weibo users. When you fill in the keywords “Weibo trending lists” 
and “promoting” in the search bar on Chinese biggest consumer-to-consumer online 
shopping site Taobao, or in search engine like Baidu, you will find the result pages 
full of sellers that provide customers with the services of creating fake trends in 
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Weibo. The average price of getting onto the list of hottest search is approximately 
US$32,200, and the price of hottest topics and hottest posts is about US$966.11 
  A product manager from Weibo’s Commercial Product Department said that these 
Taobao sellers charged lower fees for getting on trending lists than that of Sina and 
accepted all kinds of customers and content, which had caused a severe disruption to 
the normal operations of trending lists. When asking about how Sina deals with this 
problem, the manager admitted that so far an effective solution hadn’t been found yet. 
Actually, Sina already launched cleanup campaigns against fake accounts in Weibo 
for many times. However, many real accounts were banned by mistake and some fake 
accounts in good disguise escaped the cleanups. “Villains can always outsmart. 




Weakness in profitability is a general problem facing most of the Chinese social 
media business, except the three big Internet giants Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (often 
mentioned as BAT). Monetization becomes an inevitable choice for social media 
companies to sustain self-development and meet the expectation of the capital market.  
  Increasing revenue vs. preserving user experience is another dilemma for Chinese 
social media sector. If they push too far to commercialize they could worsen user 
experience and tarnish their brand. But if they don't succeed in transforming their high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The prices were acquired through the private conversation with the sellers of Taobao on July 2, 2015. 
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traffic to commercial value then it is unsustainable in the long term. The findings of 
this study show that excessive advertising and cluttered product architecture are the 
major problems occurring in the monetization, which have greatly affected user 
experience, incurred users’ antipathy and even led to a decline of user traffic. Unclear 
positioning is another problem in social media companies’ pursuit of monetization. In 
the case of Sina, Weibo has been trapped into an awkward situation due to its unclear 
positioning for a long time. It has lost some of its luster as China’s most popular 
“public square” on which users can share and exchange views; it is also not the first 
choice for Chinese people to connect with friends and families to share their personal 
lives. Besides Weibo, many other domestic social media companies are facing the 
same problems in monetization, such as the recently delisted social media company 
RenRen. 











Chapter 7 Discussions and Conclusions 
China’s media reform started from the change of the role of the state. Since the late 
1970s, Chinese state has gradually deregulated the media outlets through four 
developments of commercialization, privatization, liberalization, and 
internationalization. With the introduction of marketization, various market forces, 
including domestic and transnational investors, advertisers, sponsors and competitors, 
are involved into China’s media system. China’s new media industry was born and 
grew up with the deepening of media reform and the development of capital market 
since the late 1990s. The growing contribution of new media sector led by privately 
owned players to national economy has changed China’s media landscape, which was 
dominated by official and traditional media players. China’s new media businesses 
are transforming into a more autonomous social interest and a political force with 
potential to struggle against the state rule and influence the whole Chinese society.  
  This study has problematized the survival and development of these businesses in 
relations with the party-state, market, and Chinese public in light of two evolving 
dilemmas. One is the state-media-public dilemma -- new media companies’ obligation 
to implement censorship delegated from the state whilst meeting the needs of the 
public for free information flow. The other one is the market-media-public dilemma -- 
new media businesses’ pursuit of increasing revenue vs. preserving user experience. 
How these two dilemmas manifest themselves and how new media businesses deal 
with the dilemmas are two major issues I seek to address in this paper. Although Sina 
Weibo obviously cannot represent all new media businesses in China, some generable 
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insights and conclusive remarks may nevertheless be drawn to understand the 
dynamics and mechanisms of China’s new media business and new media system.  
 
7.1 Revisiting the State-media-public Dilemma 
Generally, submitting to political power and implementing surveillance are actually 
the best choices for Chinese new media businesses to ensure their basic commercial 
interests in China’s current political and economic environment, especially 
considering the cost of being shut down and the policy benefits that they can receive 
from the state. However, it doesn’t mean that new media entrepreneurs will 
permanently maintain such submissive relationship with the state. Minor cracks may 
emerge in the relationship when they perceive such information control as a threat to 
their material benefits. As the new media enterprises attain new growth, they have 
already recalibrated their relationship with the state.  
  Inviting the government to use social media is a good political card played by 
social media entrepreneurs, because it offers an opportunity for social media sector to 
break up the general submissive atmosphere. Social media entrepreneurs provide the 
state with a convenient and effect platform on which the party-state can propagate its 
image as benevolent protector of the nation and promote nationalism and patriotism. 
Once such beneficial relationship is established, the new media entrepreneurs will be 
more emboldened to express their economic and political demands and negotiate with 
the government on policy issues. 
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  Previous studies on the relationship between China’s new media,and the 
authoritarian information order tend to reach a conclusion that there is an uneasy 
alliance between capitalists in new media sector and state officials in charge of 
maintaining social stability (e.g., Lagerkvist, 2012). However, according to the 
findings presented in Chapter 5, I would like to argue that the relationship between 
the state and new media entrepreneurs is no longer a confrontational relation. Chinese 
new media entrepreneurs have developed their own survival philosophy in dealing 
with Chinese state’s media control. They become more tactful and clever than before, 
neither offending the state nor the public. On one hand, they pretend to contradict 
with the authorities in order to build up the image of responsible and free media in the 
eyes of the public. On the other hand, they at times go forward with the state in 
information control in order not to annoy the authorities. Besides, the state’s presence 
in social media sphere enabled by the setup and growth of government social media 
accounts has balanced the forces in the social media world by breaking up the 
monopoly of grassroots discourse and making the government’s voice heard, hence 
the risk of social media sites of being shut down is also reduced. Furthermore, it 
enables a direct conversation between the government and the public, hence social 
media companies can avoid being caught in the middle of the two sides, and the 
troubles caused by serving as an intermediary are reduced. Instead of an uneasy 
coexistence, state and new media enterprises are more likely to reach a mutually 
beneficial cooperation in information control matters. 
  Regarding the state, its attitude toward Internet has undergone a subtle change 
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during the last years. Compared with early attitude such as vigilance, suspicion, and 
confusion, the party-state becomes more confident at utilizing Internet as an 
instrument in enhancing its political legitimacy and strengthening its authoritarian 
regimes in recent years. Outsourcing responsibilities of information control to Internet 
companies is one of the core strategies adopted by the central authorities to 
incorporate Internet entrepreneurs into its ruling system. Essentially, outsourcing 
media control responsibilities to social media is a kind of decentralization of state 
power. Since the media reform in the late 1970s, Chinese government has begun to 
decentralize its control over media outlets through a series of political and economic 
methods. Therefore, it’s not surprising to see the central authorities dare to outsource 
the once centralized censorship of the media system to commercial social media 
companies. This move also reflects the state’s confidence in its long-time successful 
regulation of new media industry and in its amicable relationship with Chinese private 
enterprises and capitalists. 
  However, it doesn’t mean that the state can fully trust the new media enterprises 
and be a “hands-off boss”. In fact, the state still needs to devote a lot of energy into 
conducting censorship and dealing with the foot-dragging of new media companies in 
implementing the delegated responsibilities. With the continuous pluralizing of online 
civil society, the rise of capitalists in new media sector, and the change of state 
leadership, the party-state is also changing its online information control methods. 
Government social media accounts become an increasingly important way for the 
authorities to interact with the public, conduct online propaganda and manage social 
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conflicts. Compared with the state’s old methods of media control, being an user of 
social media and building its own influential social media accounts is a more gentle, 
nonobvious, flexible and effective way of media control. Currently, there are signs 
that Chinese security and propaganda organs are increasingly confident that they can 
handle the challenges posed by new media. Though the free speech and the fast 
dissemination of information on Internet have challenged the authoritarian 
information order, it doesn’t mean that the authoritarian regimes are undermined; 
instead, I see a possibility that the authoritarian regimes are strengthened to some 
extent because of the state’s strategic utilization of new media. 
   
7.2 Revisiting the Market-media-public Dilemma 
When thinking of Chinese new media, people tend to think about the role of the state 
in online control and media censorship. Yet Chinese new media sector was born and 
grew up in the context of market and capital. New media itself is an interest group, 
which is influenced by different political, economic and social forces. Among these 
forces, capital market plays an increasingly important role in influencing the survival 
and development of China’s new media businesses.  
  Monetization is an inevitable choice for new media businesses to meet the 
expectation of the capital market and sustain self-development. However, 
monetization usually requires a large amount of commercial elements adding to the 
new media product, such as advertising, third-party applications, and other profitable 
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elements, while users usually prefer a clean, simple and effective interface and a 
product with clear functions. Findings in Chapter 6 have shown that conflicts between 
social media providers and social media users constantly come up in the process of 
monetization. Therefore, we could see that monetization is directly driven by the 
demands of new media business and the capital market but not by the needs of users 
and social media public. 
  The findings on the second research questions the thesis poses have shown that 
excessive advertising and cluttered product architecture resulted from the unclear 
positioning and internal power strife have exerted some negative effect on user 
experience. Unlike the increasingly mature strategies and tactics adopted by social 
media entrepreneurs to balance the interests of the state and the public, so far, there is 
no obvious evidence that any effective balancing acts have been employed by new 
media entrepreneurs to address the existing conflicts between profit making and user 
experience. Most of the social media practitioners can point out the problems 
occurring in monetization; however, few professionals take them as serious problems 
that can decide the life and death of social media business. The attitude of new media 
businesses in allying with profits has implied that commercial interest is the ultimate 
motivation that drives the decisions and choices of Chinese new media sector. This 
also indicates that new media is not equal to news media. Many previous research on 
new media has confused the concept new media with news media, thus might 
misunderstand some of the phenomena emerging in China’s new media industry.  
  The combination of Internet and capital market exerts a great influence on the 
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relation between media and public in China. Although new media offer new platforms 
for speech and expression, whether they facilitate the development of public sphere 
still remains to be seen. Wu believed that the speech on public sphere should be 
formed via the cultural and intuitional construction and always adhere to truth, 
objectivity and neutrality (Wu, 2015). However, China’s new media was born and 
brought up with capital, commercial interest is the ultimate motivation that drives the 
decisions and choices of them. It is easy for them to become the mouthpieces and 
instruments of whoever can pay. The findings in Chapter 6 have shown that the 
embrace of social media and capital does not lead to freer speech; instead, advertising 
and other profit-making moves are the main factors that distract Weibo from its public 
sphere function. New media is not news media. Pursuing profits rather than 
constructing public sphere is what the new media businesses are looking for. 
Currently, almost all of the China’s media policies aim at facilitating the development 
of capital. Few policies are carried out to help construct public sphere. Media itself in 
China now has become fully commercialized under the influence of capital. Although 
new media platforms, sometimes, provide convenience for the discussions of some 
social problems, most of them are based on the consideration of social reputation. 
Besides, they are biased toward issues of the middle class rather than the issues of 
marginal and vulnerable groups. This is why Wu argued that “the more advanced the 
Internet, the less speech there will be” (Wu, 2015). In the context of traditional mass 
media, the public could be the consumers of media products, and also could be the 
citizens under control of the authorities. However, in a new media era, we could see 
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that the public is taken more as consumers who can bring commercial interests than 
citizens who can promote democracy. The prevalence of consumerism, instead of the 
promotion of free speech, is the biggest impact of Internet to contemporary Chinese 
society. So what kills social media’s “public sphere function”? It is not the state’s 
clampdown, but more like a conspired murder by capital market and social media 
providers. 
 
7.3 A More Complicated and Dynamic Media System 
In a new media era, Chinese leaders seem to be more convinced that they have 
discovered the formula for political survival: a one-party regime that embraces 
capitalism and globalization. Internet is the best instrument that can help Chinese state 
adapt to fulfill globalization and capitalism, since it is the fastest growing sector in 
China, as well as the industry that is easy to generate global influences. This is the 
fundamental reason why Chinese state spares no effort to support new media industry. 
Simultaneously, however, the state is always trying to prohibit new media capitalists 
from becoming autonomous political force to oppose the rule of the state. Therefore, 
control policies toward new media always exist. 
  Now the Chinese state’s confusing Internet policies and the political implications of 
new media are still the chief concerns for most of the investors, especially for those 
oversea investors. However, the findings of this study have implied that in the eyes of 
these new media entrepreneurs, they would see their impact primarily in terms of 
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contributing to the development of national economy rather than affecting Chinese 
political system. It is evident that Weibo has less political discussions and more 
non-political posts than before in recent two years. Most people believe that Sina 
Weibo’s public sphere function has declined because of the government clampdown. 
However, my findings have suggested that it is also an active and natural choice of 
the social media company itself. Compared with playing politics, they care more 
about how to make profits safely. This comes back again to my argument that 
commercial interest is the ultimate motivation that drives the decisions and choices of 
Chinese privately owned new media companies. If we look at the whole picture at a 
macroeconomic level, we will find that the primary purpose of new media 
entrepreneurs in profit-making and self-development is actually in accordance with 
the long-term goal of the Chinese state in promoting the ICT industry and helping 
domestic ICT companies succeed at the global level.  
  Now we come back to the hybrid model of authoritarianism and capitalism 
discussed in Chapter 2. This model is officially defined as “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”, and aims at mobilizing all kinds of market forces but restraining their 
potential political influences at the same time. This model integrating both political 
and economic powers is generally utilized to understand China’s media system since 
the media reform. In the new media context, this model still applies. China’s new 
media sector is still under the guidance of the government that emphasizes both 
economic growth and information control. However, there are new trends. With a 
more decentralized media ownership system, the intertwining of various structural 
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forces is much more powerful and complicated than before, and the boundaries 
between political power and economic power become blurred. Many political means 
taken by the state on new media have generated economic implications in new media 
market. Multifaceted roles have been taken on by the state according to the findings 
of this research. The role of the state in interaction with new media sector is far more 
than a regulator or a supervisor, as most of the political economists of communciation 
regarded in liberal democracies (e.g., Mosco, 2009). The state can also be regarded as 
a consumer of new media and even a real market player to compete for profits in new 
media market. These changes have all complicated the political and economic 
situation facing Chinese new media sector.  
  Chinese media system needs to be redefined. A more complicated view needs to be 
taken on the dynamics and mechanisms of new media sector. Compared with the 
media system led by traditional mass media, a more complicated and dynamic media 
system is forming with the growing significance of privately owned new media forces. 
In this media system, the Chinese new media business has to invent new forms of 
operation as part of a self-preservation strategy, which are different from that of 
traditional mass media organizations, in order to maintain their complicated 
relationship with state, market and public. 
 
7.4 Avenues for Future Research 
In recent two years, China’s whole new media industry has stepped into an era of “big 
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capital”. Small and medium-sized new media enterprises start coming to stronger and 
bigger capital to obtain more resources and money, and survive in fierce market 
competition. Big new media giants keep investing in, merging and acquiring small 
and medium-sized Internet enterprises to sustain continuous self-growth. The case of 
the alliance between Sina Weibo and Alibaba analyzed in this thesis is one of the 
examples. Besides, there are a series of mergers and acquisitions in China’s Internet 
sector since 2012. In November 2015, Alibaba completed its acquisition of one of 
China’s biggest video sites Youku-Tudou (Steele, 2015). In May 2013, Baidu 
acquired streaming video service PPS to merge with iQiyi, Baidu’s video platform, in 
order to build up a larger video platform in China (Custer, 2013). In September 2013, 
Tencent invested $448 million to merge Sogou with its search engine SoSo (Hong, 
2013). In October 2015, Groupon type of website Meituan that is partly owned by 
Alibaba and consumer review website Dianping which is backed by Tencent agreed 
to a merger (Tsang, 2015). There are too many examples to list out here.  
  Now China’s new media is divided into three powerful kingdoms: Baidu, Alibaba 
and Tencent. These three groups, collectively known as BAT, just like GAFA 
(Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon), have always been in war on many issues. In the 
past, Chinese Internet experienced years of tangled warfare. Different new media 
companies fought for their own interests. Some even involved into vicious 
competitions. When it comes to the era of BAT, new media companies have begun to 
work together for survival, seeking the enhancement of competitiveness. To some 
extent, BAT has helped reduce the internal conflicts of Chinese new media sector. 
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Under the dominance of BAT, China’s Internet now increasingly becomes a liberating 
force that is unleashing entrepreneurial energy. It brings market forces into different 
aspects of the national economy. Moreover, it expands the role of the private sector at 
the expense of entrenched China’s state-owned enterprises.  
  In fact, BAT companies have turned much of China’s media landscape upside 
down in just a few short years. According to latest statistics, WeChat and Weibo have 
monopolized China’s news distribution market, leaving only 3% market share to 
traditional newspaper, radio and television (Cai, 2015). In the first three quarters of 
2015, China’s newspaper suffered a 34.5% decline in advertising income, as most of 
the advertisers are drawn to high-traffic new media platforms, such as WeChat and 
Weibo (Sina.com, 2015). In 2015, several Chinese metropolitan newspapers ceased 
publication, including the 30-year-old Shanghai Business. Many observers (see Cai, 
2015) predict that challenged by new media, most state-owned press groups will 
reduce their marketized spin-offs in the coming years, and the party newspaper may 
receive complete subsidies from the state again. Now, the biggest competitor of 
state-owned media groups is the Internet led by BAT. In fact, some of the 
forward-looking traditional media groups have already sought cooperation with BAT 
companies. In 2015, Alibaba invested in SMG’s (Shanghai Media Group) financial 
media company China Business News. Alibaba and SMG claimed that they would 
work toward enhancing Internet and traditional media convergence through the 
launch of innovative new media products (Coonan, 2015). This is only a beginning. In 
the age of “Internet plus capital”, more and more state-owned media have to bow to 
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capitals if they want to sustain development.  
  Considering all the new trends in China’s new media industry, I would like to 
invite more studies to gain insights into the “big capital” era of China’s new media. 
How does the dominance of BAT change the power game of Chinese Internet? How 
do the mergers and acquisitions show the power of China’s new media giants over 
China’s Internet development? How does the embrace of Internet and capital affect 
China’s traditional media outlets? 
 
7.5 Limitations of the Study 
Although this research was carefully prepared, I am still aware of some limitations in 
research design and methodology that impacted the findings and conclusions of my 
research.  
  First, there was a lack of prior research and literatures on the topic of my study. So 
far, only a few academic studies have taken the behaviors of China’s new media 
businesses into accounts to see the role of new media in Chinese society with a 
political economy approach of communication. Among these studies, most of them 
focused on the state-media-public relation, and almost no one presents a 
comprehensive work on how a new media business operates in relation with state, 
market and public. The lack of prior research studies on the topic has made it difficult 
for me to form the basis of my literature review and lay the foundation for 
understanding the research problems I am investigating. To bridge this gap in the 
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research literature, I invite more studies to gain insights into the values, perspectives, 
strategies and practices of new media business to further unpack various aspects of 
the relationship between state, market, public and new media businesses. 
  The second limitation is the constraints in generalizability. Considering the time to 
conduct ethnographic fieldwork, Sina Weibo was taken as the only research object in 
this study. Findings about how China’s new media businesses survive and develop are 
drawn based on the ethnographic fieldwork in Sina Weibo. Although Sina Weibo has 
some representativeness, it certainly cannot be seen as the whole new media business 
of China. One problem generated from this is that the conclusions of a broader 
context of China’s new media business was drawn on the basis of findings in a 
specific context of Sina Weibo. Studying a single case of Sina Weibo was not 
sufficient as a way of fully understanding all types of Chinese new media businesses. 
Therefore, there was a limitation in the applicable scope of my conclusion for 
understanding the practices of China’s new media industry. To generalize the findings 
for the whole Chinese new media sector, more new media companies should be 
included. Thus, I would like to invite further investigations and research studies that 
can include more Chinese new media companies with different characteristics, 
including both big Internet giants like BAT and start-ups, to draw a more 
comprehensive picture of China’s new media landscape. 
  Another limitation of this study lies in my inability to access to the top 
management of new media companies. One of the core methods of this study is the 
in-depth interview with social media practitioners. Most of the interviewees were 
175	  
senior and junior employees based on my personal contacts. However, because of 
limited contacts, I failed to interview top management of new media companies. 
Without the first-hand information and opinions provided by key new media 
entrepreneurs, some of the motivations and intentions behind the moves of new media 
companies may not be fully understood. Researchers who have acquaintances within 
the Chinese Internet industry can include new media entrepreneurs as interviewees to 
better understand the decisions and choices of Chinese new media businesses.  
  Next, I suppose that my previous work experience in Sina may lead to my 
ignorance of some of the basic issues about China’s new media industry, and thus 
influence the design of interview questions. Furthermore, many interviewees were my 
acquaintances who have knowledge of my work experience in new media industry, 
and thus some of the interviewees’ responses might be affected. For example, I found 
that several interviewees skipped or missed some very important details about Sina, 
because they supposed that I had already known about this. Though I had told them in 
advance not to treat me as a former employee, the negative influence could not be 
completely avoided. 
  Besides, I should also have included more questions of the impact of transnational 
capital on Chinese new media companies in the in-depth interviews, especially on 
how new media industry and transnational capital interact with each other and the 
political and economic implications that may lead to significant transformations in 
China. This is important for a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
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between Internet companies and capital market, and the relationship between Chinese 
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